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PIVOTAL  BATTLE 


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lit     ilii 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Class 


GETTYSBURG 

THE  PIVOTAL  BATTLE  OF  THE 
CIVIL  WAR 


MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  G.  MEADE 
Com.  Army  of  the  Potomac,  June,  18G3  —  June,  1805 


GETTYSBURG 

THE  PIVOTAL  BATTLE  OF  THE 
CIVIL  WAR 

BY 

CAPTAIN  R.  K.  BEECHAM 

OF  THE  FIRST  BRIGADE,  FIRST  DIVISION,  FIRST  CORPS. 
ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS  AND  MAP 


CHICAGO 

A.  C.  McCLURG  &  CO. 
1911 


Copyright 

A.  C.  McCLURG  &  CO. 
1911 

Published  April,  1911 


The  views  of  Gettysburg  given  in  this  volume  are  from  photographs 
from  the  extensive  collection  of  W.  H.   Tipton,  Gettysburg,  Pa. 


I.  y.  IjaU  Printing  (gampang 

<£liiraiju' 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

1 

II 
III 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

VIII 

IX 

X 

XI 

XII 

XIII 

XIV 

XV 

XVI 

XVII 

XVIII 

XIX 

XX 

XXI 

XXII 
XXIII 
XXIV 


PAGE 

THE  VETERAN'S  MECCA         ...       •       •  9 

THE  WAR  AND  ITS  SLOW  PROGRESS  •  •  •  15 
A  GLANCE  AT  THE  CAMPAIGNS  LEADING  UP  TO 

GETTYSBURG       •        •        •  •       • 

COMPARATIVE  STRENGTH  OF  THE  ARMIES  •        •  27 

A  PECULIAR  FEATURE  OF  THE  BATTLE      •        •  36 

THE  ORDER  OF  GOING  INTO  BATTLE         •        •  47 

THE  MEETING  OF  THE  WAYS  54 

JULY  FIRST,    1863          • 60 

HOWARD  IN  COMMAND 74 

WHAT  WE  SAW  FROM  SEMINARY  RIDGE     •        .  86 

LEE  AND  HIS  MISTAKES         •       •       •       •        •  97 

REYNOLDS •       •        -112 

MEADE'S  STRATEGY •  127 

LINES    WHICH    WERE    AND    LlNES  WHICH  WERE 

NOT  FORMED      •        •        •        •       •        •        •  140 

SICKLES'  SALIENT  •  •  •;  •  •  •  •  152 

PEACH  ORCHARD 164 

THE  WHIRLPOOL  OF  BATTLE  •  •  •  •  174 
LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  AND  THE  BLOODY  SUNSET 

HOUR 185 

CEMETERY  HILL  AND  GULP'S  HILL  •  •  -196 

THE  NIGHT  AND  THE  COUNCIL  •  206 

SLOCUM'S  BATTLE  AND  STUART'S  DEFEAT  •  215 

THE  GREAT  CANNONADE  •  •  •  •  •  224 

PICKETT'S  CHARGE  ..«•••  233 

GETTYSBURG  TO  APPOMATTOX  ....  248 


225235 


CONTENTS  —  Continued 

XXV     THE  UMBRELLA  GROVE  AND  THE  FIRST  MINNE 
SOTA     258 

XXVI     THE  "BLOODY  ANGLE"  AND  THE  "HiGH  TIDE"     262 

APPENDIX 

THE  TOWERS  OF  GETTYSBURG       •       •       •       •     271 
THE  NATIONAL  CEMETERY  AND  PARK         •       •     279 
LINCOLN'S  GETTYSBURG  ADDRESS  AT  THE  DEDI 
CATION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  CEMETERY,  NO 
VEMBER  19,   1863     •        •       •    .  .  •       •       •     287 

INDEX        •       • 291 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


PAGE 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  G.  MEADE      .   Frontispiece 

RELIEF  MAP  OF  GETTYSBURG  BATTLEFIELD        .         .  9 

VIEW  OF  CITY  OF  GETTYSBURG             .         .         .         .  10 

PORTRAIT  OF  CAPTAIN  R.  K.  BEECHAM     .         .         .  11 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  H.  W.  HALLECK        .         .  18 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN     .  19 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  AMBROSE   E.   BURNSIDE       .  24 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  JOSEPH    HOOKER         .         .  25 

PORTRAIT  OF  LIEUT.-GEN.  J.  E.  B.  STUART     ...        .  38 

PORTRAIT  OF  LIEUT.-GEN.  R.  S.  Ewell     ...       .         .  39 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN    BUFORD             .         .  50 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  HARRY   HETH    .         .         .  51 

PORTRAIT  OF  COL.  WILLIAM  GAMBLE          ...  61 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  F.  REYNOLDS     .         .  62 

REYNOLDS'  WOODS 63 

PORTRAIT  OF  CAPTAIN  CHAS.  C.  Dow        .         .         .  66 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  J.  J.  ARCHER    .         .         .  67 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD    .         .  76 

LUTHERAN  SEMINARY         *        .                  .         *         .  77 

BATTLE-FLAG  OF  THE  2o  WISCONSIN  INFANTRY          .   "  88 

MCPHERSON'S   FARM           .         .         .         .       f.         .  89 

EAST  CEMETERY   HILL      .   .      ,     ,   .         .         .         .  89 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  F.  C.  BARLOW     ...  90 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  ABNER   DOUBLEDAY    .         .  94 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  CARL  SCHURZ     ...  95 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PORTRAIT  OF  GEN.  ROBERT  E.  LEE           ...  98 

PORTRAIT  OF  LIEUT.-GEN.  JAMES  LONGSTREET           .  99 

GENERAL  HEADERS  HEADQUARTERS     .         .         .         .  130 

GENERAL  LEE'S  HEADQUARTERS          ^        r   i  T  •         *  ^® 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  WINFIELD  SCOTT  HANCOCK  131 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM    .         .  136 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  DANIEL  E.  SICKLES    .        ."  137 

THE  PEACH  ORCHARD        .         .         .         .        V        .  166 

THE    LOOP          .         .         .         .         .         .  '      .         .  167 

BATTLEFIELD  FROM  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  LOOKING  NORTH  178 
BATTLEFIELD  FROM  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  LOOKING  NORTH 
WEST      .        .         •".',•         •         •         •         r         •  1^8 

THE  WHEATFIELD      .         .         .       %•'.•'**.       ".      '  .  179 

GULP'S  HILL      .         .         .         .         .*."      .        \         .  179 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  G.  K.  WARREN    .         .         .   "  186 

FRONT  OF  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP  AND  WARREN  STATUE  .  187 

BATTLEFIELD  FROM  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  LOOKING  WEST  188 

LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  FROM  DEVIL'S  DEN     .         1         .  189 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE    SYKES            .         .  192 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  SEDGWICK          .         .'  193 

SPANGLER'S   SPRING            .  .       .         .         .         '•         •  202 

SECOND  MARYLAND,  CONFEDERATE,  MONUMENT           .  203 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  DAVID  McM.  GREGG          .  222 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  GEORGE  A.  CUSTER     .         .  223 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  E.  P.  ALEXANDER    '.'       .  226 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  HENRY  J.  HUNT     '  .         .  227 

PORTRAIT  OF  MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  E.  PICKETT   .         .  234. 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  J.  J.  PETTIGREW        .         .  235 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  R.  B.  GARNETT        '   .     "  .  238 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  J.  L.  KEMPER    .         .         •  239 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  LEWIS  A.  ARMISTEAD          .'  244 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

HIGH  WATER  MARK  OF  PICKETT'S  CHARGE          .         .  245 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  JUDSON    KILPATRICK  .  246 

PORTRAIT  OF  BRIG.-GEN.  ELON  J.  FARNSWORTH        .  247 

FIRST  MINNESOTA  INFANTRY  SHAFT  .         •         .  260 

SECOND  WISCONSIN  INFANTRY  MONUMENT         .         .  261 

THE  BLOODY  ANGLE 264 

ANOTHER  VIEW  OF  THE  BLOODY  ANGLE     .         .         .  265 

MONUMENT  TO  OUSTER'S  CAVALRY  BRIGADE        .         .  270 

GENERAL  VIEW  OF  BATTLEFIELD        .         .         .         .  271 

EAST  CEMETERY  HILL        ......  278 

SCENE  OF  CAVALRY  FIGHT,  THIRD  DAY     .         .         .  278 

THE  NATIONAL  CEMETERY 279 


GETTYSBURG 

THE   PIVOTAL    BATTLE    OF 
THE    CIVIL   WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  VETERAN'S  MECCA 

T  N  the  month  of  May  and  in  the  last  year  of  the 
-*-  nineteenth  century,  an  old  man,  dusty  and 
travel-stained,  changed  cars  at  Hagerstown,  Mary 
land,  and  rode  northeastward  over  a  spur  of  the 
Blue  Ridge  Range,  called  the  South  Mountain. 
The  old  man  wore  a  small  bronze  button  in  the 

V 

lapel  of  his  coat,  and  from  that,  with  other  personal 
characteristics,  it  was  plain  that  he  was  an  ex- 
Union  soldier  of  the  great  American  Civil  War. 
He  was  wonderfully  interested  in  observing  the  face 
of  the  country,  and  his  interest  increased  as  the 


GETTYSBURG 

train  crossed  the  State  line  into  Pennsylvania.  He 
seemed  to  be  watching  for  some  familiar  landmark. 

Shortly  after  crossing  the  State  line  the  train 
turned  eastward,  and  a  few  minutes  later  crossed 
a  creek  or  run,  beyond  which,  to  the  north  side  of 
the  track,  stood  a  bronze  equestrian  statue,  with  a 
long  line  of  granite  monuments  extending  to  the 
northeast,  while  to  the  southward  of  the  track  the 
same  line  of  monuments  continued,  apparently 
without  limit. 

As  the  train  passed  through  the  line  of  monu 
ments  the  old  soldier  watched  them  from  the  car 
windows  with  an  eager  eye,  and  carefully  noted  the 
lay  of  the  land  on  either  side,  as  if  the  hills  and  val 
leys  were  the  familiar  haunts  of  his  boyhood. 

Then  the  train  ran  through  a  deep  cut  across  a 
high  ridge,  coming  out  on  the  eastern  side  into  a 
beautiful  valley,  across  which,  from  west  to  east, 
extended  a  continuation  of  the  line  of  monuments 
intersected  by  the  railroad  on  the  west  side  of  the 
ridge;  and  a  moment  later,  as  the  train  drew  up  to 
the  station  in  the  outskirts  of  the  fair  city  that 
nestled  peacefully  among  the  green  hills  of  Penn- 

[10] 


CAPTAIN  R.  K.  BBECHAM 

(From    a    irar-t'unc    i)itoto(/rai)ltj 


GETTYSBURG 

sylvania,  the  brakeman    called    aloud  —  "Gettys 
burg!" 

At  this  point  our  traveller  left  the  train.  He  was 
a  Gettysburg  veteran,  returning  after  many  years 
to  revisit  the  city  and  sojourn  for  a  season  among 
the  fields  where  the  life  of  the  United  States  of 
America  was  saved,  and  where  as  a  young  man  of 
twenty-five,  he  had  fought  in  defence  of  the  Old 
Flag  and  for  the  perpetuation  of  the  Union. 

In  1863,  until  after  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  was 
fought  and  won,  the  United  States  of  America  was 
looked  upon  by  the  nations  of  Europe  as  in  the  last 
throes  of  national  dissolution,  and  "  Bull-Run  Rus 
sell's  "  statement,  thundered  forth  through  the  Lon 
don  Times,  "  The  foundation  stones  of  the  young 
American  Republic  are  falling  to  pieces, "  was  taken 
by  the  world  at  large  as  literally  true. 

There  were  then  within  and  without  the  American 
Union  thirty-five  States,  —  including  West  Vir 
ginia,  which  was  admitted  into  the  Union  in  1863, 
— but  of  these  thirty-five  States,  eleven  had  seceded 
from  the  Union  and  were  then  in  open  rebellion, 

In] 


GETTYSBURG 

waging  a  war  of  awful  bitterness  for  what  they 
termed  their  "freedom  from  oppression";  and  by 
all  that  was  good  and  great  they  had  vowed  that 
neither  force  nor  favour  could  compel  or  induce  them 
to  return  to,  or  become  again  a  part  of,  the  hateful 
old  Union.  There  were  also  three  or  four  other 
States  very  anxious  to  follow  the  example  of  their 
wayward  sisters,  which  were  kept  within  the  Union 
only  by  the  force  of  arms.  Thus  it  becomes  evident 
that  the  men  who  fought  beneath  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  at  Gettysburg  contended  for  and  defended 
the  very  existence  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

In  making  this  pilgrimage  to  his  Mecca  the  vet 
eran  had  travelled  far,  but  though  dust-begrimed, 
he  felt  no  weariness.  He  had  started  from  the  shore 
of  Puget  Sound,  that  wonderful  inland  sea  of  the 
young  Northwest,  scarcely  known  or  heard  of  in 
the  days  of  the  Civil  War;  and  not  on  foot  did  he 
travel,  as  in  his  first  weary  march,  but  in  a  flying 
chariot,  along  the  steel  rails  that  span  the  continent, 
he  crossed  the  States  of  Washington,  Idaho,  Mon 
tana,  North  Dakota,  Minnesota,  Wisconsin,  Illinois, 

[12] 


GETTYSBURG 

Indiana,  Ohio,  West  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  into 
Pennsylvania — twelve  of  the  forty-five  States  that 
in  the  last  year  of  the  nineteenth  century  constituted 
our  great  and  matchless  American  Union.  Then, 
too,  was  our  nation  at  peace  throughout  her  borders ; 
and  not  a  single  State  of  the  whole  forty-five  wanted 
to  secede  from  the  Union,  but  all  were  contented 
and  prosperous. 

In  making  that  flying  trip,  in  a  little  less  than  five 
days,  the  old  man  crossed  the  great  mountain  ranges 
of  the  continent;  travelled  plains  where  millions  of 
cattle  pasture  and  fatten;  threaded  forests  dark  and 
deep  and  apparently  without  limit;  rode  among 
fields  that  produce  the  bread  of  the  nation;  and 
visited  cities  that  swell  and  rejoice  with  the  arts  of 
peace  and  the  onward  rush  of  civilization. 

In  his  pathway  were  the  rivers  of  America — the 
Snohomish,  the  Skikomish,  the  Wenatchie,  the  Co 
lumbia,  the  Spokane,  the  Missouri,  the  Red,  the 
Mississippi,  the  Wisconsin,  the  Ohio,  the  Potomac; 
and  rivers,  cities,  fields,  forests,  plains,  and  moun 
tains  were  all  a  part,  and  only  a  part,  of  "Our 
Country."  For  two  thousand  miles  he  coursed  along 


GETTYSBURG 

the  northern  rim  and  then  dashed  southeastward  for 
another  thousand  miles  toward  the  capital  of  this 
great  country  that  we  proudly  call,  and  hope  it  shall 
ever  be,  "  The  Land  of  the  Free,"  which  certainly 
still  contains  more  of  the  blessings  of  liberty  and 
the  enjoyments  of  life  than  can  be  found  in  any 
other  land  upon  which  the  light  of  the  sun  descends. 
Is  it  strange  that  the  veteran  felt  no  weariness 
of  body  or  soul  when  he  arrived  at  last  at  his  Mecca, 
in  the  happy  days  of  peace  ? 


[MI 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  WAR  AND  ITS  SLOW  PROGRESS 

T  N  the  days  of  the  old  veteran's  first  pilgrimage 
**•  to  Gettysburg  there  was  war  in  the  land,  bloody 
and  terrible  war ;  and  the  end  thereof  seemed  farther 
away,  the  result  more  uncertain,  than  in  the  begin 
ning.  The  United  States  apparently  had  made  slow 
progress,  or  rather  no  progress  at  all,  toward  sup 
pressing  the  rebellion.  Though  the  North  was 
superior  in  population  and  possessed  greater  wealth 
and  more  abundance  of  war  material,  there  were 
other  causes  and  circumstances  that  for  a  long  time 
tended  to  equalize  the  war-strength  of  the  two 
sections. 

During  the  years  of  the  agitation  of  Secession 
the  Southland  had  made  greater  preparation  for 
war  than  had  the  United  States  Government,  and 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Confederate 
armies  possessed  the  advantages  of  a  semi-military 
training  that  the  armies  of  the  United  States  lacked. 

[15] 


GETTYSBURG 

It  is  true  that  slavery  never  gave  substantial 
wealth  to  any  people,  ancient  or  modern;  but  it  has 
always  built  up  an  aristocratic  class,  with  sufficient 
wealth  and  leisure  to  prepare  them  for  leadership ; 
and  splendid  military  leaders  they  made.  In  our 
Southland,  before  the  war,  nearly  all  the  sons  of 
planters  were  educated  in  military  tactics,  horse 
manship,  target  practice,  and  feats  of  arms.  They 
had  a  pride  of  birth  and  a  certain  arrogance  which 
qualified  them  to  command  men  in  war,  and  they 
were  a  superb  body  of  officers  in  the  Confederate 
armies,  from  Robert  E.  Lee  down  to  their  second 
lieutenants. 

Then  the  men  who  stood  behind  the  guns  in  their 
battle-lines  had  received  certain  peculiar  qualifica 
tions  for  soldiers  through  that  same  teacher.  The 
majority  of  the  men  in  the  Confederate  ranks  were 
of  the  "poor  white"  class  who  owned  not  a  single 
slave, —  many  of  them  not  even  a  mule, —  but  every 
man  of  them  owned  a  rifle,  by  which,  to  a  great  ex 
tent,  he  made  his  living.  Slavery  had  made  it  dis 
honourable  for  a  white  man  to  work  at  honest  labour, 
and  thereby  had  driven  thousands  to  subsist  chiefly 

[16] 


GETTYSBURG 

by  their  skill  as  hunters.  Their  marksmanship  was 
almost  perfect,  and  when  the  call  to  arms  came, 
they  had  the  skill  to  shoot  and  needed  no  training 
in  the  use  of  firearms.  They  were  brave  as  hunters 
proverbially  are;  obedient  to  their  superiors  as 
soldiers;  inured  to  all  manner  of  hardship  and  ex 
posure;  and  they  could  stand  up  in  battle-line  and 
shoot  with  the  best  trained  soldiers  in  the  world. 
How  could  it  be  otherwise  than  that  such  a  soldiery 
weighed  mightily  in  the  war-scale  of  the  Southland  ? 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Northern  soldiery  went 
into  the  war  reluctantly,  to  save  the  integrity  of  the 
Union.  They  were  men  of  peace;  there  were  few 
hunters  among  them,  even  from  the  West,  and  in 
many  whole  regiments  there  was  scarcely  a  man 
who  had  ever  before  handled  a  gun ;  as  an  army  they 
were  comparatively  deficient  in  marksmanship,  and 
required  much  training  and  practice  ere  they  be 
came  efficient  soldiers.  But  few  of  the  officers  of 
the  Union  armies  were  gentlemen  of  leisure  before 
the  war,  and  generally  they  lacked  every  element  of 
military  training. 

tlfl 


GETTYSBURG 

The  North  had  two-thirds  of  the  white  popula 
tion;  but  the  tactics  of  the  Confederacy  compelled 
the  Northern  armies  to  climb  every  hill  and  moun 
tain  range,  cross  every  stream  and  river,  attack 
every  natural  stronghold  that  afforded  protection, 
and  meet  them  everywhere  in  their  chosen  positions 
of  defence. 

There  were  also  two  conditions  that  found  place 
in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  must  be  noticed 
here,  as  they  had  much  to  do  with  the  prolongation 
of  the  war.  First,  in  the  Winter  of  1861-62,  Gen 
eral  George  B.  McClellan  spent  months  in  organiz 
ing  and  drilling  an  army  of  more  than  a  hundred 
thousand  men.  McClellan  was  an  organizer,  what 
ever  may  be  said  of  his  generalship ;  but  he  was  also 
a  lover  of  style,  and  delighted  greatly  in  grand  re 
views  and  showy  parades,  which  were  of  little  or  no 
use  in  the  field  where  battles  are  to  be  lost  or  won. 
Nor  was  McClellan  the  only  general  that  doted  on 
style,  his  subordinate  generals  being  about  equal  to 
him  in  their  inordinate  love  for  display.  Sunday 
morning  inspection  was  attended  to  with  surpassing 
particularity;  but  if  a  single  general  or  colonel  in 

[18] 


MAJ.-GEN.  H.  W.  HALLECK 
Com.  Armies  United  States,  July,  1862  —  March,  1864 


MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  H.  McCLELLAN 

in.  Anna  of  tlic   Potomac.  Am/.,  1861  —  AV>r.,  1862 


GETTYSBURG 

that  vast  army  ever  made  the  discovery  that  a  soldier 
could  have  a  clean  and  presentable  gun  on  inspec 
tion  without  having  that  gun  polished  to  a  finish 
brightness,  no  soldier  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
ever  heard  of  it.  The  consequence  was  that  during 
that  winter  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  wore  to  a 
frazzle  more  than  a  hundred  thousand  guns  by  the 
too  free  use  of  sandpaper,  and  the  Northern  war- 
scale  was  thereby  lightened  thirty  or  forty  per  cent 
for  the  Spring  campaign  of  1862;  and  in  such  cir 
cumstances  how  could  McClellan  have  been  ex 
pected  to  win  battles  ? 

Later,  after  the  army  took  the  field,  the  soldiers 
learned  for  themselves  and  put  in  practice,  in  caring 
for  their  arms,  the  common-sense  ideas  that  every 
hunter  knows ;  and  after  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  been  supplied  with  new  arms  all  around,  it 
stood  some  show  in  the  field  of  war. 

The  other  circumstance,  which  was  even  more 
serious  in  reducing  the  weight  of  the  Union  war- 
scale,  and  in  giving  additional  weight  to  that  of  the 
enemy,  remained  with  us  to  the  end  of  the  war. 
The  old  veteran  did  not  discover  this  latter  evil  and 

[19] 


GETTYSBURG 

fraud  that  was  practised  on  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  and  on  the  Nation,  until  after  the  beginning  of 
the  campaign  of  1862,  and  he  has  no  means  of  know 
ing  the  whole  extent  of  the  evil.  The  discovery 
was  made  by  the  soldiers  themselves,  and  was  veri 
fied  hundreds  of  times  before  the  war  ended,  that 
the  powder  used  in  our  infantry  ammunition  was 
of  the  poorest  quality  —  so  dirty  and  so  nearly  void 
of  strength  in  many  instances  as  to  be  next  to  value 
less  ;  while  the  Confederate  powder,  often  examined 
and  tested,  was  invariably  found  to  have  two-fold 
the  explosive  power  of  ours. 


[20] 


CHAPTER  III 

A  GLANCE  AT  THE  CAMPAIGNS  LEADING  UP  TO 
GETTYSBURG 

HERE  was  war  in  the  land,  and  that  war 
had  been  in  progress  for  a  period  of  more 
than  two  years,  during  which  time  many  battles 
had  been  fought  and  much  blood  sacrificed  without 
any  apparent  gain,  on  the  part  of  the  Union  cause. 
Few  indeed  were  the  battles  won,  especially  in  the 
East,  where  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  pitted 
against  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  every 
Union  campaign,  except  one,  had  been  a  failure. 

In  every  campaign,  except  one,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  assumed  the  offensive;  but,  by  the 
superior  genius  of  its  great  commander,  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  had  succeeded  in  putting  it 
first  on  the  defensive,  after  which  soon  followed 
defeat.  That  exception  was  when  Lee,  assuming 
the  offensive,  crossed  the  Potomac  River  into  Mary 
land,  where  he  in  turn  was  put  on  the  defensive  and 

[21] 


GETTYSBURG 

defeated  at  Antietam  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
under  the  command  of  General  McClellan,  and 
compelled  to  retreat  to  his  strongholds  in  Virginia. 
This  victory  at  Antietam  gave  President  Lincoln 
the  opportunity  which  he  had  long  desired,  of  issu 
ing  his  Emancipation  Proclamation,  hoping  thereby 
to  strengthen  the  Union  cause  and  correspondingly 
weaken  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy  by  inducing 
certain  of  the  slave  States  to  accept  compensation 
for  their  slaves  and  return  to  the  Union.  There 
fore,  he  left  the  proclamation  open  until  January  1, 
1863.  However,  Lincoln's  action  seemed  at  first 
to  weaken  the  Union  cause.  Lee  retreated  across 
the  Potomac,  and  from  the  Potomac  to  his  old  de 
fensive  line  south  of  the  Rappahannock,  where,  on 
the  thirteenth  of  December  was  fought  the  useless 
and  murderous  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  How  or 
why  the  authorities  at  Washington  concluded  to 
fight  a  battle,  or  allowed  a  battle  to  be  fought,  as 
late  in  the  season  as  December,  is  beyond  all  com 
prehension;  also,  why  Lincoln,  as  Commander-in- 
Chief ,  should  have  been  blind  to  the  fact  that  our 
army  was  worn  out,  and  needed  rest  and  thorough 

[22] 


GETTYSBURG 

reorganization;  and  that  with  the  Rappahannock 
in  its  front  and  the  Potomac  as  a  convenient  base, 
there  was  the  ideal  place,  not  to  fight  a  battle  in 
December,  but  to  prepare  the  army  for  battle  in 
the  season  for  battles.  Why  any  general  with  a 
grain  of  military  knowledge  in  his  head  should  not 
have  seen  that  nothing  could  be  gained  even  by  a 
victory  in  mid-winter  with  such  roads  and  such  a 
climate  to  contend  against  as  Virginia  furnished, 
passes  all  understanding.  But  the  battle  was  or 
dered  and  fought,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  defeated  with  terrible  slaughter. 

Then  followed  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the 
midnight  of  war,  the  darkest  period  of  its  existence. 
Many  officers  talked  open  treason,  while  in  the 
ranks  men  reviled  the  Government,  and  nearly  all 
seemed  to  agree  that  the  war  for  the  Union  had  de 
generated  into  a  "  war  for  the  nigger."  The  de 
moralization  increased  after  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation  was  issued,  on  January  1,  1863,  and 
it  reached  its  most  appalling  stage  about  January 
twentieth,  when  Burnside  made  another  attempt  at 
a  winter  campaign,  which  was  brought  to  an  end  by 

[231 


GETTYSBURG 

a  providential  rain  that  deluged  the  land  and  made 
the  roads  impassable.  Oh,  that  blessed  rain  !  The 
campaign  was  short,  but  long  remembered  as 
"  Burnside  stuck  in  the  mud." 

The  Emancipation  Proclamation  then  came  in 
for  its  full  share  of  abuse  and  ridicule;  "  Old  Abe's 
Folly  "  was  jeered  by  every  lawyer  in  the  army,  and 
among  our  officers  we  had  many  lawyers.  They 
argued  that  the  proclamation  could  serve  no  good 
purpose  and  would  never  emancipate  a  single  slave. 
But  there  were  some  anti-slavery  men  in  the  army, 
who  believed  from  the  beginning  that  slavery  was 
the  cause  of  the  war,  and  must  end  with  the  war; 
and  they  said:  "  It  is  up  to  the  army.  If  rebellion 
wins,  emancipation  is  a  dead  letter;  but  if  we  put 
down  the  rebellion,  as  we  started  out  to  do,  and  in 
tend  to  do,  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  will  free 
every  slave  in  America." 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  January,  General 
Joseph  Hooker  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Hooker  was  a  fighting 
general,  but  he  recognized  the  fact  that  an  army  — 
as  shown  by  the  rolls  —  with  2,922  officers  and 

[24] 


MAJ.-GEN.  AMBROSE  E.  BUENSIDE 
Com.  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Nov.,  1862  —  Jan.,  1863 


MAJ.-GEN.  JOSEPH  HOOKER 

Com.  A  nn i/  of  the   Potomac,  J<DI..  1tW.i  —  ./inic,  1863 


GETTYSBURG 

81,964  soldiers  absent  in  hospitals  or  on  leave  or 
from  desertion,  needed  rest  and  reorganization  be 
fore  any  more  serious  fighting  began;  and  for  the 
next  three  months  he  applied  himself  to  that  task, 
which,  to  his  credit,  he  accomplished  so  thoroughly 
that  thereafter  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  never 
wavered  in  its  discipline. 

Early  in  May  the  Spring  campaign  opened;  but 
that  splendid  army  of  123,000  men  that  Hooker 
led  into  battle  south  of  the  Rappahannock  was,  by 
the  superior  generalship  of  Lee,  put  upon  the  de 
fensive,  defeated,  and  compelled  to  retreat  to  its 
former  position  north  of  the  river. 

Chancellorsville  was  Lee's  greatest  military 
achievement;  but  the  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  that  time,  though  very  discouraging  to 
the  Administration,  did  not  seem  to  affect  in  the 
least  degree  the  morale  of  the  army.  Thereafter 
the  soldiers  sang  as  of  old  their  songs  of  love,  and 
their  songs  of  war,  but  it  was  not  until  after 
Gettysburg  that  they  began  to  sing — 

"  John  Brown's  body  lies  mouldering  in  the  grave, 
But  his  soul  is  marching  on !  " 
[23] 


GETTYSBURG 

From  that  date,  however,  until  the  end  of  the  war, 
in  camp,  on  the  march,  before  and  after  battle,  the 
hills  of  Virginia  rang  with  the  refrain  — 

"  Glory,  glory,  halleluiah !     Glory,  glory,  halleluiah ! 
Glory,  glory,  halleluiah !     His  soul  is  marching  on !  " 


[26] 


CHAPTER  IV 

COMPARATIVE  STRENGTH  OF  THE  ARMIES 

A  FTER  winning  two  great  victories,  like 
-**•  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville,  it  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at  that  Lee  should  consider  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  under  his  command 
and  leadership,  as  invincible.  Therefore,  imme 
diately  after  the  latter  battle,  Lee,  with  the  consent 
and  enthusiastic  cooperation  of  Jefferson  Davis 
and  the  whole  Confederate  Government,  began  to 
plan  and  prepare  for  a  second  invasion  of  the  North. 
For  the  purpose  of  that  invasion  Lee  reorganized 
his  army,  intending  if  possible  to  make  his  second 
invasion  more  successful  than  the  first ;  and  we  may 
be  certain  that  he  made  every  effort  in  his  power  to 
enable  him  to  lead  that  army  to  victory.  He  did 
not  invade  the  North  with  the  intention  of  being 
defeated  in  his  first  battle  across  the  line  and 
turned  back  to  his  old,  familiar  stamping  ground, 
if  he  could  help  it. 

[27] 


GETTYSBURG 

On  May  thirtieth,  Lee  issued  an  order  reorganiz 
ing  his  army,  which  at  that  time  consisted  of  two 
corps,  commanded  respectively  by  James  Long- 
street  and  A.  P.  Hill.  According  to  his  field  re 
port  of  that  date — the  last  field  return  of  record 
from  Lee's  army  previous  to  the  Battle  of  Gettys 
burg —  the  total  strength  of  those  two  corps  and  his 
cavalry  was  as  follows: 

Longstreet's  Corps  ">  ''  .  rn .  ; !  30,732 
Hill's  Corps  \  V:'v  i  .  .  32,588 
Stuart's  Cavalry  Corps  &!;tel  r  V  10,292 


Total  Infantry,  Artillery,  and  Cavalry,  73,612 

We  have  no  certain  and  accurate  account  of  the 
strength  of  Lee's  army  after  it  was  reorganized  into 
three  corps,  but  it  does  not  seem  reasonable  to  pre 
sume  that  he  reorganized  his  army  into  three  corps 
just  for  ostentation.  Lee  was  not  built  that  way. 
He  reorganized  his  army  into  three  corps  in  order  to 
add  to  its  efficiency ;  and  he  then  and  there  and  there 
after  added  every  regiment  and  every  man  that  the 
Confederate  Government  would  give  him,  and  it 
gladly  gave  him  every  man  obtainable.  Lee  was 

[28] 


GETTYSBURG 

about  to  undertake  a  great  enterprise  —  nothing 
short  of  an  invasion  of  the  North,  which  he  hoped, 
and  the  Confederate  Government  confidently  ex 
pected,  would  result  in  a  great  and  sweeping  victory, 
leading  directly  to  an  acknowledgment  of  the  Con 
federacy  by  the  nations  of  Europe.  Is  it  at  all 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  he  would  undertake  such 
a  stupendous  work  without  first  obtaining  what  he 
considered  reasonable  and  adequate  reinforcements  ? 
It  is  fair  to  presume  that  in  adding  to  his  army  a 
third  corps,  he  thereby  materially  increased  its 
numerical  strength. 

Whatever  the  full  strength  of  Lee's  army  of  in 
vasion  may  have  been,  Lee  himself  and  the  Con 
federate  Government  also  were  extremely  careful 
that  the  world  should  not  know  with  any  degree  of 
certainty  what  it  was,  and  to  this  day  it  remains  a 
sealed  book.  Still  we  do  know  of  a  certainty  that 
the  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and  regiments  of 
Lee's  army,  as  reorganized  for  the  great  campaign 
that  terminated  in  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  were 
each  and  all  stronger  than  the  corresponding  or 
ganizations  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  While 

[29] 


GETTYSBURG 

Lee's  army  was  composed  of  three  corps,  the  Union 
army  was  composed  of  seven;  while  Lee's  army 
comprised  thirty-nine  brigades  of  infantry,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  comprised  fifty -one  brigades. 

The  unit  of  both  armies  was  the  regiment,  and  in 
that  respect  the  Confederate  army  had  a  decided 
advantage  over  the  Union  army.  The  regimental 
formation  was  the  same,  but  the  Confederacy 
adopted  a  different  method  of  adding  recruits. 

The  Confederacy,  while  it  lasted,  was  a  military 
organization,  pure  and  complete;  and  at  the  very 
start  their  military  leaders  determined  that  every 
thing  else  should  bow  to  the  efficiency  of  their  army. 
Therefore,  after  the  second  year  of  the  war  they 
added  very  few  new  regiments.  Instead,  they  al 
most  robbed  the  cradle  and  the  grave  for  recruits  to 
fill  up  their  armies,  but  instead  of  making  up  full 
regiments  entirely  of  raw  and  unseasoned  men,  they 
divided  them  up  among  the  old  regiments  long  in 
the  field,  wherein  every  private  soldier  was  as  good 
or  better  than  an  officer  of  a  new  regiment.  Usually, 
an  old  regiment  of  three  hundred  experienced  men 
is  worth  more  in  battle  than  a  new  regiment  of  nine 

[so] 


GETTYSBURG 

hundred.  Take  a  regiment  reduced  by  hard  serv 
ice  to  two  hundred  men,  or  twenty  to  the  company; 
increase  it  to  three  hundred  by  adding  ten  recruits 
to  each  company;  within  a  week  or  ten  days  the 
wrhole  three  hundred  are  veterans,  and  the  recruits 
are  about  as  good  as  the  best  of  them.  In  that  way 
five  hundred  recruits  are  better  for  an  army  than 
two  full  regiments  of  a  thousand  men  each,  fresh 
from  civil  life  with  no  military  experience. 

The  Confederate  leaders  had  sense  enough  to  dis 
cover  that  fact  early  in  the  war,  and  they  proceeded 
at  once  to  put  their  knowledge  into  practice  any 
where  and  everywhere  along  military  lines,  paying 
no  regard  whatever  to  the  whims  of  those  who  knew 
nothing  about  war,  but  who  thought  perhaps  some 
other  way  might  possibly  be  an  improvement. 

With  the  Union  army  it  was  different.  It  is 
doubtful  if  any  of  our  military  authorities  ever 
learned  the  superiority  of  the  system  of  sending  re 
cruits  to  old  regiments  in  the  field,  over  adding  en 
tirely  new  regiments;  and  if  they  did  they  could 
not,  or  at  least  did  not,  put  it  into  practice  to  any 
extent.  Up  to  the  last  year  and  last  month  of  the 

[31] 


GETTYSBURG 

war,  the  State  authorities  recruited  full  regiments 
of  green  troops  and  sent  them  to  the  front  in  great 
unwieldy  bodies  to  fill  up  the  armies,  while  the  old 
and  experienced  regiments  dwindled  into  nothing 
ness.  That  plan  furnished  official  positions  for 
political  pets,  most  of  whom  were  worthless  as  sol 
diers  in  any  position,  but  it  did  not  do  the  best  that 
could  be  done  for  the  army.  If  one  of  these  full 
regiments  was  added  to  a  brigade,  it  outnumbered 
the  old  four  regiments  combined;  but  in  the  first 
battle  any  one  of  the  first  regiments  with  a  hundred 
men  or  less,  was  usually  worth  the  most.  The  new 
regiment  would  soon  become  a  power  in  the  brigade, 
but  at  a  terrible  sacrifice  of  life.  When  reduced  to 
about  five  hundred  men,  that  regiment  was  at  its 
best,  and  became  the  backbone  of  the  brigade.  By 
their  system  of  filling  up  their  old  regiments,  the 
Confederates  kept  them  at  all  times  at  very  nearly 
their  fighting  weight,  which,  as  we  have  stated,  was 
about  five  hundred  men  to  the  regiment;  and  as  each 
brigade  in  both  armies  contained  four  or  five  regi 
ments,  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  even  a  slight 
difference  in  the  numerical  strength  of  the  units 

[32] 


GETTYSBURG 

created  a  difference  in  all  the  organizations  above 
the  unit. 

These  facts  present  the  opportunity  of  making 
a  comparative  estimate  of  the  strength  of  Lee's 
army  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign  that  cannot  be 
far  from  correct.  In  the  Union  army  we  had  fifty- 
one  brigades,  and  a  total  strength  of  infantry  of 
77,208,  or  an  average  of  1,514  men  to  the  brigade. 
In  Lee's  army  there  were  thirty-nine  brigades  of 
infantry,  which  reasonably  averaged  eighteen  hun 
dred  or  two  thousand  men  to  the  brigade ;  and  if  the 
latter,  which  was  less  than  several  of  them  num 
bered,  Lee's  total  infantry  strength  was  about  78,- 
000.  But  if  we  estimate  the  average  of  Lee's 
brigades  at  the  former  figure  of  eighteen  hundred, 
it  would  still  give  him  a  total  of  70,200  infantry, 
besides  his  artillery  and  cavalry. 

The  fact  is,  however,  that  there  are  no  means  of 
ascertaining  the  exact  strength  of  Lee's  army. 
Longstreet  gives  his  estimate  at  75,568,  which  is 
probably  as  accurate  as  any  to  be  obtained  from  a 
Confederate  source;  but  as  Longstreet  estimates  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  at  more  than  one  hundred 

[33] 


GETTYSBURG 

thousand,  we  must  take  his  figures  with  a  grain  of 
allowance. 

With  regard  to  the  strength  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  there  can  be  no  question.  General  Meade, 
in  his  testimony  before  the  Congressional  Com 
mittee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  stated  the 
strength  of  his  army  at  "a  little  under  100,000  — 
probably  95,000  men."  That  estimate  was  very 
nearly  correct,  as  the  returns  of  June  30,  1863,  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  "present  for  duty 
equipped,"  shows  as  follows: 

First  Corps  .  .  .  •  .  .  10,022 
Second  Corps  ,  .  ,  .  12,904 
Third  Corps  ,  ,  ,  .  11,924 

Fifth  Corps  .  ,.  .  ,  v  12,509 
Sixth  Corps  .  ,  .  >  .  :  15,555 
Eleventh  Corps  .  .  .  .  9,841 

Twelfth  Corps       .         .         .         .  8,589 

Reserve  Artillery  .         .         .         .  2,546 

Cavaby  Corps       f       .'      .'       .         10,809 


Total  .        i:        *         .         .         94,699 

It  is  an  easy  matter  to  verify  these  figures.    They 
are  of  record  in  the  War  Department  of  the  United 

[34] 


GETTYSBURG 

States.  We  know  to  an  absolute  certainty  the 
strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  from 
all  the  knowledge  we  are  able  to  glean  on  the  sub 
ject  we  conclude  that  the  contending  armies,  com 
manded  respectively  by  Generals  Meade  and  Lee, 
were  numerically  about  equal.  At  all  events  Lee 
was  satisfied  that  his  army  was  in  many  respects 
superior  to  the  Union  army  opposed  to  him,  and  his 
generals  looked  upon  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  as  then  marshalled,  equipped,  and  led,  as  in 
vincible.  It  was,  as  General  Gordon  described  it, 
"in  the  zenith  of  assurance,  with  compact  ranks, 
boundless  confidence,  and  exultant  hopes,  as  proud 
and  puissant  an  army  as  was  ever  marshalled." 


[35] 


CHAPTER  V 

A  PECULIAR  FEATURE  OF  THE  BATTLE 

"Ti  If  ANY  people  do  not  readily  understand  why 
•^  •*•  it  was  that  in  the  concentration  of  the  oppos 
ing  armies  for  battle,  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  commanded  by  Lee,  which  was  the  army  of 
invasion,  advanced  from  the  north  toward  Gettys 
burg  ;  while  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  commanded 
by  Meade,  which  was  the  defensive  or  repelling 
army,  moved  up  from  the  south  to  meet  the  invad 
ing  army  and  give,  or  rather  receive,  battle.  The 
positions  in  winch  we  find  the  two  armies  at  this 
time  can  be  explained  only  by  a  brief  outline  of 
their  previous  movements.  Lee's  main  army 
crossed  the  Potomac  River  into  Maryland  at  Wil- 
liamsport,  on  the  twenty-fourth  and  twenty-fifth 
days  of  June,  1863,  with  the  exception  of  the  main 
body  of  his  cavalry,  under  the  command  of  Stuart. 
Lee  had  instructed  Stuart  to  cover  his  movements, 

[36] 


GETTYSBURG 

to  deceive  Hooker  as  long  as  possible  with  regard 
to  Lee's  whereabouts,  and  to  prevent  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  from  crossing  the  river  in  pursuit, 
while  he  secured  favourable  offensive  positions  for 
his  army. 

Previous  to  this,  on  the  fifteenth  of  June,  Gen 
eral  Ewell,  with  the  Second  Corps  of  Lee's  army 
and  two  brigades  of  cavalry,  crossed  the  Potomac 
at  the  same  point;  Ewell  sent  his  cavalry  in 
advance,  up  the  Cumberland  Valley  as  far  as  Cham- 
bersburg,  while  he  moved  leisurely  with  his  infantry, 
gathering  supplies  of  flour  and  beef-cattle  for  the 
army,  also  replenishing  his  supply  of  mules  and 
draft  horses  from  the  farmers  of  that  region.  He 
also  raised  all  the  ready  money  he  could  by  assessing 
the  towns  and  cities  along  his  route.  Ewell  had  ten 
days  in  which  to  operate  against  a  peaceful  country, 
without  so  much  as  a  regiment  of  soldiers  to  oppose 
his  free  hand,  before  Lee  made  his  crossing,  and  by 
that  time  was  well  up  the  Cumberland  Valley  with 
his  whole  corps.  On  crossing  the  Potomac  with  his 
main  army  Lee  immediately  concentrated  at 
Hagerstown,  six  miles  north  of  the  river  and 

[37] 


GETTYSBURG 

seventy-four  miles  southwest  of  Harrisburg,  the 
capital  of  Pennsylvania,  which  city  Lee  proposed 
to  make  his  first  objective  point.  There  was  no 
army  in  his  front  except  his  own  Second  Corps, 
nothing  to  interfere  with  his  onward  march;  and 
Ewell  had  already  gathered  and  stored  at  conven 
ient  points  the  supplies  necessary  for  his  army.  No 
general  ever  had  a  more  complete  and  delightful 
walk-away;  and  taking  advantage  of  this  most 
favourable  situation,  he  lost  not  a  moment  but 
dashed  through  the  Cumberland  Valley,  intending 
to  reach  and  cross  the  Susquehanna  River  and  cap 
ture  Harrisburg.  He  also  directed  Ewell  to  cross 
the  South  Mountain  into  the  Susquehanna  Valley 
and  occupy  all  the  important  points  and  all  the  roads 
leading  southward  from  Harrisburg.  In  this  move 
ment  Early,  with  E well's  first  division,  crossed  the 
mountains  by  the  Chambersburg  Pike,  passing 
through  Gettysburg  on  the  afternoon  of  the  twenty- 
sixth  of  June,  which  town  he  assessed  to  the  tune 
of  ten  thousand  dollars;  which  little  amount  he 
failed  to  collect,  either  on  account  of  the  poverty  of 
the  business  men  of  Gettysburg,  or  their  "pull" 
with  the  Confederate  authorities.  We  were  told  by 

[38] 


LIEUT.-GEN.  J.  E.  B.  STUART 
Com.  Cavalry  Corps,  Army  Northern  Virginia 


LIEUT.-GEN.  R.  S.  EWELL 
Com.  2d  Corp*,  Army  Northern,  Virginia 


GETTYSBURG 

old  residents  of  Gettysburg  that  before  the  war  the 
1  town  had  enjoyed  great  prosperity  through  certain 
Southern  business  houses,  and  that  at  the  time  of 
the  battle  it  was  Pennsylvania's  hotbed  of  secession. 
We  cannot  vouch  for  the  truth  of  this  report,  but  if 
ture,  it  would  readily  account  for  some  other  inci 
dents  besides  the  fact  that  Early  failed  to  get  his 
ten-thousand-dollar  assessment.  From  Gettysburg 
Early  marched  northeast  on  the  York  Pike  to  the 
town  of  York,  where  he  was  more  fortunate  in  his 
financial  schemes;  he  succeeded  in  raising  some 
money,  assessing  that  city  at  one  hundred  thousand 
dollars,  part  of  which  he  collected. 

General  Gordon  says*:  "  Early  wanted  to  bor 
row,  or  secure  in  some  other  way,  for  the  use  of  his 
troops,  a  certain  amount  of  greenbacks,  and  he 
succeeded  in  making  the  arrangement.  I  learned 
afterwards  that  the  only  promise  to  pay,  like  that 
of  the  Confederate  notes,  was  at  some  date  subse 
quent  to  the  establishment  of  Southern  independ 
ence."  Probably  nothing  in  Gordon's  memoirs  of 
Gettysburg  is  more  pointedly  true  in  every  particu- 

*  From  "  Reminiscences,"  by  Gen.  John  B.  Gordon,  copy 
righted  by  Messrs.  Charles  Scribner's  Sons. 

[30] 


GETTYSBURG 

lar  than  this  explanation  of  Early's  financial  deal 
at  York. 

To  throw  some  further  light  on  the  patriotic  spirit 
that  to  some  extent  pervaded  that  portion  of  Penn 
sylvania,  against  which  the  Union  army  had  to  con 
tend  even  in  the  North,  we  will  again  quote  the 
words  of  General  Gordon,  in  his  York  experience  : 

"  As  we  moved  along  the  street,  a  little  girl,  probably  twelve 
years  of  age,  ran  up  to  my  horse  and  handed  me  a  large  bou 
quet  of  flowers,  in  the  centre  of  which  was  a  note  in  delicate 
handwriting,  purporting  to  give  the  numbers  and  describe  the 
position  of  the  Union  forces  at  Wrightsville,  toward  which  I 
was  advancing.  I  carefully  read  and  reread  this  strange 
note.  It  bore  no  signature  and  contained  no  assurance  of 
sympathy  for  the  Southern  cause,  but  it  was  so  terse  and 
explicit  in  its  terms  as  to  compel  my  confidence.  The  second 
day  we  were  in  front  of  Wrightsville,  and  from  the  high 
ridge  on  which  this  note  suggested  that  I  halt  and  examine 
the  position  of  the  Union  troops,  I  eagerly  scanned  the  pros 
pect  with  my  field-glasses,  in  order  to  verify  the  truth  of  the 
mysterious  communication,  or  detect  its  misrepresentation. 
There,  in  full  view  before  us,  was  the  town,  just  as  described, 
nestling  on  the  banks  of  the  Susquehanna.  There  was  the 
blue  line  of  soldiers  guarding  the  approach,  drawn  up  as  indi 
cated,  along  the  intervening  ridge  and  across  the  pike.  There 
was  the  long  bridge  spanning  the  Susquehanna  and  connect 
ing  the  town  with  Columbia  on  the  other  bank.  Most  impor 
tant  of  all,  there  was  the  gorge  or  ravine  running  off  to  the 
right  and  extending  around  the  left  flank  of  the  Federal  line 
and  to  the  river  below  the  bridge.  Not  an  inaccurate  detail  in 

[40] 


GETTYSBURG 

that  note  could  be  discovered.  I  did  not  hesitate,  therefore, 
to  adopt  its  suggestion  of  moving  down  the  gorge  in  order  to 
throw  my  command  on  the  flank,  or  possibly  in  the  rear  of  the 
Union  troops,  and  force  them  to  a  rapid  retreat  or  surrender. 
The  result  of  this  movement  vindicated  the  strategic  wisdom 
of  my  unknown,  and  —  judging  by  the  handwriting  —  female 
correspondent,  whose  note  was  none  the  less  martial  because 
embedded  in  roses,  and  whose  evident  genius  for  war,  had 
occasion  offered,  might  have  made  her  a  captain  equal  to 
Catherine.  .  .  . 

"  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  note  concealed  in  the 
flowers  handed  me  at  York  had  indicated  a  ravine  down  which 
I  could  move,  reaching  the  river  not  far  from  the  bridge.  As 
my  orders  were  not  restricted,  except  to  direct  me  to  cross 
the  Susquehanna  if  possible,  my  immediate  object  was  to  move 
rapidly  down  that  ravine  to  the  river,  then  along  its  right 
bank  to  the  bridge,  seize  it,  and  cross  to  the  Columbia  side. 
Once  across,  I  intended  to  mount  my  men,  if  practicable,  so 
as  to  pass  rapidly  through  Lancaster  in  the  direction  of  Phil 
adelphia,  and  thus  compel  General  Meade  to  send  a  portion  of 
his  army  to  defend  that  city.  This  programme  was  defeated, 
first,  by  the  burning  of  the  bridge;  and,  second,  by  the  immi 
nent  prospect  of  battle  near  Gettysburg.  The  Union  troops 
stationed  at  Wrightsville  had,  in  their  retreat  across  it,  fired 
the  bridge  which  I  had  hoped  to  secure." 

Besides  Gordon's  story  of  the  note  in  the  bouquet, 
which  is  certainly  more  interesting  than  anything 
the  author  could  say  in  its  place,  the  side-light 
thrown  on  the  history  of  that  campaign  and  on  the 
position  of  the  Confederate  army  at  that  time  by 
the  foregoing  quotation  is  well  worth  utilizing  here. 

[41] 


GETTYSBURG 

The  reader  will  notice  that  Gordon,  commanding 
a  brigade  of  Lee's  Second  Corps,  had  reached  the 
Susquehanna  River  at  Wrightsville,  below  Harris- 
burg,  when  Lee's  concentration  order  reached  him. 
Returning  now  to  Lee's  main  army  as  it  moved 
along  the  Cumberland  Valley  from  Chambersburg 
northeast  toward  the  Susquehanna  River,  we  note 
that  everything  was  working  beautifully  for  Lee. 
The  capital  of  Pennsylvania  was  almost  within  his 
grasp.  Just  a  few  more  days,  and  the  first  great 
stroke  of  his  campaign  of  invasion  would  be  accom 
plished.  It  was  at  that  time  that  Longstreet's  scout, 
Harrison,  brought  the  news  to  Lee's  headquarters 
that  Hooker  had  outmanoeuvred  Stuart,  and  with 
his  whole  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Point 
of  Rocks  and  Edwards's  Ferry,  on  the  twenty-fifth 
and  twenty-sixth  of  June,  and  was  then  in  hot 
pursuit.  These  tidings  from  out  the  South  troubled 
Lee,  for  he  saw  and  clearly  comprehended  the  fact 
that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  must  be  taken  into 
immediate  consideration.  Furthermore  Lee  learned 
that  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  June  Hooker  had  dis 
covered  the  unprotected  condition  of  his  line  of 

[42] 


GETTYSBURG 

communications,  and  would  have  drawn  the  garrison 
from  Harper's  Ferry  to  act  with  the  Twelfth  Corps 
to  strike  Lee's  trains  exposed  from  the  Potomac  to 
Chambersburg.  Halleck  would  not  give  his  con 
sent  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Harper's  Ferry  garri 
son,  which  piece  of  foolishness  saved  Lee's  trains. 
The  disagreement  of  Halleck  and  Hooker  on  the 
matter  of  the  Harper's  Ferry  garrison  caused  the 
resignation  of  Hooker  and  the  appointment  of 
Meade  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  Hooker  was  clearly  right  in  his  contention, 
and  Halleck  was  wrong — as  he  usually  was — but 
it  served  as  an  excuse  to  get  rid  of  Hooker.  Meade 
was  allowed  to  withdraw  the  garrison,  but  before 
he  had  time  to  move  on  Lee's  trains  and  communi 
cations,  Lee  had  seen  the  necessity  of  turning  in  his 
tracks.  He  therefore  abandoned  his  attack  on 
Harrisburg;  leaving  the  Cumberland  Valley,  he 
marched  eastward  across  the  South  Mountain  into 
the  valley  of  the  Susquehanna,  and  on  the  night  of 
the  thirtieth  of  June,  his  army  was  located  about  as 
follows:  Early's  division  on  the  York  Pike,  fifteen 
miles  northeast  of  Gettysburg;  Johnson's  division 

[43] 


GETTYSBURG 

eighteen  miles  northeast,  on  the  Harrisburg  Road; 
Rodes'  division  ten  miles  north,  on  the  Carlisle 
Road;  Fender's  division  eight  miles  northwest,  on 
the  Mummasburg  Road;  Heth's  division  five  miles 
northwest  on  the  Chambersburg  Pike;  and  from 
that  point  to  Chambersburg  in  a  continuous  line 
west  for  twenty  or  twenty-five  miles  lay  the  balance 
of  Lee's  army,  thus  covering  the  whole  country  and 
every  highway  for  the  distance  of  about  forty  miles 
east  and  west,  and  every  one  of  those  highways  con 
verging  at  Gettysburg. 

On  the  other  hand  the  Union  army,  which  had 
crossed  the  Potomac  one  day  later  than  Lee's  army, 
and  fully  fifty  miles  south  and  east,  with  a  mountain 
range  between,  had  marched  northward,  spreading 
out  like  a  fan  to  the  eastward  in  order  to  present  a 
barrier  between  Lee's  army  and  our  national  capital. 

On  June  twenty-eighth,  General  Meade  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  army.  He  con 
tinued  our  march  to  the  northward;  and,  on  the 
night  of  June  thirtieth  Buford's  cavalry  division 
occupied  a  position  northwest  of  Gettysburg,  with 
headquarters  at  the  Lutheran  Seminary  on  Semi- 

[44] 


GETTYSBURG 

nary  Ridge,  his  troops  picketing  the  Chambersburg 
Pike  and  the  Mummasburg  Road,  and  guarding 
the  crossings  of  Willoughby  Run,  within  an  hour's 
march  of  Heth's  outposts  of  Lee's  foremost  division. 
Our  First  Corps,  commanded  by  General  Double- 
day,  was  at  Marsh  Creek,  six  miles  from  Buford's 
position.  Howard,  with  the  Eleventh  Corps,  was 
at  Emmetsburg,  thirteen  miles  away.  Sickles' 
Third  Corps  was  somewhere  between  Emmetsburg 
and  Taneytown,  probably  about  the  same  distance 
away  as  the  Eleventh.  These  three  corps,  with 
Buford's  cavalry  division,  made  up  the  right  wing 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Reynolds.  Beyond  Sickles'  corps  the  balance 
of  the  Union  army  lay  stretched  away  to  the  south 
east  along  the  Taneytown  Road  and  Baltimore 
Pike  for  a  distance  of  thirty  or  forty  miles. 

General  Meade  had  established  his  headquarters 
at  or  near  Taneytown,  and  was  supervising  the  sur 
vey,  through  his  chief  engineer,  of  a  position  on 
Pipe  Creek  two  miles  south  of  Taneytown,  that 
seemed  to  him  a  choice  position  for  a  defensive  bat 
tle,  and  there  he  hoped  to  await  Lee's  advance  and 

[45] 


GETTYSBURG 

attack.  His  army  was  scattered  from  Dan  to  Beer- 
sheba,  so  to  speak,  his  idea  being  to  concentrate  at 
this  point  when  he  found  Lee,  and  if  possible  to 
induce  Lee  to  follow  his  retreating  forces  to  his 
chosen  position.  Such  were  the  comparative  posi 
tions  and  dispositions  of  the  opposing  armies  and 
their  commanding  generals  on  the  night  before  the 
great  battle  —  the  Southern  army  to  the  northward 
and  the  Northern  army  to  the  southward  —  from 
which  positions  they  advanced  toward  each  other, 
meeting  in  their  appalling  death-grapple  at 
Gettysburg. 


[461 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  ORDER  OF  GOING  INTO  BATTLE 

T  T  is  said  that  before  the  great  battle  of  Marathon 
*•  the  Greeks  and  the  Persians  stood  in  battle 
array  for  days  before  the  battle  opened,  each  army 
manoeuvring  for  some  position  of  advantage;  Mil- 
tiades  not  caring  to  leave  his  strong  position  on  the 
heights  to  attack  the  Persians  who  darkened  the 
plain  below,  and  Darius  not  relishing  the  risk  of 
attacking  the  Greeks  in  their  strong  and  well-chosen 
position.  The  Persians  were  ready  for  battle  from 
the  start,  as  Darius  had  a  mighty  army  and  every 
regiment  in  place.  He  was  not  waiting  for  rein 
forcements,  but  for  sand.  The  Greeks  were  few, 
and  Miltiades  wanted  every  Greek  he  could  get; 
but  when  he  was  reinforced  by  a  thousand  heavy- 
armed  Platseans,  he  took  the  chances  and  ordered 
the  Greeks  to  wade  in,  which  they;  did,  with  good 
results  for  the  Greeks. 

[47] 


GETTYSBURG 

At  Waterloo  the  English  held  the  heights,  the 
French  occupying  the  low  ground,  but  both  armies 
camped  on  the  field  the  night  before  the  battle;  for 
we  are  told  that  at  one  o'clock  A.M.  on  the  eight 
eenth  of  June,  1815,  Napoleon,  while  exploring 
on  horseback  the  hills  near  Rassomme,  in  the  tem 
pest  and  in  the  rain,  was  gratified  "  to  see  the  long 
line  of  English  camp  fires  illuminating  all  the  hori 
zon  from  Frischemont  to  Braine  TAllend."  Na 
poleon  was  gratified  to  know  the  English  were 
there,  and  he  considered  them  as  his  meat ;  but  when 
the  morning  dawned  he  was  in  no  hurry  to  attack. 
It  had  rained  during  the  night  and  the  grass  that 
grew  luxuriantly  on  the  Belgian  hillsides  was  wet 
and  difficult  for  his  soldiers  to  wade  through, — 
Napoleon  always  had  a  tender  spot  in  his  heart  for 
his  soldiers, —  so  it  was  half -past  eleven  o'clock 
before  the  first  gun  was  fired  at  Waterloo.  Both 
armies  were  ready  for  battle,  and  had  been  for 
hours,  but  appeared  not  anxious  to  engage.  Some 
times  opposing  armies  do  not  form  in  battle  array 
and  wait  for  each  other,  until  everything  is  in  readi- 

[48] 


GETTYSBURG 

ness  on  both  sides,  and  then  at  an  apparently  agreed 
signal  they  join  issue  all  along  the  line. 

At  Gettysburg  the  conditions  were  different. 
Here  were  two  armies,  each  nearly  100,000  strong, 
drawing  toward  each  other  and  anxious  to  engage 
in  deadly  strife  —  so  anxious  that  neither  was  ready 
for  battle  when  it  began;  they  were  destined  to  join 
battle  on  this  field,  and  yet,  with  the  exception  of 
Buford's  little  band  of  cavalry  watching  the  cross 
ings  of  Willoughby  Run,  the  heights  and  the  valleys 
were  vacant.  Where  were  the  armies  ?  When  the 
Battle  of  Gettysburg  opened  on  the  morning  of  the 
first  of  July  between  the  heads  of  the  leading 
columns,  the  main  portions  of  the  armies  were  from 
twenty  to  fifty  miles  apart. 

The  advantages  were  greatly  in  Lee's  favour. 
He  had  his  army  comparatively  well  in  hand.  He 
had  seven  highways  at  his  service,  all  converging 
at  his  rendezvous,  to  facilitate  the  movement  of  his 
troops.  He  had  issued  his  orders  of  concentration 
to  his  corps  and  divisions,  and  each  was  marching 
by  the  shortest  route  to  the  point  designated;  and 
when  the  head  of  .his  foremost  division  under  Heth 

[49] 


GETTYSBURG 

encountered  Buford's  cavalry  on  the  banks  of 
Willoughby  Run,  the  rear  of  his  outmost  column 
was  not  more  than  twenty-five  miles  away. 

For  Meade  the  situation  was  most  unfavourable. 
While  Buford  occupied  the  vantage  ground  of 
camping  on  the  outskirts  of  the  field,  and  was  await 
ing  the  advance  of  Lee  upon  his  lines,  he  could  not 
hope  for  support  from  Meade's  main  army  in  that 
position.  Meade  had  not  ordered  the  advance  and 
concentration  of  his  army  at  that  or  any  other  point ; 
in  fact  he  was  in  ignorance  of  the  whereabouts  and 
the  movements  of  his  adversary,  and  with  head 
quarters  at  Taneytown,  fifteen  miles  away,  was 
waiting  for  Lee  to  come  and  find  him. 

General  Reynolds,  who  commanded  the  right 
wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  had  sent  Buford 
forward  to  his  advanced  position  and  had  ordered 
the  First  Corps  at  Marsh  Creek,  and  the  Eleventh 
Corps  at  Emmetsburg,  to  move  in  the  same  direc 
tion  at  an  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  July  first. 

When  Buford  was  attacked,  Reynolds  hurried 
forward  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  to  his  sup 
port,  and  also  sent  a  despatch  to  General  Meade  at 

[50] 


BRIG.-GEN.  JOHN  BUFORD 
Com.  1st  Division,   Cavalry  Corps 


BRIG.-GEN.  HARRY  IIETII 

/)/r/x/o//  ('(HHiiHiiidrr,  3d  Corps,  Arnn/  \(trtlicni   Yinjiniit 


GETTYSBURG 

Taneytown,  telling  him  that  Lee's  forces  were  in 
front  of  him;  that  he  would  hold  the  key  to  the 
situation  till  the  last  moment,  and  until  the  main 
army  should  arrive,  and  that  the  heights  of  Gettys 
burg  was  the  place  to  fight  the  battle. 

About  twenty  minutes  past  eight  o'clock  A.M., 
July  first,  Heth's  division  encountered  Buford's 
pickets  and  opened  the  battle.  An  hour  later  the 
First  Corps,  under  Doubleday,  began  to  arrive, 
reinforcing  Buford.  Another  hour  and  Fender's 
division  of  Lee's  army  reinforces  Heth.  About 
noon,  or  a  little  later,  Rodes'  division  arrives  from 
the  north  and  is  extending  Heth's  lines  eastward, 
when  Howard's  Eleventh  Corps  of  the  Union  army 
comes  up  from  the  south  reinforcing  Doubleday 
and  Buford,  and  engaging  Rodes,  to  the  north 
of  the  city.  All  this  time  the  battle  is  in  progress. 
An  hour  or  two  later  Early's  division  from  the 
northeast  reinforces  Rodes,  turning  the  tide  of 
battle  against  the  Union  army. 

At  four  o'clock  P.M.  Howard  and  Doubleday 
withdraw  their  shattered  columns  to  Cemetery  Hill, 
where  at  about  five  o'clock  they  are  reinforced  by 

[511 


GETTYSBURG 

Slocum's  Twelfth  Corps,  and  about  the  same  time 
General  Hancock  arrives  on  Cemetery  Hill ;  Meade 
having  received  Reynolds'  despatch  and  sending 
Hancock  forward  to  inspect  the  field  and  report  the 
situation. 

Night  declares  a  truce  to  the  battle,  but  not  to  the 
marching.  Before  morning  dawns,  Lee's  army  is 
all  in  line  except  Pickett's  division  and  Stuart's 
cavalry,  while  Lee  himself  has  established  his  head 
quarters  at  or  near  the  Lutheran  Seminary.  Han 
cock  has  reported  to  Meade  his  approval  of  the 
position  then  being  held  for  the  continuation  of  the 
battle.  Meade  has  accepted  Hancock's  report  as 
final;  has  ordered  his  whole  army  to  concentrate  at 
Gettysburg,  and  has  established  his  headquarters 
just  in  rear  or  south  of  Cemetery  Hill,  arriving  in 
person  about  midnight.  The  Second  Corps,  com 
manded  by  Hancock,  has  reached  the  field  and  pro 
longed  Meade's  line  to  the  left.  Sickles'  Third 
Corps  is  also  on  the  ground  ready  to  take  position 
in  the  line.  Still  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps,  num 
bering  28,000  men,  or  more  than  a  third  of  Meade's 
army,  are  absent.  With  the  coming  of  day,  the 

[52] 


GETTYSBURG 

manoeuvring  for  position  begins.  Neither  army 
seems  as  anxious  for  battle  as  it  was  the  day  before. 
They  adopt  the  tactics  of  the  Greeks  and  Persians 
at  Marathon  for  many  hours.  In  the  afternoon, 
however,  the  battle  opens  again  with  great  fury, 
and  continues  until  after  dark.  Just  before  sunset 
Meade  is  reinforced  by  the  fifth,  and  a  little  later 
by  the  third  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

Again  night  puts  an  end  to  the  carnage.  During 
the  night  of  July  second,  Pickett's  division  and 
Stuart's  cavalry  reinforce  Lee's  army;  he  then  has 
at  his  command  the  whole  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  while  the  first  and  second  divisions  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  arrive,  making  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  complete. 

When  dawns  the  morning  of  July  third,  the  two 
armies  face  each  other  in  their  entirety, —  all  that  is 
left  of  them.  General  Meade  has  at  last  concen 
trated  his  forces;  Lee  has  accomplished  the  same; 
and  they  are  ready  for  the  closing  struggle.  Such 
was  the  order  of  joining  battle,  at  Gettysburg,  on 
the  morning  of  the  third  day. 


[53] 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  MEETING  OF  THE  WAYS 

for  situation  is  Gettysburg, 
fairest  among  the  cities  of  the  Keystone  State, 
far-famed  and  most  glorious  of  battlefields  !  City 
of  monuments,  adorned  in  the  fair  garments  of 
Peace,  environed  with  the  memorials  of  war.  On 
every  hand  are  the  open  pages  whereon  Heroism 
and  Patriotism  have  written  their  deeds  of  valour 
and  endurance,  in  lines  so  deep  that  Time  himself 
shall  not  efface  their  memory. 

Gettysburg  stands  in  an  undulating  valley.  A 
half-mile  to  the  east  the  sparkling  waters  of  Rock 
Creek  meander  away  southward  until  lost  in  over 
shadowing  woods  that  darken  the  rocky  slopes  of 
bold  Gulp's  Hill. 

Northward  the  fair,  cultivated  valley,  with  its 
wealth  of  garden,  field,  orchard,  and  meadow, 
stretches  afar.  To  the  west,  seven  hundred  yards 
away,  the  Lutheran  Theological  Seminary  crowns 

[54] 


GETTYSBURG 

the  summit  of  Seminary  Ridge,  which  extends  in  a 
north  and  south  direction  as  far  as  the  eye  can  reach. 
From  Seminary  Ridge  westward  for  a  thousand 
yards  or  more  the  country  slopes  away  in  undulating 
waves  to  Willoughby  Run. 

South  of  the  city,  like  the  hanging  gardens  of 
Babylon  of  old,  rises  Cemetery  Hill,  beautifully 
adorned  to  its  summit  with  spreading  trees  and 
towering  monuments.  Cemetery  Hill  is  prolonged 
to  the  eastward,  separated  only  by  a  grassy  depres 
sion  from  the  rocky  ridge  known  as  Gulp's  Hill, 
which  rises  to  an  almost  impregnable  citadel  and 
then  slopes  away  to  the  southeastward  more  gently 
though  still  rugged,  for  a  mile  or  more  to  Rock 
Creek.  Cemetery  Hill  is  also  prolonged  to  the 
southwestward  by  what  is  called  the  Emmetsburg 
Road  Ridge,  until  it  intersects  and  becomes  a  part 
of  the  Seminary  Ridge,  two  and  a  half  miles  away. 
Still  another  ridge  puts  out  from  Cemetery  Hill  to 
the  southward,  which  rises  very  gently  from  the 
valley  to  the  westward  at  first,  becoming  more 
prominent  with  the  distance,  and  two  miles  and  a 
half  to  the  southward  terminates  in  Round  Top, 

[55] 


GETTYSBURG 

the  glory  of  the  Gettysburg  hills,  overlooking  all 
the  surrounding  landscape.  Southward  from  Round 
Top  the  valley  of  Rock  Creek  spreads  out  in  its 
loveliness,  beyond  the  ken  of  human  vision. 

A  dozen  highways  lead  into  and  converge  at 
Gettysburg,  and  they  were  all  there  in  1863.  Across 
the  streams,  along  the  ridges,  threading  the  valleys, 
over  the  hills  they  came,  from  the  north,  from  the 
south,  from  the  east,  and  from  the  west;  and  it  was 
owing  to  the  fact  that  Gettysburg  stood  in  1863,  as 
she  still  stands  to-day,  at  the  "  meeting  of  the  ways," 
that  she  was  destined  to  become  the  central  point  in, 
and  thus  to  give  her  name  to,  the  pivotal  battle  of 
America's  civil  war. 

Beginning  at  the  west,  or  a  little  north  of  west, 
where  the  battle  began,  there  is  first,  the  Chambers- 
burg  Pike,  which  crosses  Willoughby  Run  a  mile 
and  a  half  away,  and  Seminary  Ridge,  seven  or 
eight  hundred  yards  north  of  west  from  the  city. 
Just  north  of  this  road  and  only  a  short  distance 
from  it  is  the  railroad  from  Hagerstown,  that  cuts 
the  line  of  monuments  demarcating  the  old  battle- 
line,  just  east  of  Willoughby  Run.  At  the  time  of 

[56] 


GETTYSBURG 

the  battle  the  railroad  was  not  there,  but  the  grad 
ing  for  it  had  been  begun,  and  a  deep  cut  ran 
through  Seminary  Ridge,  wherein  now  runs  the 
railroad.  Second,  the  Mummasburg  Road  from  the 
northwest,  crossing  Willoughby  Run  and  Seminary 
Ridge  at  a  somewhat  greater  distance  from  the  city 
than  the  first;  third  and  fourth,  the  Carlisle  and 
Newville  Roads,  which  unite  about  a  mile  north  of 
the  city  and  enter  it  as  the  Carlisle  Road ;  fifth,  the 
Harrisburg  Road  from  the  capital  of  the  State, 
which  approaches  and  enters  the  city  from  east  of 
north,  crossing  Rock  Creek  about  a  mile  out;  sixth 
and  seventh,  the  York  Pike  and  the  Hunterstown 
Road,  which,  uniting  just  before  crossing  Rock 
Creek  about  three- fourths  of  a  mile  northeastward, 
enter  the  city  as  the  York  Pike.  Upon  these  seven 
roads  the  various  corps,  divisions,  and  brigades  com 
prising  Lee's  army  of  invasion  concentrated  at 
Gettysburg  to  meet  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Then  from  the  eastward  there  is  the  Hanover 
Road,  not  used  by  either  army  until  the  third  of 
July,  when  Stuart's  Confederate  cavalry  moved  out 
thereon  at  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  of  that  day, 

[57] 


GETTYSBURG 

and  a  mile  or  two  east  of  Gettysburg  was  met  and 
defeated  by  Pleasonton's  Union  cavalry.  The  Han 
over  Road  crosses  Rock  Creek  about  half  a  mile 
directly  east  of  the  city. 

From  the  southward  there  are  three  roads :  first, 
the  Baltimore  Pike,  which  crosses  Rock  Creek  three 
or  four  miles  to  the  southeast  of  the  city  and  enters 
it  over  the  eastern  slope  of  Cemetery  Hill;  second, 
the  Taneytown  Road,  leading  up  directly  from  the 
southward  and  just  east  of  Round  Top  and  the 
southern  prolongation  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  and 
entering  the  city  over  and  along  the  western  slope 
of  Cemetery  Hill;  third,  the  Emmetsburg  Road 
from  the  southwest  following  along  the  crest  of  the 
Emmetsburg  Road  Ridge,  crossing  the  Taneytown 
Road,  and  intersecting  the  Baltimore  Pike  on  the 
northern  slope  of  Cemetery  Hill  in  the  outskirts  of 
the  city,  thus  forming  her  main  street  north  and 
south,  called  Baltimore  Street.  Upon  the  aforesaid 
three  roads  the  various  corps,  divisions,  and  brigades 
of  the  Union  army  concentrated  at  Gettysburg  to 
give  battle  to  Lee's  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 
There  was  one  other  road  from  the  southwest  called 

[58] 


GETTYSBURG 

the  Hagerstown  or  Fair  field  Road,  which  crosses 
Willoughby  Run  something  like  a  mile  and  a  half 
south  of  west,  and  Seminary  Ridge  a  half-mile 
directly  west  of  Gettysburg.  This  road  was  not 
used  by  either  army  before  or  during  the  battle,  but 
it  led  away  from  Gettysburg  through  the  South 
Mountain  passes  to  Hagerstown  and  the  Potomac 
River;  and  during  the  battle  Lee  guarded  this  road 
as  the  apple  of  his  eye,  for  it  represented  his  back 
door  of  escape  if  the  battle  went  against  him.  After 
the  battle  was  over  he  found  this  gateway  through 
the  mountains  a  most  convenient  and  important 
way  over  which  to  lead  his  defeated  army  back  to 
the  shelter  of  his  friendly  Virginian  hills  beyond 
the  Potomac  River,  and  he  neglected  not  to  make 
good  use  of  it  for  that  purpose. 


[59] 


W 


CHAPTER  VIII 

JULY  FIRST,  1863 

HEN  dawned  the  morning  of  July  first, 
General  Buford  occupied  this  unique  posi 
tion:  With  one  small  division  of  cavalry  number 
ing  about  three  thousand  men,  he  was  guarding  the 
crossings  of  Willoughby  Run  on  two  highways 
leading  into,  and  from  a  mile  and  a  half  to  a  mile 
and  three-fourths  northwest  of,  Gettysburg;  Lee's 
whole  army  was  from  four  to  twenty-three  miles 
away,  every  division  and  brigade  of  which  was 
marching  steadily  and  rapidly  toward  him;  only 
two  corps  of  the  Union  army  were  in  position  to 
support  him,  one  of  them  numbering  8,500  men 
( Stannard's  brigade  of  the  third  division  not  being 
with  the  First  Corps  in  the  first  day's  battle)  being 
six  miles  away,  and  the  other  (the  Eleventh  Corps) 
9,500  strong,  at  Emmetsburg,  thirteen  miles  dis 
tant;  while  the  balance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  the  commanding  General  thereof  were  far  out 

[60] 


COL.  WILLIAM  GAMBLE 

Com.  1st  Brigade,  1st  Division,  Cavalry  Corps 


GETTYSBURG 

of  reach  for  that  day,  and  in  blissful  ignorance  of 
his  situation.  But  Buford  quailed  not;  and  Heth, 
with  the  leading  division  of  Lee's  army,  found  him 
at  his  post.  The  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry  of  Gam 
ble's  brigade,  out  on  the  Chambersburg  Pike  about 
a  mile  west  of  Willoughby  Run,  opened  the  battle 
with  Archer's  brigade  of  Heth's  infantry,  about 
eight  o'clock  in  the  morning.  The  First  Corps  of 
the  Union  army  was  early  astir,  and  as  we  were 
marching  along  the  Emmet sburg  Road  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Gettysburg,  our  ears  were  saluted  with  the 
first  cannon-shot  of  the  opening  battle.  The  shots 
sounded  far  away,  and  we  had  no  idea  that  we  were 
coming  almost  immediately  into  the  presence  of  the 
enemy.  We  were  within  a  mile  of  Gettysburg  and 
could  see  the  fair  city  to  the  northeastward,  reposing 
in  peace  that  summer  morning  ere  the  battle  began 
that  was  to  shake  the  very  stones  of  her  foundations. 
It  was  just  before  nine  o'clock,  and  here  we  were 
met  by  General  Reynolds,  who  had  returned  to  urge 
us  forward  with  all  possible  speed  to  the  support  of 
Buford.  General  Reynolds  sat  upon  his  horse  on 
the  west  side  of  the  highway  facing  us,  and  as  we 

[61] 


GETTYSBURG 

marched  near  the  head  of  the  column  we  had  a  fair 
view  of  his  features.  The  General  looked  careworn, 
and  we  thought,  very  sad,  but  the  high  purpose  of 
his  patriotic  soul  was  stamped  upon  every  lineament. 
It  was  the  last  time  we  saw  him.  He  directed  the 
turning  of  our  column  to  the  westward  and  then 
rode  rapidly  toward  Gettysburg  to  confer  with 
Buford  at  his  headquarters  at  the  Seminary. 
Within  a  short  half -hour  thereafter  he  had  given 
his  life  for  his  country. 

As  we  turned  from  the  Emmetsburg  Road  west 
ward,  scattering  solid-shot  tore  through  the  tree- 
tops  above  our  heads,  reminding  us  that  the  battle 
was  on  in  earnest,  and  much  nearer  than  we  had 
supposed.  Then  Fairchild,  our  Colonel,  sprang 
from  his  horse,  which  he  gave  to  the  care  of  Sanf ord, 
his  hostler,  as  he  shouted  his  command,  "  Non-com 
batants  to  the  rear  ! "  We  marched  rapidly  for 
ward,  loading  our  guns  as  we  advanced.  Within 
five  hundred  yards  from  the  point  where  our  Colonel 
dismounted  we  reached  the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge. 
Five  hundred  yards  farther,  and  we  entered  the 
edge  of  McPherson's  Woods  —  afterwards  called 

[62] 


MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  F.  REYNOLDS 

Com.  1st,  3d,  and  llth  Corps,  July  1 


O 

o 


O   ^ 


GETTYSBURG 

Reynolds'  Woods  —  on  the  crest  of  a  second  ridge, 
where  Buford's  thin  line  was  heroically  holding 
Archer's  infantry  in  check,  which  was  advancing 
steadily  through  the  woods  from  the  westward. 

At  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  long  before, 
"  all  quality,  pride,  pomp,  and  circumstance  of  glo 
rious  war"  had  disappeared  from  the  American 
armies  on  either  side.  A  few  regiments  or  brigades 
wore  some  distinguishing  feature  of  dress  besides 
the  corps-badge,  by  which  they  were  recognized,  but 
there  was  to  be  seen  among  our  embattled  ranks 
nothing  to  compare  with  the  pomp  and  show  of  war, 
as  portrayed  by  Hugo,  on  the  field  of  Waterloo: 

"  The  flaming  calbacks,  the  waving  sabre-taches,  the  crossed 
shoulder-belts,  the  grenade  cartridge-boxes,  the  dolmans  of 
the  huzzars,  the  red  boots  with  a  thousand  creases,  the  heavy 
shakos  festooned  with  fringe,  the  almost  black  infantry  of 
Brunswick  united  with  the  scarlet  infantry  of  England,  the 
English  soldiers  with  great  white  circular  pads  on  their 
sleeves  for  epaulets,  the  Hanoverian  light  horse  with  their 
oblong  leather  caps  with  copper  bands  and  flowing  plumes  of 
red  horsehair,  the  Scotch  with  bare  knees  and  plaids,  and  the 
large  white  gaiters  of  our  grenadiers." 

In  our  whole  army  there  was  no  more  distin 
guished  brigade  in  the  matter  of  dress  than  the  old 
Iron  Brigade  of  the  First  Corps,  which  was  the  first 

[63] 


GETTYSBURG 

infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  relieve  the 
cavalry  and  join  battle  with  Heth's  leading  brigade 
of  Lee's  infantry  on  the  morning  of  the  first  of 
July.  This  distinguishing  feature  of  dress  was  not 
for  style  or  foolishness,  but  simply  because  the 
brigade  at  its  first  organization  had  been  supplied 
with  the  black  regulation  army-hats  instead  of  caps, 
which  articles  of  headgear  were  retained  through 
out  the  war.  These  hats  were  looped  up  on  the 
right  side,  and  contained  a  small  plume  or  feather, 
also  on  the  right  side,  and  a  blue  cord  for  a  band. 
This  brigade  was  known  throughout  both  armies 
as  the  "  Black  Hats  " ;  but  even  these  hats  were  far 
from  showy  when  the  old  brigade  relieved  the 
cavalry  that  morning.  At  this  stage  of  the  game 
the  regiments  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were 
not  there  for  vain-glory,  but  for  business;  and  the 
same  may  be  truthfully  said  of  the  Confederates. 
What  we  saw  that  July  morning  as  we  neared  the 
edge  of  the  woods  was  a  thin  line  of  horsemen 
dressed  in  faded  blue  with  yellow  trimmings, 
powder-begrimed  and  disordered  by  the  heat  of  bat 
tle,  fighting  as  best  they  could  to  delay  the  advanc- 

[64] 


GETTYSBURG 

ing  enemy.  Then  came  the  order,  "  Forward  into 
line,"  and  the  Second  Wisconsin  Infantry,  number 
ing  about  three  full  companies,  surged  forward  like 
a  wave  of  the  sea,  and  a  dark  line  of  worn  and 
ragged  blue  swept  on  toward  the  wooded  crest. 
Behind  that  line  the  cavalry  retired,  and  on  the  crest 
of  the  hill  we  were  confronted  by  a  heavy  line  of 
ragged  butternut,  firing  steadily  as  they  advanced 
up  the  slope.  Before  us  was  the  far-extending  line 
of  Archer's  brigade;  behind  us  were  three  regiments 
of  our  own  brigade,  which,  wave  after  wave,  surged 
forward  to  extend  our  line  to  the  right  and  to  the 
left,  as  we  moved  steadily  down  the  slope  receiving 
a  galling  fire  from  Archer's  men.  It  was,  as  in 
thousands  of  other  instances,  just  the  unadorned, 
long-drawn-out  line  of  ragged,  dirty  blue  against  the 
long-drawn-out  line  of  dirty,  ragged  butternut,  with 
no  "  pomp  of  war "  about  it,  and  no  show  or  style 
except  our  old  black  hats.  Archer's  men  recognized 
these  at  once,  and  shouted  to  each  other,  "Thar 
comes  them  old  black-hats  !  It 's  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  sure  ! " 

[65] 


GETTYSBURG 

Before  we  had  advanced  thirty  yards  into  the 
woods,  our  Colonel  received  a  severe  wound,  from 
which  he  lost  an  arm;  and  immediately  after,  our 
Lieutenant-Colonel  was  killed.  We  held  our  fire 
until  within  ten  yards  of  the  Confederate  line,  and 
then  gave  them  a  volley  that  counted;  for  Archer's 
line  gave  way,  retreating  slowly  and  stubbornly 
through  the  woods  and  finally  across  Willoughby 
Run.  We  followed  closely  upon  their  heels,  and, 
crossing  the  run  about  a  moment  later,  captured 
General  Archer  and  several  hundred  of  his  men  who 
had  taken  shelter  behind  a  clump  of  willows.  In 
the  charge  across  the  Run  this  willow-clump,  very 
compact  and  interwoven,  divided  the  second  regi 
ment  into  two  parts,  our  veteran  being  in  the  right 
battalion  or  division.  The  left  division  was  led  by 
Captain  Charles  Dow,  and  to  him  General  Archer 
surrendered  and  offered  his  sword.  But  Captain 
Dow  replied :  "  Keep  your  sword,  General,  and  go 
to  the  rear;  one  sword  is  all  I  need  on  this  line."  So 
General  Archer  passed  in  front  of  the  willow-clump 
toward  our  right  before  crossing  the  Run  to  the  rear. 
When  within  about  forty  yards  of  us  he  was  met  by 

[661 


CAPTAIN  CHAS.  C.  DOW 
(From  a  war-time  photograph) 


BRIG.-GEX.  .1.  -J.  ARCHER 

Diritdon,   3d   6'or/jx,   Ann}/    Norilicni    Virginia 


GETTYSBURG 

a  lieutenant  of  the  second  regiment  then  serving  as 
a  staff  officer,  who  demanded  of  Archer  his  sword. 
At  first  the  General  refused,  trying  to  explain  his 
right  to  .retain  it  by  the  order  of  Captain  Dow,  but 
the  lieutenant  insisted,  and  to  save  further  trouble 
the  General  surrendered  his  sword  to  the  man  who 
had  no  right  to  receive  it.  It  is  not  always  that 
the  man  on  the  outmost  line  receives  the  reward 
which  is  his  due. 

Just  as  General  Archer  and  his  captured  men 
were  crossing  the  Run  to  the  rear,  under  a  hastily 
improvised  guard,  and  it  became  certain  that  we  had 
won  the  first  heat  of  battle,  a  sergeant  of  our  com 
pany,  Jonathan  Bryan  by  name,  was  shot  through 
the  heart  by  a  Confederate  from  the  edge  of  the 
woods  beyond  a  field  in  our  front,  while  waving  his 
hat  and  cheering  for  victory.  He  was  by  birth  a 
Pennsylvanian,  and  one  of  the  best  and  bravest 
among  the  soldiers  of  the  Second  Wisconsin.  Com 
rade  Bryan  was  the  only  man  of  our  regiment  killed 
west  of  Willoughby  Run. 

When  the  old  veteran  visited  Gettysburg  in  1900, 
he  found  no  stone  marking  the  spot  where  the  brave 

[67] 


GETTYSBURG 

common-soldier  fell,  nor  yet  a  monument  or  marker 
to  show  the  place  where  we  captured  Archer,  nor 
a  line  on  our  regimental  monument  telling  to  the 
world  the  important  fact  in  the  history  of  the  regi 
ment,  that  the  Second  Wisconsin  Infantry  crossed 
Willoughby  Run  on  the  first  day  of  July,  1863,  and 
there  captured  General  Archer  of  the  Confederate 
army.  Why  this  oversight  or  neglect  ? 

A  few  moments  after  comrade  Bryan  was  killed, 
our  line  was  withdrawn  to  the  east  side,  and  we  took 
up  a  defensive  position  with  Willoughby  Run  in 
our  front  at  close  rifle-range.  Our  brigade  com 
prised  five  regiments,  but  the  Sixth  Wisconsin, 
being  on  division  rear-guard  during  the  march  of 
the  morning,  was  not  with  us.  It  followed  the 
second  brigade,  coming  upon  the  field  a  little  later, 
and  with  that  brigade  it  passed  by  our  rear  and 
engaged  in  the  morning's  first  battle  with  Davis's 
Confederates,  who  were  also  of  Heth's  division 
farther  to  the  right,  extending  our  battle-line  beyond 
or  north  of  the  Chambersburg  Pike. 

Immediately  after  forming  our  battle-line  east  of 
Willoughby  Run,  we  threw  out  a  skirmish  or  picket 

[68] 


GETTYSBURG 

line  well  screened  by  the  bushes  on  the  bank  of  the 
Run,  and  then  proceeded  to  call  the  roll  of  com 
panies  and  take  an  inventory  of  our  losses.  We 
went  into  that  morning  skirmish  with  a  total  strength 
of  three  hundred  and  two  men  in  our  regiment. 
The  battle  did  not  last  more  than  thirty  minutes, 
but  our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  one  hundred 
and  sixteen,  or  thirty-eight  per  cent.  This  fact 
shows,  as  heretofore  stated,  that  the  Confederate 
soldiers  were  expert  marksmen  and  used  good 
powder.  The  other  regiments  of  our  brigade  did 
not  meet  with  so  heavy  a  loss,  for  the  Confederate 
fire  was  concentrated  upon  us,  as  we  charged  down 
the  slope  through  the  grove;  but  their  prompt  and 
active  support  enabled  us  to  drive  General  Archer 
to  cover,  and,  as  Longstreet  tells  us  in  his 
"Memoirs,"  page  354,  "captured  General  Archer 
and  one  thousand  of  Heth's  men."  Herein  Long- 
street  gives  us  greater  credit  than  belongs  to  us,  a 
generosity  unusual  for  him.  We  captured  Archer 
and  more  men  than  the  second  regiment  took  into 
battle;  but  our  brigade  did  not  capture  a  thousand 
at  that  time,  though  during  the  whole  day  the  two 

[69] 


GETTYSBURG 

brigades  of  Wadsworth's  division  captured  a  thou 
sand  or  more  of  Heth's  men.  Our  second  brigade 
—  Cutler's  —  was  also  victorious  on  our  right;  and 
between  the  two  we  humbled  the  pride  of  Archer's 
and  Davis's  brigades,  thoroughly. 

Following  this  sharp  skirmish  of  the  morning, 
there  was  a  lull  in  the  battle,  lasting  from  half  to 
three-fourths  of  an  hour.  The  second  and  third 
divisions  of  the  First  Corps  arrived  during  the  lull 
and  extended  our  lines  to  the  right  and  left,  making 
the  battle-front  of  the  First  Corps  a  mile  or  more 
in  length,  facing  nearly  westward,  and  in  that  line 
we  mustered  8,500  men,  before  our  losses  of  the 
morning,  which  were  severe. 

Buford's  cavalry,  which  had  fought  Heth's 
infantry  for  an  hour  before  being  relieved  by  our 
First  Corps,  and  had  lost  heavily  in  the  engagement, 
then  moved  to  the  northward  to  protect  our  right. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Confederates,  under  A.  P. 
Hill  commanding  their  Third  Corps,  were  re-form 
ing  their  lines  for  the  renewal  of  the  battle.  Arch 
er's  brigade  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Fry,  and 
reinforced  with  Pettigrew's  and  Brockenbrough's 

[70] 


GETTYSBURG 

brigades.  Hill  was  also  reinforced  by  Fender's 
division;  Thomas's  brigade  on  his  left  supporting 
Davis,  and  Lane's,  Scales',  and  Perrins'  brigades 
supporting  his  right  and  overlapping  the  Union 
left.  This  gave  the  Confederates'  strength  in  our 
front  at  eight  brigades,  as  against  our  six,  each  of 
which  was  numerically  stronger  than  ours. 

While  we  lay  in  battle-line  during  this  lull,  our 
wounded  were  assisted  to  the  rear,  but  the  dead  were 
left  where  they  fell,  —  in  fact  we  had  no  men  to 
spare  from  our  ranks  for  any  purpose  where  the 
absolute  necessity  did  not  exist;  and  we  noticed  a 
soldier  of  our  company  who  had  been  wounded,  some 
distance  to  the  rear,  as  we  came  through  the  wood. 
He  had  secured  two  muskets  from  the  field,  which 
he  was  using  as  crutches,  and  when  we  last  saw  him 
he  was  far  up  the  slope,  making  his  way  off  the 
field  without  assistance,  though  so  severely  wounded 
that  his  leg  was  afterwards  amputated  above  the 
knee.  He  lived  for  many  years  after  the  war 
ended. 

Before  the  battle  reopened,  word  was  passed  along 
our  line  informing  us  of  the  death  of  General 

[71] 


GETTYSBURG 

Reynolds.  He  was  killed  a  few  moments  after  he 
went  into  action  in  the  morning,  a  little  to  the  right 
and  about  fifty  yards  in  front  of  the  point  where  we 
entered  the  wood.  A  granite  monument  marks  the 
spot  where  he  fell,  and  the  grove  is  now  renamed 
"Reynolds' Woods." 

About  half -past  ten  o'clock  our  pickets  reported 
the  advancing  of  the  enemy  in  strong  force,  and  soon 
thereafter  the  battle  reopened  all  along  the  line. 

In  the  immediate  front  of  the  position  held  by 
the  Second  Wisconsin  in  the  wood,  Willoughby 
Run  ran  in  and  out  among  the  willow-clumps,  leav 
ing  many  rocky  spaces  free  from  cover;  and  as  the 
Confederates  advanced  to  cross  the  Run,  we  tried 
to  make  it  lively  for  them,  and  so  far  succeeded  that 
they  were  a  full  hour  in  forcing  the  passage;  but 
they  were  brave  and  determined,  and  after  desper 
ate  resistance  we  were  obliged  to  concede  them  the 
privilege  of  crossing.  However,  we  did  not  then  sur 
render  the  grove,  but  held  on  to  it  for  hours,  yield 
ing  it  only  foot  by  foot,  and  inch  by  inch.  The 
grove  was  our  citadel,  and  it  in  itself  furnished  the 
means  of  strong  defence.  Every  tree  was  a  breast- 

[72] 


GETTYSBURG 

work,  every  log  a  barricade,  every  bush  a  cover  and 
concealment,  and  we  made  good  use  of  every  defen 
sive  object. 

From  Willoughby  Run  to  Seminary  Ridge  the 
distance  is  not  great.  It  is  475  yards  from  the  creek 
to  the  ridge  at  the  eastern  edge  of  the  woods,  where 
our  battle  with  Archer  began  in  the  morning;  and 
500  yards  from  the  edge  of  the  grove  to  the  crest  of 
Seminary  Ridge.  We  measured  this  ground  care 
fully  in  1900,  because  we  remembered  it  as  a  good 
long  two  miles  in  that  day  of  battle.  The  whole 
distance  is  less  than  a  thousand  yards,  but  it  took 
Hill's  Confederates  five  weary  hours  to  travel  it, 
and  then  they  did  not  quite  reach  the  goal  of  their 
ambition  until  after  we  had  abandoned  it  from  other 
causes. 


[73] 


CHAPTER  IX 

HOWARD  IN  COMMAND 

WHILE  this  struggle  in  Reynolds'  Grove 
was  going  on  in  all  its  fury,  and  the  battle 
was  raging  desperately  along  the  whole  front  of  the 
First  Corps,  General  Howard  arrived  in  advance  of 
his  Corps  (the  Eleventh)  and  assumed  command 
of  the  field  as  the  ranking  General.  The  cupola  of 
the  Lutheran  Seminary  was  the  headquarters  of  the 
Union  forces  on  the  first  day  of  July,  1863,  first 
under  Buford  and  Reynolds,  later  under  Double- 
day,  and  finally  under  Howard.  The  cupola  was  a 
tower  of  observation  from  which  all  the  surrounding 
country  could  be  seen  as  from  no  other  point ;  from 
that  cupola  General  Howard  caught  his  first  full 
view  of  the  battlefield  and  the  situation,  and  at 
once  resolved  to  do  his  utmost  in  fighting  to  a  suc 
cessful  finish  the  mighty  game  that  Buford  and 
Reynolds  had  so  heroically  begun.  He  therefore 
directed  the  first  and  third  divisions  of  the 

[74] 


GETTYSBURG 

Eleventh  Corps,  under  General  Carl  Schurz,  to 
extend  our  right  from  the  Mummasburg  Road, 
where  it  crosses  the  Seminary  Ridge  about  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  northwest  of  Gettysburg,  east 
ward  to  Rock  Creek;  and  he  placed  the  second 
division  in  reserve  on  Cemetery  Hill,  south  of  the 
city,  knowing  that  it  would  become  necessary  to 
retire  to  that  position  before  reinforcements  could 
arrive.  This  was  a  wise  and  soldier-like  movement 
on  the  part  of  General  Howard,  as  was  afterwards 
demonstrated. 

Schurz's  two  divisions  gave  us  an  additional 
strength  of  four  brigades,  or  6,300  men,  swelling 
our  aggregate  battle  strength  to  17,800  including 
Buford's  cavalry. 

Later,  Stein wehr  was  ordered  to  send  Coster's 
brigade  to  protect  Schurz's  right,  on  Rock  Creek 
northeast  from  Gettysburg.  Counting  the  full 
strength  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  in  the  'day's  battle, 
Howard's  force  comprised  about  21,000  men. 
Schurz's  line  of  battle  from  Seminary  Ridge  to 
Rock  Creek  was  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  in 
length,  and  formed  nearly  a  right  angle  with  the 

[75] 


GETTYSBURG 

line  of  the  First  Corps.  As  Schurz  advanced  his 
line  northward  he  was  met  by  Swell's  third  divi 
sion,  commanded  by  Rodes,  comprising  the  bri 
gades  of  Daniel,  Iverson,  Doles,  Ramseur,  and 
O'Neal,  five  brigades  in  all  against  Schurz's  four 
brigades.  Rodes  had  also  occupied  Seminary 
Ridge  north  of  the  Mummasburg  Road,  and  plac 
ing  his  artillery  in  position  on  Oak  Hill,  a  promi 
nent  point  of  Seminary  Ridge,  about  a  half-mile 
northward,  used  it  with  deadly  effect  both  on 
Doubleday's  right  and  Schurz's  left,  while  the  latter 
was  forming  his  brigades  for  battle. 

As  thus  extended  by  the  forces  of  Schurz  against 
Rodes,  the  battle  was  in  full  progress  from  Semi 
nary  Ridge  to  Rock  Creek  by  half -past  one  or  two 
o'clock,  and  all  that  afternoon  raged  in  great  fury 
on  both  of  Howard's  battle-fronts ;  to  the  westward 
under  Doubleday,  and  to  the  northward  under 
Schurz. 

Out  on  the  west  front,  we  of  the  Iron  Brigade, 
after  hours  of  desperate  fighting,  had  at  last  been 
driven  from  Reynolds'  Grove,  about  three  o'clock 
P.M.,  and  our  lines  to  the  right  and  left  seemed  to 

[76] 


MAJ.-GEN.  OLIVER  0.  HOWARD 
Com.  llth  Corps 


02   « 


GETTYSBURG 

be  giving  way.  When  we  found  ourselves  on  the 
eastern  verge  of  the  wood  there  was  behind  us  an 
open  field  extending  to  the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge, 
five  hundred  yards  distant.  To  our  right  and  to  our 
left  our  line  bent  back  toward  the  ridge,  and  our 
flanks  would  soon  be  exposed ;  besides,  we  had  more 
than  we  could  do  to  hold  our  front.  After  aban 
doning  the  grove  there  was  but  one  other  position 
short  of  Seminary  Ridge  that  there  was  any  chance 
of  holding.  That  was  in  the  hollow,  —  a  kind  of  dry 
run  or  wet  weather  creek  between  the  two  ridges, 
two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  either.  This 
position  we  held  for  some  time,  giving  the  Johnnies 
a  hot  reception  as  they  came  out  of  the  wood  and 
advanced  down  the  slope. 

Behind  us  on  the  ridge  was  our  artillery,  which  up 
to  this  time  had  given  us  no  assistance  in  the  battle. 
In  fact  it  had  been  an  infantry  engagement  along 
our  part  of  the  line  since  the  opening  of  the  battle 
in  the  morning.  Not  an  artillery  shot,  not  a  burst 
ing  shell,  not  a  swish  of  canister  had  disturbed  our 
lines  that  we  can  now  remember.  It  was,  or  had 
been,  peculiarly  an  infantry  battle,  and  on  both  sides 

[77] 


GETTYSBURG 

the  artillery  had  kept  hands  off,  or  had  been  engaged 
in  other  parts  of  the  field.  But  when  the  butternut 
line  surged  heavily  down  the  slope  upon  us,  and  we 
saw  to  the  right  and  the  left  that  we  were  still  in 
advance  of  our  general  lines,  and  the  hollow  became 
hot  with  the  incessant  hum  of  the  bees  of  battle,  then 
we  concluded  that  we  must  make  a  dash  for  the  crest 
of  the  hill,  where  the  artillery  could  assist  us.  We 
cannot  remember  of  hearing  any  order  to  retreat, 
but  as  a  flock  of  birds  are  seen  to  quit  their  tree  at 
the  same  instant,  so  every  man  seemed  to  take  in  at 
a  glance  the  necessity  of  hastily  withdrawing.  If 
our  recollection  is  not  at  fault,  we  passed  over  that 
last  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  much  more  rapidly 
than  over  any  other  portion  of  our  journey  from 
Willoughby  Run  to  Seminary  Ridge  on  the  first  day 
of  July,  1863. 

The  Confederates  were  surging  down  the  oppo 
site  slope  under  a  cloud  of  fire  and  smoke,  when  we 
started  to  gain  the  ridge,  and  immediately  they 
divined  our  intention.  They  seemed  to  think  it 
would  be  the  proper  thing  for  them  to  run  in  under 
the  cover  of  our  batteries  with  us,  and  they  did  their 

[73] 


GETTYSBURG 

very  best  to  accomplish  that  strategy.  It  became  at 
once  a  life  and  death  race  for  all  of  us.  Any  man 
left  on  the  face  of  that  hillside  when  the  artillery 
should  open  with  canister  would  never  fight  again. 
It  was  certain  death  to  any  comrade  disabled  in  that 
wild  rush;  a  wound,  a  slip  of  the  foot,  a  misstep, 
were  fatal. 

The  Confederates  had  ceased  firing  and  were 
giving  their  whole  attention  to  the  race,  for,  blue  or 
gray,  we  must  get  inside  the  range  of  those  gaping 
mouths  before  they  belch  their  fire,  or  we  are  doomed. 
How  many  of  our  comrades  were  left  behind  in  that 
awful  race,  God  only  knows  !  We  who  got  in  had 
time  to  take  one  hasty  glance  behind.  Our  boys 
seemed  safe ;  there  were  a  few  of  them  in  a  kind  of 
fringe  hanging  between  the  battery  sections,  that 
the  gunners  were  swerving  their  pieces  to  avoid,  but 
farther  down,  two-thirds  of  the  way  up  the  hill, 
came  the  Confederates,  yelling  like  demons,  in  a 
mad  charge  for  our  guns. 

We  had  struck  the  crest  just  north  of  a  small 
building  which  stood  near  the  north  end  of  the  Sem 
inary  and  about  forty  yards  south  of  the  Chambers- 

[79] 


GETTYSBURG 

burg  Pike.  Here  was  stationed  one  section  of 
Stevens'  Fifth  Maine  Battery,  the  other  sections 
being  stationed,  one  between  this  small  building  and 
the  Seminary,  and  the  other  south  of  the  Seminary. 
Across  the  Chambersburg  Pike  were  stationed  three 
guns  of  Battery  B,  Fourth  United  States  Artillery, 
in  half  battery,  the  other  half  battery  being  sta 
tioned  a  hundred  yards  farther  north  and  beyond 
the  railroad  cut.  Along  the  ridge  north  and  south 
of  these  batteries,  which  were  in  our  immediate 
vicinity,  were  ranged  the  other  batteries  of  the  First 
Corps,  namely,  Battery  L,  First  New  York,  Bat 
tery  B,  First  Pennsylvania,  and  Battery  B,  Second 
Maine;  five  batteries,  or  thirty  guns  in  all.  These 
guns  were  brimmed  with  shell  or  double-shotted 
with  canister ;  they  were  carefully  posted  by  the  best 
field  artillerymen  in  the  army ;  every  man  was  at  his 
station,  and  they  were  awaiting  this  very  opportu 
nity.  The  charging  Confederates  were  brave  men, 
—  in  fact,  no  braver  ever  faced  death  in  any  cause, 
and  none  ever  faced  more  certain  death  ! 

Almost  at  the  same  moment,  as  if  every  lanyard 
was  pulled  by  the  same  hand,  this  line  of  artillery 

[80] 


GETTYSBURG 

opened,  and  Seminary  Ridge  blazed  with  a  solid  sheet 
of  flame,  and  the  missiles  of  death  that  swept  its 
western  slopes  no  human  beings  could  endure.  After 
a  few  moments  of  the  belching  of  the  artillery,  the 
blinding  smoke  shut  out  the  sun  and  obstructed  the 
view.  We  of  the  infantry  fell  into  line  between 
the  artillery  sections  and  assisted  with  our  musketry, 
keeping  up  the  fire  until  our  pieces  grew  hot  in  our 
hands,  and  the  darkness,  as  of  night,  had  settled 
upon  us.  Not  a  Confederate  reached  our  line. 
After  we  had  ceased  firing  and  the  smoke  of  battle 
had  lifted,  we  looked  again,  but  the  charging  Con 
federates  were  not  there.  Only  the  dead  and  dying 
remained  on  the  bloody  slopes  of  Seminary  Ridge. 
This  struggle  for  the  possession  of  Seminary 
Ridge  is  described  by  one  of  the  boys  of  Battery  B 
of  the  Fourth  United  States  Artillery,  whose  station 
was  about  seventy  yards  north  of  our  position,  who 
gives  an  account  of  the  same  battle  from  an  artillery 
man's  point  of  view,  and  also  from  a  different  but 
near-by  position.  The  "  Cannoneer"  writes  of  this 
battle  as  follows: 

[81] 


GETTYSBURG 

"  In  the  meantime  our  infantry  out  in  the  field  toward  the 
creek  was  being  slowly  but  surely  overpowered,  and  our  lines 
were  being  forced  in  toward  the  Seminary.  It  was  now  con 
siderably  past  noon.  In  addition  to  the  struggle  going  on  in 
our  immediate  front,  the  sounds  of  a  heavy  attack  from  the 
north  side  were  heard,  and  away  out  beyond  the  creek  to  the 
south  a  strong  force  could  be  seen  advancing  and  overlapping 
our  left.  The  enemy  was  coming  nearer,  both  in  front  and 
on  the  north,  and  stray  balls  began  to  zip  and  whistle  around 
our  ears  with  unpleasant  frequency.  Then  we  saw  the  bat 
teries  that  had  been  holding  the  position  in  advance  of  us 
limber  up  and  fall  back  toward  the  Seminary,  and  the  enemy 
simultaneously  advance  his  batteries  down  the  road.  All  our 
infantry  out  toward  the  creek  on  both  sides  of  the  pike  began 
to  fall  back. 

"  The  enemy  did  not  press  them  very  closely,  but  halted  for 
nearly  an  hour  to  re-form  his  lines,  which  had  been  very  much 
shattered  by  the  battle  of  the  forenoon.  At  last,  having 
re-formed  his  lines  behind  the  low  ridges  in  his  front,  he  made 
his  appearance  in  grand  shape.  His  line  stretched  from  the 
railroad  grading  across  the  Cashtown  or  Chambersburg  Pike, 
and  through  the  fields  south  of  it  half  way  to  the  Fairfield 
Road  —  nearly  a  mile  in  length.  First  we  could  see  the  tips 
of  their  color-staffs  coming  up  over  the  little  ridge,  then  the 
points  of  their  bayonets,  and  then  the  Johnnies  themselves, 
coming  on  with  a  steady  tramp,  tramp,  and  with  loud  yells. 
It  was  now  apparent  that  our  old  Battery's  turn  had  come 
again,  and  the  embattled  boys  who  stood  so  grimly  at  their 
posts  felt  that  another  page  must  be  added  to  the  record  of 
Buena  Vista  and  Antietam.  The  term  *  boys  '  is  literally  true, 
because  of  our  gun  detachment  alone,  consisting  of  a  sergeant, 
two  corporals,  seven  cannoneers,  and  six  drivers,  only  four 
had  hair  on  their  faces ;  while  the  other  twelve  were  beardless 
boys  whose  age  would  not  average  nineteen  years,  and  who,  at 

[82] 


GETTYSBURG 

any  other  period  of  our  history,  would  have  been  at  school. 
The  same  was  more  or  less  true  of  all  the  other  gun  detach 
ments.* 

"  But  if  boys  in  years,  they  were  veterans  in  battle,  and 
braver  or  steadier  soldiers  than  they  were  never  faced  a  foe. 

"  A  glance  along  our  line  at  that  moment  would  have 
afforded  a  rare  study  for  an  artist.  As  the  day  was  hot, 
many  had  their  jackets  off,  some  with  sleeves  rolled  up,  and 
they  exchanged  little  words  of  cheer  with  each  other  as  the 
gray  line  came  on.  In  quick,  sharp  tones,  like  successive 
reports  of  a  repeating  rifle,  came  Davison's  orders : 

"  '  Load  —  Canister  —  Double ! '  There  was  a  hustling  of 
cannoneers,  a  few  thumps  of  the  rammer-heads,  and  then: 
'  Ready  —  By  piece  —  At  will  —  Fire ! ' 

"  We  were  formed  '  straddle '  of  the  railroad  cut,  the  *  Old 
Man,'  as  we  called  Captain  Stewart,  with  three  guns  forming 
the  right  half-battery  on  the  north  side,  and  Davison  with 
the  three  guns  of  the  left  half  on  the  south  side.  Stewart's 
three  guns  were  somewhat  in  advance  of  ours,  forming  a 
slight  echelon  in  half-battery,  while  our  three  guns  were  in 
open  order,  bringing  the  left  gun  close  to  the  Chambersburg 
Road.  We  were  formed  in  a  small  field,  and  our  guns  raked 
the  road  to  the  top  of  the  low  crest  forming  the  east  bank  of 
Willoughby  Run.  The  time  of  day  was  about  2:30  or  3  P.M. 
Hall's  and  Reynolds'  batteries  which  had  held  the  crest  in 
our  right-front  had  retired  to  Seminary  Ridge,  and  all  the 
infantry  of  the  First  Corps  that  had  been  fighting  in  our  front 
had  fallen  back.  Directly  in  our  front  —  that  is  to  say,  on 
both  sides  of  the  pike  —  the  Rebel  infantry,  whose  left  lapped 
the  north  side  of  the  pike  quite  up  to  the  line  of  the  railroad 
grading,  had  been  forced  to  halt  and  lie  down  to  avoid  the 
tornado  of  canister  that  we  had  given  them  from  the  moment 

*This  was  true  of  our  whole  army :  an  army  of  boys. 


GETTYSBURG 

they  came  in  sight  over  the  bank  of  the  creek.  But  the  regi 
ments  in  the  field  to  their  right,  south  of  the  pike,  kept  on, 
swinging  their  right  flanks  forward  as  if  to  take  us  in  reverse, 
or  cut  us  off  from  the  rest  of  our  troops  near  the  Seminary. 
At  this  moment,  Davison,  bleeding  from  two  desperate  wounds 
and  so  weak  that  one  of  the  boys  had  to  hold  him  up  on  his 
feet  —  one  ankle  being  shattered  —  ordered  us  to  form  the 
half-battery  action  left,  by  wheeling  on  the  left  gun  as  a 
pivot,  so  as  to  bring  the  half-battery  on  a  line  with  the  Cham- 
bersburg  Pike,  muzzles  facing  south.  His  object  was  to  rake 
the  front  of  the  Rebel  line  closing  in  on  us  from  that  side.  Of 
the  four  men  left  at  our  gun  when  this  order  was  given,  two 
had  bloody  heads,  but  they  were  still  fighting,  and  Sergeant 
Mitchel  jumped  on  our  off  wheel  to  help  us.  This  change  of 
front  gave  us  a  clear  rake  along  the  Rebel  line  for  a  whole 
brigade  length,  but  it  exposed  our  right  flank  to  the  raking 
volleys  of  their  infantry  near  the  pike,  who  at  that  moment 
began  to  get  up  and  come  on  again.  Then  for  seven  or  eight 
minutes  ensued  probably  the  most  desperate  fighting  ever 
waged  between  artillery  and  infantry  at  close  range,  without 
a  particle  of  cover  on  either  side.  They  gave  us  volley  after 
volley  in  front  and  flank,  and  we  gave  them  double-canister  as 
fast  as  we  could  load.  The  Sixth  Wisconsin  and  the  Eleventh 
Pennsylvania  infantry  crawled  up  over  the  bank  of  the  rail 
road  cut,  or  behind  the  rail  fence  in  rear  of  Stewart's  caissons, 
and  joined  their  musketry  to  our  canister,  while  from  the 
north  side  of  the  cut  flashed  the  chain-lightning  of  the  '  Old 
Man's '  half-battery  in  one  solid  streak. 

"  At  this  time  our  left  half-battery,  taking  their  first  line 
en  echarpe,  swept  it  so  clean  with  double-canister  that  they 
sagged  away  from  the  road  to  get  cover  from  the  fences  and 
trees  that  lined  it.  From  our  second  round  on,  a  gray  squir 
rel  could  not  have  crossed  that  road  alive.  The  very  guns 
became  things  of  life  —  not  implements,  but  comrades. 

[84] 


GETTYSBURG 

Every  man  was  doing  the  work  of  two  or  three.  At  our  gun, 
at  the  finish,  there  were  only  the  Corporal,  No.  1,  and  No.  3, 
with  two  drivers  fetching  water.  The  water  in  their  buckets 
was  like  ink,  their  faces  and  hands  smeared  all  over  with 
burnt  powder.  The  thumbstall  of  No.  3  was  burned  to  a 
crisp  by  the  hot  ventfield.  Between  the  black  of  the  burnt 
powder  and  the  crimson  streaks  of  his  bloody  head,  Corporal 
Packard  looked  like  a  demon  from  below.  Up  and  down  the 
line,  men  reeling  and  falling ;  splinters  flying  from  wheels  and 
axles,  where  bullets  hit ;  in  rear,  horses  tearing  and  plunging, 
mad  with  wounds  or  terror;  drivers  yelling;  shells  bursting; 
shot  shrieking  overhead,  howling  about  our  ears,  or  throw 
ing  up  great  clouds  of  dust  where  they  struck;  the  musketry 
crashing  on  three  sides  of  us;  all  crash  on  crash,  and  peal  on 
peal;  smoke,  dust,  splinters,  blood,  wreck,  and  carnage  inde 
scribable  ;  but  the  brass  guns  of  old  B  still  bellowed,  and  not  a 
man  or  boy  flinched  or  faltered !  " 

Such  was  the  battle  as  seen  and  experienced  by 
the  artillery;  and  all  along  that  line,  whether  of 
artillery  or  infantry,  the  first  of  July,  1863,  was  a 
day  long  to  be  remembered. 


CHAPTER  X 

WHAT  WE  SAW  FROM  SEMINARY  RIDGE 

T  N  the  eyes  of  an  American  soldier,  perhaps  in  the 
•*•  eyes  of  any  soldier,  there  is  nothing  so  beautiful 
and  inspiring  as  the  flag  under  which  he  has  fought 
long  and  earnestly,  when  it  shines  out  triumphantly 
above  a  hard-won  battlefield.  His  best  girl's  picture 
that  he  wears  against  his  heart,  and  is  mindful  to 
snatch  a  glimpse  of  at  the  first  opportunity  after  the 
battle  is  over,  is  not  more  beautiful.  Even  the  old 
veteran's  silver-haired  wife,  faithful  and  true  for  a 
lifetime,  is  not  more  inspiring  to  look  upon  in  his 
old  age,  than  was  the  flag  victorious  in  the  days  of 
his  youth. 

So,  when  the  clouds  lifted  and  floated  away  from 
Seminary  Ridge  that  July  afternoon  and  we  saw 
the  Stars  and  Stripes — up  to  that  moment  more 
frequently  the  emblem  of  defeat  than  of  victory  for 
us  —  emerging,  all  glorious,  from  the  smoke  of  batT 
tie  in  the  fulness  of  victory,  as  we  hoped,  can  you 

[86] 


GETTYSBURG 

wonder,  O  reader,  that  Old  Glory  appeared  sur 
passingly  beautiful  to  us  on  that  occasion?  The 
flag  our  fathers  gave  us  is  the  emblem  of  our 
country,  representing  liberty,  justice,  and  humanity, 
and  in  time  of  war,  right  or  wrong,  it  is  every 
American  soldier's  duty  to  honour  and  defend  it 
against  all  enemies,  with  his  last  breath  and  last  drop 
of  blood;  but  in  time  of  peace  it  is  the  duty  of  every 
American  citizen  to  see  to  it  that  the  flag  of  free 
America  shall  remain  the  emblem  of  liberty,  justice, 
and  humanity,  to  the  end  that  her  soldiers  may  fail 
not  in  the  possession  of  the  spirit  of  patriotism,  so 
necessary  in  war,  yielding  not  to  adversity,  nor 
becoming  disheartened  by  defeat. 

In  those  dark  days  of  the  Civil  War,  the  Union 
soldier,  true  to  his  patriotic  convictions,  saw  victory 
beyond  defeat,  and  beyond  victory  a  triumphant 
peace,  that  surely  and  certainly  would  crown  his 
efforts  at  last.  Therefore  at  Gettysburg  we  hailed 
that  dear  old  flag,  shining  out  for  a  few  brief 
moments  above  Seminary  Ridge,  as  the  harbinger 
of  victory  and  peace.  Then  we  looked  hastily  for 
the  proof  of  our  hopes.  In  our  front  there  was  no 

[87] 


GETTYSBURG 

sign  of  the  enemy  between  our  position  and  Rey 
nolds'  Grove,  but  to  the  right  and  to  the  left  the 
smoke  of  battle  still  enshrouded  all  distant  points. 

Company  H  of  the  Second  Wisconsin  was  then 
the  colour  company  of  the  regiment;  and  as  we 
stood  on  the  ridge  watching  the  movement  of  events, 
Captain  Nat  Rollins  called  us  around  the  old  regi 
mental  flag,  which,  riddled  and  rent,  was  held 
proudly  in  its  place  by  Sergeant  Davison,  informing 
us  that  it  was  Major  Mansfield's  order  that  the  whole 
company  —  reduced  to  a  handful  of  men  —  should 
act  as  colour  guard.  The  Captain,  looking  at  his 
watch,  said,  "  It  is  four  o'clock."  What  further  he 
would  have  said  was  cut  short  by  some  one  shouting, 
"  Look  there  !  What  troops  are  those  ? "  pointing 
away  to  the  northeast.  We  all  looked,  of  course,  and 
we  saw  the  whole  valley  north  of  the  city,  from 
Seminary  Ridge  on  the  west  to  Rock  Creek  on  the 
east,  alive  with  rapidly  advancing  troops,  bearing  tri 
umphantly  above  them  the  saucy  battle-flags  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  we  knew  that  Schurz's  line  had 
been  driven  from  its  position.  Still  nearer,  in  the 
outskirts  of  the  city,  we  caught  a  glimpse  of  the 

[88] 


BATTLE-FLAG  OF  THE  2D  WIS 
CONSIN  INFANTRY 


McPHERSON'S  FARM 
Showing  Railroad  Cut  and  Chwribersburg  Pike 


EAST  CEMETERY  HILL 

Point,  Afternoon  of  July   I 


GETTYSBURG 

Stars  and  Stripes  disappearing  behind  the  walls  and 
buildings,  borne  on  by  our  troops,  retiring  in  haste 
and  confusion.  Any  flag  should  appear  beautiful 
and  inspiring  to  those  who  follow  and  defend  it, 
according  to  what  it  represents  to  them;  but  that 
line  of  Confederate  battle-flags,  though  represent 
ing  disunion,  at  that  moment  presented  a  stronger 
guaranty  of  victory  for  the  Confederacy  on  the 
field  of  Gettysburg  than  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
seeking  cover  from  the  northward,  or  ranged  along 
the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge,  presented  in  behalf  of 
the  Union. 

The  cause  of  this  sudden  change  in  our  view  of 
the  situation  was  the  fact  that  about  an  hour  before, 
Early's  division  of  Swell's  corps,  coming  in  from 
the  northeast  along  the  York  Road,  had  crossed 
Rock  Creek  close  up  to  the  city,  driving  his  four 
brigades,  like  a  huge  wedge,  between  the  flank  and 
rear  of  Barlow's  Union  division  resting  its  right  on 
Rock  Creek,  and  Coster's  brigade,  sent  from  Stein- 
wehr's  reserve  on  Cemetery  Hill  to  protect  the 
Union  flank  at  the  point  where  the  York  Road 
crosses  the  creek.  Schurz's  brigades  were  then 

[89] 


GETTYSBURG 

hotly  engaged  with  Rodes'  five  brigades  along 
their  whole  front;  and  the  four  additional  brigades 
of  Early's  division,  swelling  the  Confederate 
strength  to  nine  brigades,  as  against  the  six  brigades 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  swept  Coster  back  toward 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  then  threw  their  full  strength 
against  Schurz's  right  and  rear.  Thus  assailed  in 
front  and  flank,  Schurz's  two  divisions  holding  our 
north  front  were  rolled  up  and  swept  from  the  field. 
And  that  was  what  we  saw,  in  its  closing  stages,  as 
we  turned  our  eyes  northeastward  from  Seminary 
Ridge  at  four  o'clock,  and  scanned  the  valley  north 
of  Gettysburg. 

Of  that  event  let  General  Gordon  tell;  he  com 
manded  one  of  Early's  brigades  and  was  on  that 
part  of  the  field : 

"  Returning  from  the  banks  of  the  Susquehanna,  and  meet 
ing  at  Gettysburg,,  July  first,  1863,  the  advance  of  Lee's 
forces,  my  command  was  thrown  quickly  and  squarely  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  Union  army.  A  more  timely  arrival  never 
occurred.  The  battle  had  been  raging  for  four  or  five  hours. 
The  Confederate  General,  Archer,  with  a  large  portion  of  his 
brigade,  had  been  captured.  Heth  and  Scales,  Confederate 
Generals,  had  been  wounded.  The  ranking  Union  comman 
der  on  the  field,  General  Reynolds,  had  been  killed,  and  How 
ard  assigned  to  the  command.  The  battle,  upon  the  issue  of 

[90] 


BRIG.-GEN.  F.  C.  BARLOW 
Com.  1st  Division,  llth  Corps 


GETTYSBURG 

which  hung,  perhaps,  the  fate  of  the  Confederacy,  was  in  full 
blast.  The  Union  forces  were  advancing  and  pressing  back 
Lee's  left,  and  threatening  to  envelop  it.  The  Confederates 
were  stubbornly  contesting  every  foot  of  ground,  but  the 
Southern  left  was  slowly  yielding.  A  few  moments  more,  and 
the  day's  battle  might  have  been  ended  by  the  complete  turn 
ing  of  Lee's  flank.  I  was  ordered  to  move  at  once  to  the  aid 
of  the  heavily  pressed  Confederates.  With  a  ringing  yell  my 
command  rushed  upon  the  line  posted  to  protect  the  Union 
right.  Here  a  hand-to-hand  struggle  occurred.  That  protect 
ing  Union  line  once  broken,  left  my  command  not  only  on 
their  right  flank,  but  obliquely  in  rear  of  it.  Any  troops  that 
were  ever  marshalled  would,  under  like  conditions,  have  been 
as  surely  and  swiftly  shattered.  There  was  no  alternative  for 
Howard's  men  except  to  break  and  fly,  or  to  throw  down  their 
arms  and  surrender.  Under  the  concentrated  fire  from  the 
front  and  flank,  the  marvel  is  that  any  escaped. 

"  The  whole  of  that  portion  of  the  Union  army  in  my  front 
was  in  inextricable  confusion  and  in  flight.  They  were  neces 
sarily  in  flight,  for  my  troops  were  upon  their  flank  and  rap 
idly  sweeping  down  the  lines.  The  firing  upon  my  men  had 
almost  ceased.  Large  bodies  of  the  Union  troops  were  throw 
ing  down  their  arms  and  surrendering,  because  in  disorganized 
and  confused  masses,  they  were  wholly  powerless  either  to 
check  the  movement  or  return  the  fire. 

"  As  far  down  the  lines  as  my  eye  could  reach,  the  Union 
troops  were  in  retreat.  Those  at  a  distance  were  still  resist 
ing,  but  giving  ground,  and  it  was  only  necessary  for  me  to 
press  forward  in  order  to  insure  the  same  results  which  inva 
riably  follow  such  flank  movements." 

In  the  foregoing  account  General  Gordon  takes 
much  credit  to  his  command,  and  the  reader  might 

[91] 


GETTYSBURG 

readily  receive  the  impression  that  Gordon,  and  not 
Early,  commanded  the  Confederate  division  thrown 
so  effectively  upon  Howard's  right  flank  at  that 
time ;  but  otherwise  Gordon's  description,  as  we  saw 
the  field  from  Seminary  Ridge,  is  impressingly 
accurate.  There  was  no  doubt  in  the  mind  of  any 
of  us  who  saw  the  action  as  to  the  true  condition  of 
affairs.  Looking  closer,  we  saw  that  the  retreat 
from  our  own  line  farther  to  the  westward  had 
already  begun,  and  must  have  been  in  progress  for 
some  time,  as  the  Chambersburg  Pike  all  the  way 
from  Seminary  Ridge  to  the  city  was  black  with  our 
troops  in  swift  retreat.  To  our  brigade  no  order  for 
retreat  was  given  that  we  can  remember.  In  fact 
there  was  no  time  to  waste;  so  we  stood  not  on  the 
order  of  our  going,  but  went  at  once. 

From  our  position  Gettysburg  was  seven  hundred 
yards  southeast  of  us  (we  have  since  measured  the 
distance),  and  the  Chambersburg  Pike,  which  ran 
along  our  right  and  rear,  was  wide  and  smooth  and 
down  grade  all  the  way,  and  we  made  good  use  of  it. 
The  artillery  had  the  right  of  way  by  virtue  of  their 
power  to  possess  it,  and  they  drove  their  horses  at  a 

[92] 


GETTYSBURG 

pace  that  would  have  surprised  Jehu,  the  mad  driver 
of  old. 

General  Doubleday,  who  commanded  our  First 
Corps,  in  his  written  account  of  this  retreat,  says: 
"  I  waited  until  the  artillery  had  gone,  and  then  rode 
back  to  the  town  with  my  staff.  As  we  passed 
through  the  streets,  pale  and  frightened  women  came 
out  and  offered  us  coffee  and  food,  and  implored  us 
not  to  abandon  them.  .  f .,;*  The  First  Corps 
was  broken  and  defeated,  but  not  dismayed.  There 
were  but  few  left,  but  they  showed  the  true  spirit  of 
soldiers.  They  walked  leisurely  from  the  Seminary 
to  the  town,  and  did  not  run." 

It  would  be  interesting  to  one  old  veteran  to 
know  when  the  retreat  began  as  heretofore  spoken 
of,  or  where  General  Doubleday  "  waited  until  the 
artillery  had  gone."  We  of  the  Black  Hat  Brigade 
did  not  wait  a  second  after  taking  in  at  a  glance  the 
full  peril  of  our  situation,  but  dashed  down  the 
Chambersburg  Pike.  While  we  were  running  our 
very  best,  Stevens'  Fifth  Maine  Battery,  that  we 
defended  or  that  defended  us  while  we  were  re 
pulsing  the  Confederates'  last  charge  on  Seminary 


GETTYSBURG 

Ridge,  and  which  we  had  left  in  position — knowing 
well  the  ability  of  the  artillery  to  get  out  of  there 
faster  than  we  could  —  and  also  Battery  B  of  the 
Fourth  U.  S.  passed  us,  their  horses  on  a  full  run, 
and  the  cannoneers  clinging  to  the  caissons  and 
limber  chests;  but  we  saw  nothing  of  General 
Doubleday  and  his  staff  waiting  in  the  fence-corners 
along  the  pike. 

Of  course  it  stirs  the  heart  of  an  old  veteran  to 
have  his  General  speak  in  words  of  commendation 
of  himself  and  comrades;  nevertheless,  we  must 
conclude  that  a  number  of  us  left  Seminary  Ridge 
some  time  after  our  General,  for  when  we  arrived 
in  the  city,  there  were  no  "pale  and  frightened 
women  on  the  streets,"  with  coffee  and  cookies  for 
us.  They  had  exhausted  their  supply  before  our 
arrival  and  had  gone  into  their  houses,  as  any  sen 
sible  lady  would  have  done  about  that  time  and 
under  the  same  circumstances.  In  fact  the  streets 
were  not  the  places  for  women  then.  It  was  all 
right  and  a  good  thing  for  the  First  Corps  and  the 
army,  that  General  Doubleday  did  not  remain  too 
long  on  Seminary  Ridge,  nor  in  the  city,  for  he  was 

[94] 


\ 


MAJ.-GEN.  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY 
Com.  1st  Corps,  July  1 


MAJ.-GEN.  CARL  SCILHRZ 

Coin.    Htli   Corjw, 


GETTYSBURG 

a  good  soldier,  and  the  army  and  the  country  needed 
his  services ;  but  it  is  one  of  the  facts  of  history  that 
we  lost  in  prisoners  taken  by  the  enemy  that  first 
day  of  July  from  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps, 
about  2,500  men,  most  of  them  captured  on  that 
retreat  and  in  the  city,  after  General  Doubleday  had 
ridden  through  and  out  of  it. 

The  boys  said  afterwards  that  they  got  tangled 
up  in  the  names  of  the  brigade  commanders  of 
Schurz's  third  division  of  the  Eleventh  Corps, 
General  Von  Schimmelfennig  and  Colonel  Krz- 
yzanowski.  These  officers  were  from  the  Vaterland, 
or  from  some  other  foreign  country,  and  they  had 
brought  their  own  names  with  them.  As  General 
Von  Schimmelfennig  commanded  the  third  divi 
sion  when  Schurz  took  command  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  there  really  was  some  cause  for  the  entangle 
ment  in  the  streets  of  Gettysburg  in  addition  to 
Early's  flank  movement;  and  the  soldiers  will  have 
their  jokes.  We  were  surely  greatly  hurried  and 
badly  tangled  in  the  streets  of  Gettysburg  on  that 
retreat,  however,  and  many  a  brave  Union  soldier 
went  to  Richmond  arid  to  his  death  on  that  account. 

[95] 


GETTYSBURG 

When  we  reached  the  city  the  Confederates  were 
already  in  possession  of  the  northern  and  eastern 
portions  of  it.  Generals  Howard,  Doubleday,  and 
Schurz  were  then  on  Cemetery  Hill,  where  they 
should  have  been,  re-forming  their  shattered  com 
mands  to  meet  Lee's  expected  attack  on  their  new 
position  that  afternoon,  and  long  before  the  sun 
went  down;  but  had  they,  or  any  of  them,  taken 
the  precaution  to  plant  a  few  pieces  of  artillery  in 
positions  to  sweep  the  streets  of  Gettysburg,  sup 
ported  by  detachments  of  infantry  under  officers 
with  staying  qualities,  to  cover  our  retreat,  many  of 
our  men  might  have  been  saved  from  captivity,  who, 
conditions  being  otherwise,  were  lost.  The  fact  is, 
that  our  generals  as  well  as  ourselves  were  badly 
tangled. 

When  we  reached  the  city  the  Confederates  were 
having  everything  their  own  way.  Those  of  us  who 
could  run  the  gantlet  rejoined  our  commands  and 
rallied  on  Cemetery  Hill,  and  those  who  could  not, 
but  were  cut  off  and  picked  up  by  the  Confederates, 
went  to  Richmond.  It  was  4:30  o'clock  P.M.,  and 
the  battle  and  retreat  of  July  first  were  over. 

[96] 


CHAPTER  XI 

LEE  AND  HIS  MISTAKES 

T  EE  arrived  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg,  prob-, 
•*•— •  ably  about  four  o'clock  of  July  first.  He  was, 
says  Longstreet,  "  in  time  to  view  the  closing  opera 
tions  of  the  engagement.  His  headquarters  were  on 
Seminary  Ridge  at  the  crossing  of  the  Cashtown  or 
Chambersburg  Road.  After  surveying  the  enemy's 
position,  noting  movements  of  detachments  of  the 
enemy  on  the  Emmetsburg  Road,  the  relative  posi 
tions  for  manoeuvre,  the  lofty  perch  of  the  enemy, 
the  rocky  slopes  from  it,  all  making  the  position 
clearly  defensive,  I  said,  'We  could  not  call  the 
enemy  to  a  position  better  suited  to  our  plans.  All 
that  we  have  to  do  is  to  file  around  his  left  and  secure 
good  ground  between  him  and  his  capital.'  I  was 
not  a  little  surprised  at  his  impatience  as,  striking 
the  air  with  his  closed  hand,  he  said,  *  If  he  is  there 
to-morrow  I  will  attack  him/  I  answered,  '  If  he 
is  there  to-morrow  it  will  be  because  he  wants  you  to 

[97] 


GETTYSBURG 

attack,'  and  queried,  *  If  that  height  has  become  the 
objective,  why  not  take  it  at  once  ?  We  have  40,000 
men,  less  the  casualties  of  the  day;  he  cannot  have 
more  than  20,000.' " 

In  following  the  history  of  this  great  battle  dur 
ing  the  two  following  days  it  will  be  well  for  the 
reader  to  keep  in  mind  the  foregoing  statement  by 
Longstreet,  of  his  conversation  with  Lee,  and  their 
points  of  difference,  as  they  surveyed  from  Semi 
nary  Ridge  the  new  position  taken  up  by  the  Union 
army,  and  not  later  than  half -past  four  o'clock  of 
July  first. 

Lee  was  a  man  of  genius,  and  in  that  respect  may 
be  called  a  great  man.  Great  men  are  apt  to  make 
great  mistakes.  The  pages  of  history  are  replete 
with  illustrations  of  this  fact.  Napoleon,  the  great 
est  military  genius,  probably,  that  the  world  has  ever 
produced,  made  mistakes  that  no  ordinary  man  of 
sound  common  sense  would  have  made ;  and  the  great 
Confederate  commander  was  no  exception  to  the 
rule.  Honoured  by  the  people  of  his  State  and  of 
the  Nation;  educated  at  the  expense  of  the  Govern 
ment;  lifted  into  greatness  by  the  Republic;  he  had 

[98] 


GEN.  ROBERT  E.  LEE 
Com.  Army  of  Northern  Virginia    r 


LIEUT.-GEN.  JAMES  LONGSTREET 
Com.  1st  Corps,  Ami)/  of  Northern  Viruitna 


GETTYSBURG 

drawn  his  sword  against  her  in  the  hour  of  her  peril, 
and  had  become  her  greatest  adversary  and  most 
resourceful  enemy.  This  was  the  great  mistake  of 
Lee's  life. 

Lee  was  a  great  general.  His  enemies  in  the 
Civil  War  all  admitted  that  fact,  and  the  world 
admits  it  to-day.  He  was  the  idol  of  his  army,  and 
the  inspiration  of  the  seceding  States ;  but  when  he 
abandoned  his  defensive  policy,  wherein  he  chiefly 
excelled,  and  carried  the  war  into  the  North,  he  made 
his  great  military  mistake.  As  Shakespeare  hath 
truly  said.  — 

"  There  is  a  tide  in  the  affairs  of  men 
Which,  taken  at  the  flood,  leads  on  to  fortune." 

Lee  had  made  every  preparation  to  ride  the  flood- 
tide  of  fortune.  Behind  the  Rappahannock's  pro 
tecting  hills  he  had  marshalled  an  army  that  was  the 
pride  of  his  ambitious  heart,  and  the  hope  of  the 
Rebellion.  He  was  playing  a  bold  game  for  a  stu 
pendous  stake.  His  lieutenants  were  generals  of 
marked  ability,  tested  and  tempered  in  the  fiery 
ordeal  of  battle  on  many  occasions.  To  him  and  to 
his  cause  they  were  known  to  be  true  as  refined  steel. 

[99] 


GETTYSBURG 

His  officers  of  field  and  staff  were  brave  and  effi 
cient,  and  every  soldier  in  his  mighty  army  was  ready 
to  bear  every  hardship  of  march,  to  dare  every  dan 
ger  of  battle,  that  their  great  chieftain  thought  nec 
essary.  No  army  in  the  world  since  the  days  of 
Alexander  the  Great  was  ever  held  more  completely 
in  the  power  of  one  directing  hand.  No  leader  of 
men  or  of  armies,  except  Alexander,  ever  stood 
among  his  generals  so  supremely  their  leader  and 
their  Commander-in- Chief. 

In  every  movement  since  assuming  command  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  front  of  Rich 
mond  in  1862,  he  had  handled  his  divisions  with  con 
summate  skill.  He  had  outgeneralled  McClellan 
in  front  of  Richmond,  Pope  in  front  of  Washington, 
Burnside  in  front  of  Fredericksburg,  and  Hooker 
at  Chancellors ville.  In  this  campaign  he  had  out 
generalled  Hooker  and  invaded  Pennsylvania  with 
out  a  serious  battle.  So  far,  he  had  outgeneralled 
Meade  and  his  corps  commanders,  by  keeping  his 
own  army  well  in  hand  while  he  separated  the  Union 
commands  widely,  one  from  the  other.  He  would 
meet  and  defeat  the  corps  of  the  Union  army  in 

[100] 


GETTYSBURG 

In  line  on  Cemetery  Hill  the  Union  forces  com 
prised  Buford's  cavalry  division,  2,500  strong,  the 
First  Corps  3,000,  and  the  Eleventh  Corps  7,200, 
the  remnants  of  the  divisions  that  had  borne  the 
brunt  of  the  battle;  in  all,  12,700  men.  To  those 
may  be  added  Slocum's  Twelfth  Corps,  which 
arrived  on  the  ground  about  the  time  our  broken 
columns  reached  Cemetery  Hill;  for  General 
S locum  made  the  best  time  of  all  in  coming  to  our 
rescue. 

Slocum's  corps  numbered  8,500,  and  extended 
our  line  to  the  left  along  Cemetery  Ridge ;  but  later, 
and  during  the  night,  it  took  a  position  on  our  right 
from  the  crest  of  Gulp's  Hill  to  Rock  Creek.  With 
this  reinforcement  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  Howard 
commanded  a  force  of  21,200  men,  at  five  o'clock 
P.M.,  to  meet  Lee's  expected  attack  with  35,000, 
and  there  was  not  another  Union  regiment  within 
eight  hours'  march  of  his  position.  What  was  even 
worse,  Meade  had  not  yet  ordered  the  concentration 
of  the  remaining  four  infantry  corps  and  two 
cavalry  divisions  of  his  army  at  Gettysburg,  and 
they  were  quietly  and  peacefully  resting  from  ten 

[  105  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

to  twenty-two  miles  away ;  but  Lee,  from  his  exalted 
viewpoint  on  Seminary  Ridge,  looking  across  the 
wide  intervening  valley  to  the  Union  lines  in  hurry 
ing  formation  on  Cemetery  Hill,  only  said,  as  he 
struck  the  air  with  his  clinched  hand,  "If  he  is 
there  to-morrow  I  will  attack  him." 

Whatever  Lee's  reasons  may  have  been  for  not 
attacking  that  night,  they  were  perfectly  satisfac 
tory  to  that  weary  portion  of  the  Union  army,  hard 
at  work  intrenching  their  position  on  Cemetery 
Hill;  and  equally  satisfactory  to  the  whole  army 
was  his  conclusion  to  attack  that  strong  position,  so 
easily  avoided,  on  the  following  day,  provided  he 
would  delay  that  attack  until  General  Meade  could 
and  would  concentrate  his  army ;  but  why  a  general 
of  Lee's  genius  and  daring  should  have  continued 
the  battle  then  or  ever,  in  such  a  disadvantageous 
position  for  him,  especially  after  General  Meade 
had  partially  concentrated  his  army  there  and 
chosen  his  battle-ground,  passes  all  understanding. 

Before  starting  out  on  his  invasion  of  the  North, 
Lee  had  agreed  with  his  corps  commanders  to  make 
his  campaign  one  of  defensive  tactics ;  which  means, 

[106] 


GETTYSBURG 

simply,  avoiding  the  giving  of  battle  in  the  enemy's 
chosen  position,  and  compelling  the  enemy,  if  pos 
sible,  to  attack  him  in  his  chosen,  defensive  position. 
Lee  had  perfect  confidence  in  the  fighting  strength 
of  his  army,  and  in  the  military  skill  and  ability  of 
his  generals;  while  that  army,  to  a  man,  had  supreme 
confidence  in  their  leaders,  and  especially  in  their 
commander-in-chief .  Longstreet,  speaking  of  his 
own  corps,  says:  " The  First  Corps  was  as  a  solid 
rock,  a  great  rock.  It  was  not  to  be  broken  of 
good  position  by  direct  assault,  and  was  steady 
enough  to  work  and  wait  for  its  chosen  battle." 
And  of  Lee's  army,  as  a  whole,  Longstreet  adds, 
after  enumerating  the  comparative  appointments 
and  advantages  of  the  opposing  armies :  "  We  were 
prepared  to  march  cheerfully  forward  and  accept 
the  gauge,  hoping  by  strategic  skill  to  throw  the 
onus  of  battle  upon  the  enemy." 

General  Gordon  also  speaks  of  Lee's  army  before 
joining  battle  on  the  first  of  July,  as  of  "compact 
ranks,  boundless  confidence,  and  exultant  hopes, 
as  proud  and  puissant  an  army  as  was  ever 
marshalled."  Nor  were  Lee's  generals  lacking  in 

[107] 


GETTYSBURG 

confidence  in  their  own  ability  as  leaders  in  the  field ; 
and  Lee  himself  so  confidently  believed  in  his  own 
superior  generalship,  that  he  seemed  frequently  to 
ignore  the  very  existence  of  the  Union  generals 
who  were  opposed  to  him. 

Therefore,  from  every  military  standpoint, 
illumed  by  all  the  sidelights  of  human  experience 
that  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  situation,  Lee 
should  have  won  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg;  and 
almost  every  event  of  march  and  manoeuvre  and 
battle,  up  to  the  closing  hours  of  July  first,  was 
most  decidedly  favourable  to  him  and  to  his  cause. 
But  it  was  written  among  the  eternal  stars  that  the 
final  result  should  be  otherwise. 

When  Lee  crossed  the  South  Mountain  Range 
and  came  face  to  face  with  his  old  antagonist,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  we  find  him  unaccountably 
nervous,  impatient,  hesitating.  "If  he  is  there 
to-morrow,  I  will  attack  him,"  tells  the  story.  That 
one  sentence  expresses  more  than  many  pages. 
Why  should  he  attack  a  strong  defensive  position 
at  any  time,  when  it  was  so  plainly  in  his  power  to 
flank  and  avoid  it  ?  It  was  necessary  to  fight  the 

[108] 


GETTYSBURG 

battle  of  July  first,  for  Buford  and  Reynolds  and 
Howard  were  in  his  path ;  but  that  battle  was  won, 
and  his  pathway  clear.  The  Union  army  had  been 
driven  to  Cemetery  Hill  —  to  a  strong  defensive 
position  but  most  unfavourable  for  offensive 
operations  against  Lee's  further  movements,  and 
for  that  night  at  least,  absolutely  out  of  his  way; 
for  a  beautiful  undulating  valley  more  than  a  mile 
wide,  stretching  away  to  the  southward,  lay  between 
him  and  his  helpless  enemy.  Why  should  he  turn 
aside,  and  go  out  of  his  way  to  buck  against  a  fight 
ing  foeman's  stronghold,  when  he  could  rest  his 
army  in  peace  from  five  o'clock  until  midnight,  and 
then  have  plenty  of  time  to  slip  quietly  along  the 
west  side  of  the  wide  valley,  with  Seminary  Ridge 
at  his  back,  and  no  enemy  near  enough  to  detect 
or  disturb  his  march  ?  In  two  hours  he  could  have 
been  south  of  Howard's  rock-ribbed  citadels,  cutting 
Meade's  army  in  two  without  a  battle,  and  com 
pelling  that  portion  on  Cemetery  Hill  and  Ridge 
to  abandon  its  worthless  position  and  hurry  south 
ward  to  join,  if  possible,  the  other  wing  in  saving 
their  communications  and  covering  the  national 

[109] 


GETTYSBURG 

capital.  He  did  not  do  it,  however,  and  for  once, 
at  least,  Lee's  courage  failed  him.  It  must  be  con 
ceded  that,  as  a  man  and  a  general,  he  was  not 
usually  lacking  in  physical  courage;  but  in  that 
respect  he  was  no  braver  than  the  rank  and  file  of 
his  army.  Here,  however,  we  find  him  lacking  in 
that  physical  courage  so  necessary  in  the  com 
mander  of  an  army.  Here  was  a  brilliant  chance 
of  war,  greatly  in  his  favour,  that  Lee  dared  not 
take.  Behind  his  position  on  Seminary  Ridge  ran 
the  Hagerstown  Road  in  a  southwestward  direction 
through  the  South  Mountain  Range  to  the  crossings 
of  the  Potomac,  and  Lee,  with  all  his  genius,  and 
all  his  warlike  daring,  refused  to  abandon  that 
back-door  for  a  safe  retreat  to  the  Potomac  and 
Virginia,  in  the  event  that  he  should  meet  with 
defeat. 

General  R.  H.  Anderson,  commanding  the  first 
division  of  Hill's  corps,  reported  a  conversation 
with  General  Lee  at  about  twelve  o'clock  noon  of 
July  first,  in  which  Lee  said:  "  I  am  in  ignorance 
as  to  what  we  have  in  front  of  us  here.  It  may  be 
the  whole  Federal  army,  or  it  may  be  only  a  detach- 

[no] 


GETTYSBURG 

ment.  If  it  is  the  whole  Federal  force,  we  must 
fight  a  battle  here.  If  we  do  not  gain  a  victory, 
those  defiles  and  gorges  which  we  passed  this  morn 
ing  will  shelter  us  from  disaster." 

So  it  would  seem  that  Lee  had  lost  much  of  his 
confidence,  and  was  looking  for  disaster,  and  a 
sheltered  retreat.  For  that  reason  he  clung  to  the 
Hagerstown  Road,  and  used  it  for  that  purpose. 


[in] 


G 


CHAPTER  XII 

REYNOLDS 

ENERAL  JOHN  F.  REYNOLDS  was 


graduated  from  West  Point  in  1841.  He 
was  thereafter  commissioned  a  lieutenant  of  artil 
lery,  and  in  the  Mexican  War  he  won  the  brevets  of 
Captain  at  Monterey  and  of  Major  at  Buena  Vista. 
When  the  Civil  War  broke  out  in  1861,  he  was  com 
missioned  a  Brigadier-General,  and  commanded  a 
brigade  in  McClellan's  peninsula  campaign,  and  a 
division  under  Pope  at  the  second  Bull  Run,  in 
1862.  In  November  of  that  year  he  was  appointed 
a  Major-General,  and  placed  in  command  of  the 
First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which 
position  he  held  in  the  Fredericksburg  and  Chancel- 
lorsville  campaigns,  and  during  the  toilsome  march 
to  Pennsylvania  in  June.  He  was  in  command  of 
the  right  wing  of  our  army,  comprising  the  First, 
Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps,  and  Buford's  cavalry 

[112] 


GETTYSBURG 

division,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  on  July  first,  at 
Gettysburg. 

General  Reynolds  was  a  man  of  more  than  ordi 
nary  ability  on  the  march  and  in  the  field.  His 
corps,  to  a  man,  looked  upon  him  as  a  reliable 
soldier,  patriotic,  and  devoted  to  the  Union  cause, 
but  above  and  beyond  all  else  a  general  devoted  to 
the  care  of  the  soldiers  under  his  command,  and  true 
to  their  rights  as  American  citizens,  engaged  with 
himself  in  the  common  cause  of  nationality. 

In  our  experience  of  four  years  in  the  army,  as 
a  Union  soldier,  we  frequently  had  occasion  to 
notice  that,  while  the  five  senses  seemed  as  well 
developed  among  that  class  known  in  the  army  as 
generals,  as  among  the  larger  class  known  as  com 
mon  soldiers,  that  most  important  of  all  the  senses 
—  the  sixth,  or  common  sense  —  was  not  so  well 
developed  in  them.  Common  sense  may  be  defined 
as  good  sense;  that  is  to  say,  a  man  who  is  sensible 
and  of  good  judgment  in  common,  everyday  affairs 
possesses  common  sense.  We  call  that  man  sensible 
whose  acts  and  conduct  in  matters  of  practical  con 
cern  are  marked  and  governed  by  sound  judgment. 

[113] 


GETTYSBURG 

Taking  the  foregoing  as  a  true  and  correct  defini 
tion  of  the  term,  one  is  surprised  at  the  dearth  of 
generals  in  our  army  during  the  Civil  War  (and 
probably  in  all  other  armies  of  all  other  wars)  who 
possessed  a  fair  quantity  and  fair  quality  of 
common  sense. 

A  general  above  all  men,  should  have  the  good 
sense  to  know  that  the  soldiers  of  his  command  are 
human  beings,  subject  to  human  ailments,  and  need 
and  deserve  all  the  care  that  he  can  possibly  give 
them  in  everything  pertaining  to  the  daily  routine 
of  life  in  camp  and  on  the  march,  in  order  that  they 
may,  when  the  hour  of  battle  comes,  arrive  on  the 
firing  line  in  condition  to  give  the  best  possible 
service  to  their  cause.  But  alas,  how  few  of  them 
seem  to  consider  these  simple  but  important  matters 
worthy  of  their  genius  !  We  have  more  than  once 
seen  and  experienced,  after  a  wearisome  day's 
march,  on  going  into  camp  at  night,  and  after  the 
fires  were  kindled  and  the  soldiers  were  engaged  in 
preparing  their  supper,  a  whole  corps  of  troops 
moved  by  their  commander,  from  one  to  three 
hundred  yards,  where  they  were  obliged  to  relight 

[114] 


GETTYSBURG 

their  camp-fires  before  they  could  procure  their  sup 
per  and  take  the  rest  that  they  so  greatly  needed, 
and  all  on  account  of  the  lack  of  just  a  little  common 
sense  in  their  general. 

We  have  marched  and  countermarched  for  a  full 
hour,  when  the  shades  of  night  were  falling,  after 
marching  all  day  in  the  rain  and  mud,  follow 
ing  our  general  and  his  staff  wrhile  they  rode  their 
horses  hither  and  thither  as  they  hunted  up  con 
venient  headquarters  for  the  general  to  pass  the 
night  under  a  roof. 

How  the  soldiers  wrould  curse  on. such  occasions  ! 
Not  that  they  objected  to  the  general  finding  a  con 
venient,  or  even  luxurious  resting-place  for  himself 
and  staff,  if  only  he  would  apply  the  rules  of  com 
mon  sense  to  our  condition,  which  he  failed  to  do. 

But  to  cap  the  climax.  On  a  hot  July  day,  when 
the  old  veteran  held  the  position  of  captain  in  a 
certain  brigade,  the  following  event  occurred  not 
far  from  Petersburg,  Va.  We  were  returning  to 
rejoin  our  corps  from  the  right  of  our  lines,  where 
our  whole  brigade  had  been  engaged  for  a  week  in 
building  fortifications ;  but,  regardless  of  our  com- 

[115] 


GETTYSBURG 

fort,  the  general  rode  with  his  staff  on  a  full  gallop 
from  the  rear  to  the  front,  through  the  whole  length 
of  the  brigade,  keeping  the  centre  of  the  road  and 
scattering  his  regiments  to  the  right  and  to  the  left, 
and  for  no  reason  under  the  sun  except  that  he  had 
no  common  sense,  and  wanted  to  show  his  authority 
and  high-mightiness.  Oh,  how  the  soldiers  of  that 
brigade  did  respect  and  honour  their  general  from 
that  day,  and  forever  after  !  If  it  had  been  neces 
sary  for  the  general  and  his  staff  to  ride  to  the 
front,  how  easily  an  officer  could  have  ridden  a  little 
in  advance  and  directed  each  regiment  to  oblique 
to  the  right  or  left,  as  he  might  designate,  and  thus 
give  the  general  free  passage  without  in  any  man 
ner  disturbing  the  orderly  formation  and  march  of 
the  brigade  for  a  single  moment.  In  the  presence 
of  an  enemy  the  act  would  have  been  murderous, 
and  could  have  been  done  only  by  a  fool  or  a  mad 
man.  With  no  enemy  within  miles  of  us,  as  was 
the  case,  the  act  was  the  most  brazen  display  of 
big-headed  pomposity  that  we  ever  witnessed.  But 
we  are  glad  to  be  able  to  report  that  such  acts 

[116] 


GETTYSBURG 

were  infrequent  in  our  army,  and  we  never  saw 
it  repeated. 

We  have  joined  in  many  a  march  in  old  Virginia, 
when  the  days  were  long  and  hot,  and  the  power  of 
the  soldiers  to  endure  the  fatigue  of  the  march  and 
keep  their  places  in  the  ranks  was  greatly  enhanced 
by  an  opportunity  to  brew  a  cup  of  coffee  by  the 
wayside  from  time  to  time.  This  fact  was  well 
known  by  every  general  in  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  and  the  practice  was  never  forbidden  by  any  of 
them,  so  far  as  we  can  remember;  but  at  the  same 
time  we  were  generally  obliged  to  take  our  chances 
during  our  moments  of  rest  that  were  occasionally 
ordered,  in  building  fires  for  that  purpose,  not 
knowing  the  length  of  time  the  rest  would  continue. 
We  were  obliged  to  guess  at  it,  and  by  guess  many 
a  camp-fire  was  built  in  vain,  and  many  a  half- 
steeped  cup  of  coffee  thrown  into  the  dust ;  for  our 
generals  were  men  of  genius,  contemplating,  as  they 
rode  on  the  march,  the  shock  of  armies  in  battle, 
and  the  mighty  deeds  they  would  accomplish  when 
they  aligned  for  action  these  very  soldiers.  They 
knew  that  the  men  were  tried  and  true,  yet  they 

[117] 


GETTYSBURG 

considered  them  so  far  beneath  their  notice  on  the 
march  that  they  entirely  overlooked,  for  their  con 
venience,  this  simple  matter  of  coffee-making.  The 
reader  can  readily  imagine  the  inconvenience,  and 
the  loss  of  coffee  and  rest — to  both  of  which  we 
were  entitled — by  the  lack  of  common  sense  on 
the  part  of  our  generals.  He  can  imagine  also 
how  the  soldiers  would  curse,  until  the  very  atmos 
phere  was  blue,  and  brimstone  seemed  to  smoke  on 
the  hot  stones  of  the  highway,  when,  after  wasting 
the  time  that  should  have  been  devoted  to  needed 
rest,  in  getting  their  fires  all  ablaze  and  their  coffee- 
pails  in  place,  with  the  water  close  to  the  boiling 
point,  the  notes  of  the  bugle  announced  that  the 
march  would  forthwith  be  resumed. 

We  mention  these  little  circumstances  of  bygone 
days — hundreds  of  which  we  have  seen  and  experi 
enced — in  order  to  compare  with  them  the  common- 
sense  methods  practised  by  General  Reynolds 
toward  his  corps  while  on  the  march.  He  was  the 
only  corps  commander  under  whom  we  had  the 
honour  of  serving  during  the  Civil  War  (and  we 
served  under  several)  whose  acts  of  common  sense 

[118] 


GETTYSBURG 

are  a  pleasure  to  remember.  There  was  another 
general  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  whose 
brigade  we  were  numbered,  who  watched  and  pro 
vided  with  the  same  care  and  consideration  over 
his  brigade,  that  General  Reynolds  exercised 
toward  his  corps,  and  that  commander  was  General 
Gibbon.  We  did  not  serve  under  Gibbon  after  he 
took  command  of  a  division,  but  we  have  reason  to 
believe  that  General  Gibbon  never  lost  his  common 
sense. 

During  our  first  campaigns  under  the  command 
of  General  Reynolds,  in  the  Fall  and  Winter  of 
1862,  our  marches  were  not  long,  and  the  weather 
was  not  extremely  hot  until  after  the  Chancellors- 
ville  campaign  was  ended,  in  May,  but  even  then 
we  had  learned  to  look  upon  him  as  a  sensible  man 
in  every  respect,  and  a  reliable  general  in  the  field 
and  on  the  march.  It  was  not,  however,  until  the 
Gettysburg  campaign  opened,  that  we  learned  the 
true  value  of  such  a  commander.  The  First  Corps 
broke  camp  on  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock 
River,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  on  the  morning  of 
the  twelfth  day  of  June,  and  started  on  that  weari- 

[119] 


GETTYSBURG 

some  march  of  about  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles, 
which  terminated  at  Gettysburg  on  July  first. 
Some  days  our  marches  were  short,  and  some  days 
we  rested  in  camp  and  did  not  march  at  all;  but  on 
other  occasions,  like  unto  the  long  hot  June  days 
of  Virginia,  we  made  long,  hot,  and  tedious 
marches.  It  was  particularly  on  those  trying  occa 
sions  that  we  learned  to  appreciate  the  superior 
ability  of  General  Reynolds  in  caring  for  his  troops 
and  providing  for  their  comfort,  by  a  little  timely 
forethought,  the  best  and  not  the  worst  that  could 
be  obtained  for  them  in  the  field. 

Whether  the  march  of  the  day  was  long  or  short, 
whenever  a  halt  was  made  for  a  sufficient  length 
of  time,  a  staff  officer  carried  the  General's  order 
to  every  regiment  in  the  corps,  'You  will  have 
time  to  make  coffee  if  you  so  desire."  If  we  did 
not  receive  that  order  no  man  started  a  fire,  and 
during  the  whole  march  there  was  never  a  fire 
lighted  in  vain.  What  a  relief  it  was  to  the  thou 
sands  of  men  who  wore  the  First  Corps  badge,  to 
know  for  a  certainty  that  they  could  rest  in  peace, 
if  the  halt  was  intended  for  a  rest  only;  and  if  the 

[120] 


GETTYSBURG 

halt  was  to  be  long  enough  to  make  coffee,  we  would 
be  so  informed.  Then,  when  we  halted  for  the 
night  and  went  into  camp  at  the  end  of  the  day's 
march,  there  was  no  moving  of  weary  regiments 
from  one  point  to  another;  for  the  position  for  the 
encampment  was  selected  in  advance  by  the  Gen 
eral  himself,  or  by  a  staff  officer,  and  each  brigade 
commander,  as  he  came  up  with  his  command,  was 
directed  where  to  place  his  brigade,  and  where  he 
would  find  water  and  wood  for  his  regiments. 
There  was  no  confusion,  no  waste  of  time.  It  was 
all  very  simple,  but  it  did  require  considerable  extra 
care  and  trouble  on  the  part  of  the  corps  com 
mander;  and  we  soldiers  of  the  First  Corps  were 
very  thankful  that  our  General  had,  not  only  com 
mon  sense,  but  sufficient  humanity  in  his  heart  to 
use  it.  After  we  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Mary 
land,  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  June,  there  was  a 
change  in  the  weather,  and  it  rained  every  day  or 
night,  and  some  of  the  time  both  day  and  night, 
until  the  first  of  July;  but  the  General's  care  for 
his  troops  never  slackened. 

Mill 


GETTYSBURG 

On  that  campaign  the  boys  of  the  First  Corps 
applied  to  General  Reynolds  the  sobriquet  of  "  Old 
Common  Sense,"  in  their  appreciation  of  his  remark 
able  supply  of  that  commodity;  yet  he  was  not  old 
in  years,  only  forty-three  when  he  was  killed,  but 
old  in  comparison  to  the  rank  and  file  of  his  corps, 
who  were  only  boys  of  from  sixteen  to  twenty-five ; 
and  especially  was  he  old  in  practical  wisdom  to 
care  for  the  everyday  needs  of  his  soldiers,  as  com 
pared  with  other  generals  in  command  of  army 
corps. 

To  double-quick  in  the  heat  of  the  day  from  one 
part  of  a  battlefield  to  another,  in  order  to  meet  the 
enemy  in  some  unexpected  quarter;  to  move  hastily 
to  a  stronger  or  more  desirable  position  when  in 
proximity  with  or  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy;  to 
move  half  the  army,  or  the  whole  of  it  for  that  mat 
ter;  to  change  the  positions  of  brigades,  divisions, 
and  corps,  in  order  to  make  an  encampment  more 
secure  from  attack  —  all  these  are  incidents  in  a 
soldier's  life  and  duty  that  he  accepts  cheerfully, 
no  matter  what  the  inconvenience  or  hardship 
imposed  thereby;  but  to  be  hack-hammered  from 

[122] 


GETTYSBURG 

pillar  to  post,  when  weary,  footsore,  and  hungry, 
just  to  satisfy  the  senseless  whim  of  a  general  run 
ning  over  with  selfish  egotism,  is,  to  say  the  least, 
trying  on  a  soldier's  nerves. 

On  the  morning  of  July  first,  1863,  when  Gen 
eral  Reynolds  found  himself  on  the  soil  of  his 
native  State,  with  Lee's  whole  army  in  his  front, 
the  question  may  arise,  Did  he  act  wisely  and  with 
that  discretion  which  is  the  better  part  of  valour  ? 
From  all  the  surrounding  conditions  at  the  time  it 
would  seem  that  he  made  a  great  mistake  in  opening 
the  battle.  General  Meade's  headquarters  were  at 
Taneytown,  fifteen  miles  to  the  southward,  and  his 
army  was  widely  scattered  and  out  of  touch  for  at 
least  the  next  twelve  hours  with  Reynolds'  com 
mand.  Meade's  orders  to  Reynolds  seem  to  have 
been  to  uncover  Lee's  army  and  fall  back  to  Pipe 
Creek,  delaying  Lee's  march  as  much  as  possible, 
while  notifying  Meade  so  that  he  might  concentrate 
his  army  for  a  general  and  decisive  battle.  How 
ever,  when  Reynolds  uncovered  Lee's  army  he  sent 
a  despatch  to  Meade  to  the  effect  that  the  heights 
of  Gettysburg  was  the  place  to  fight  the  battle,  and 

[123] 


GETTYSBURG 

that  he  would  hold  the  position  with  the  right  wing 
while  Meade  concentrated  his  army  at  that  point. 
Then  Reynolds  plunged  the  First  Corps  into  battle 
to  support  Buford's  cavalry  division,  and  called 
the  Eleventh  and  Third  Corps  to  his  assistance,  the 
latter  of  which  did  not  reach  the  field  that  day,  an3 
the  very  life  of  the  troops  engaged  was  fought  out 
long  before  reinforcements  arrived.  As  Reynolds 
was  killed  in  the  very  beginning  of  the  battle,  it  is 
impossible  to  say  what  his  intentions  may  have  been, 
but  it  is  certain  that  there  was  no  concert  of  action 
between  the  generals,  and  this  lack  of  harmony 
must  have  led  to  disaster,  but  for  the  fact  that  Rey 
nolds'  mistake  was  followed  by  a  greater  mistake 
on  the  part  of  Lee.  As  Reynolds  rode  up  from  the 
southward  on  the  morning  of  July  first,  through 
the  whole  length  of  the  wide  valley  stretching 
between  Seminary  Ridge  on  the  west  and  Cemetery 
Hill  and  Ridge  on  the  east,  he  must  have  assumed 
that  Lee's  whole  army  was  west  of  Seminary  Ridge 
and  that  he  could  maintain  his  position  thereon  until 
the  whole  of  Meade's  army  arrived.  After  Rey 
nolds'  death,  when  E well's  corps  came  in  upon  us 

[124] 


GETTYSBURG 

from  the  northeast,  taking  Howard's  right  in 
reverse,  there  was  nothing  left  for  Howard  to  do 
but  seek  refuge  on  Cemetery  Hill.  If  Reynolds 
knew  of  the  situation  of  Swell's  corps  within  the 
Susquehanna  Valley,  he  must  have  relied  on  finally 
retreating  to  Cemetery  Hill,  just  as  Howard  did, 
and  that  Lee  would  continue  the  battle  there.  As 
Lee  did  that  very  thing,  it  may  be  assumed  that 
Reynolds'  battle  of  July  first  was  not  a  mistake 
but  a  strategic  movement  that  resulted  in  final 
victory,  although  General  Reynolds  lost  his  life  in 
carrying  it  to  success. 

Four  years  of  service  in  the  army  did  not  incline 
the  old  veteran  toward  hero-worship,  but  after 
nearly  half  a  century  he  still  remembers  that  toil 
some  march  from  Fredericksburg  to  Gettysburg  in 
1863,  as  among  the  pleasant  recollections  of  those 
strenuous  war  days;  and  while  life  remains  he  will 
remember  that  dark,  silent,  alert  man  who  com 
manded  the  First  Corps,  with  a  feeling  of  profound 
veneration.  General  John  F.  Reynolds  may  not 
be  represented  in  Statuary  Hall  of  the  national 
capitol,  beside  the  Father  and  Preserver  of  the 

[125] 


GETTYSBURG 

country,  but  his  statue  stands  in  the  wide  Hall  of 
Fame  on  Cemetery  Hill,  within  the  great  battle 
field  where  he  gave  his  life  in  the  cause  for  which 
the  immortal  Lincoln  died;  and  there  shall  it  stand 
for  all  time,  truthfully  representing  a  patriot  and 
common-sense  general. 


T126] 


CHAPTER  XIII 

MEADE'S  STRATEGY 
lENERAL    REYNOLDS'    despatch,    sent 


about  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  July 
first,  stating  that  he  had  met  Lee's  army,  and  that 
the  heights  of  Gettysburg  was  the  place  for  the 
battle,  reached  General  Meade  at  Taneytown  just 
as  soon  as  a  good  horse  could  carry  it  to  him,  prob 
ably  by  eleven  o'clock.  But  General  Meade  did 
not  order  his  army  to  concentrate  at  Gettysburg. 
He  was  preparing  to  meet  Lee  at  Pipe  Creek,  whom 
he  expected  to  follow  Reynolds'  retiring  column, 
and  to  attack  him  in  his  chosen  position.  Lee  had 
started  out  on  an  offensive  campaign,  and  it  was 
Meade's  intention  that  he  should  continue  the 
offensive,  and  give  battle  in  some  strong  position 
that  Meade  hoped  to  select.  For  that  purpose 
Meade  had  established  his  headquarters  at  Taney 
town,  and  selected  a  defensive  position  at  Pipe 
Creek,  in  what  appeared  to  be,  and  in  fact  was,  a 

[127] 


GETTYSBURG 

suitable  position  for  the  mobilization  of  his  army, 
when  he  should  discover  Lee  and  succeed  in  calling 
him  in  that  direction.  While  Meade's  army  was 
widely  scattered,  it  was  in  a  far  better  condition  for 
concentration  at  Pipe  Creek  than  at  Gettysburg. 
General  Hunt,  with  the  artillery  reserve,  was  with 
him  at  Taneytown,  and  the  Second  Corps  under  the 
command  of  Hancock  was  not  far  away,  while  the 
Fifth  Corps  was  at  Union  Mills,  the  Sixth  Corps 
at  Manchester,  and  the  Third  Corps,  which  was 
part  of  the  right  wing,  was  still  as  near  Taneytown 
as  Gettysburg. 

Meade,  it  must  be  confessed,  was  not  a  great  gen 
eral.  He  had  been  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  less  than  four  days;  in  fact  he  was 
then  only  nominally  in  command.  He  did  not  know 
his  army,  and  outside  of  the  Fifth  Corps  that  he 
had  previously  commanded,  the  army  knew  but 
very  little  about  Meade.  Each  corps  commander 
seemed  to  have  a  general  idea  of  the  situation  and 
of  his  duties,  and  tried  to  do  the  best  he  could 
according  to  the  light  he  possessed,  but  to  the  army 
the  situation  was  far  from  encouraging.  The 

F1281 


GETTYSBURG 

results  of  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville  had 
not  inspired  us  with  confidence  in  our  generals,  and 
the  great  lack  of  harmony  among  them  at  that  time 
was  sufficient  to  fill  all  hearts  with  foreboding. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  a  splendid  body 
of  men,  with  confidence  in  its  ability  to  defeat  Lee, 
if  once  put  into  position  to  meet  him  squarely  in 
battle.  The  danger  was  that  Lee,  by  superior 
generalship,  would  defeat  us  in  detail,  one  or  two 
corps  at  a  time.  With  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
united,  it  mattered  little  to  us  who  our  general 
might  be,  but  the  all-important  question  was, 
Would  Meade  display  sufficient  generalship  to 
unite  his  army  ?  General  Meade  lacked  confidence 
in  his  own  ability  as  a  general.  In  plain  English, 
he  was  afraid  of  Lee.  Very  likely  he  had  good  and 
sufficient  reasons  to  fear  Lee's  generalship.  Prob 
ably  every  prominent  general  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  except  perhaps  General  Hooker  (and 
in  that  Hooker  was  clearly  wrong) ,  considered  Lee 
superior  as  a  general  to  Meade,  or  to  himself;  but 
that  fact  did  not  deter  Reynolds  from  doing  his 
best  to  put  up  a  winning  battle  against  him  on  the 

[129] 


GETTYSBURG 

first  of  July.  It  did  not  deter  Howard  from  taking 
up  the  battle  where  Reynolds  laid  it  down  with  his 
life,  and  making  every  effort  toward  a  soldierly 
disposition  of  his  small  force  to  hold  Cemetery  Hill 
as  long  as  good  fighting  could  hold  it.  It  did  not 
deter  Slocum  from  marching  his  corps  to  the  assist 
ance  of  those  already  on  the  battlefield,  without 
orders  from  the  commanding  general,  but  from  the 
fact  that  he  had  learned  that  the  battle  was  on,  and 
that  his  corps  was  needed  on  the  firing  line. 

Still  it  must  have  been  a  severe  disappointment 
to  General  Meade  when  he  learned  that  Reynolds 
had  opened  the  battle  at  Gettysburg,  for  it  was 
good  strategy  on  Meade's  part  to  concentrate  his 
army  in  a  defensive  position  before  the  battle  was 
opened,  or  at  least  to  have  his  army  well  in  hand, 
so  that  it  should  not  be  destroyed  piecemeal.  Gen 
eral  Meade,  through  the  aid  of  his  engineers,  had 
selected  a  strong  defensive  line  behind  Pipe  Creek, 
in  a  position  approved  by  General  Halleck,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  at  Washington,  as  well  as  by 
himself,  covering  both  Washington  and  Baltimore 
by  lines  that  could  not  be  turned.  How  could  it  be 

[130] 


GENERAL  MEADE'S  HEADQUARTERS 


GENERAL  LEE'S  HEADQUARTERS 


MAJ.-GEN.  WINFIELD  SCOTT  HANCOCK 
Com.  Left  Centre,  Union  Forces,  July  2  and  3 


GETTYSBURG 

expected  that  he  would  abandon  this  carefully 
selected  position,  with  his  strongest  corps  near  at 
hand  and  convenient  for  the  concentration  of  his 
whole  army,  and  rush  pell-mell  to  Gettysburg  to 
support  the  battle  in  that  vicinity?  Meade  could 
not,  in  justice  to  himself  and  his  position,  act  with 
undue  haste,  and  he  called  to  his  aid  in  counsel  at 
that  trying  hour,  no  less  a  person  than  General 
Hancock,  commander  of  the  Second  Corps.  The 
outcome  of  that  consultation  was  that  Meade 
directed  Hancock  to  ride  to  Gettysburg,  view  the 
situation  there,  and  report  the  condition  as  he  found 
it.  More  than  that,  Meade  delegated  to  Hancock 
the  authority  of  Commander-in-Chief  for  the  time 
being,  leaving  it  within  his  discretion  whether  or 
not  to  retreat  from  Gettysburg  to  Pipe  Creek,  or 
order  the  army  to  concentrate  at  Gettysburg.  Gen 
eral  Meade  reserved  for  himself  no  choice  in  the 
matter.  He  left  the  entire  situation  to  Hancock's 
judgment,  hoping,  no  doubt,  that  he  would  decide 
against  Gettysburg  for  the  battle-ground ;  but  when 
he  decided  in  its  favour  Meade  was  compelled  to 
reinforce  that  point  with  his  whole  army. 

[  181  1 


GETTYSBURG 

General  Hancock  arrived  on  Cemetery  Hill 
about  half -past  four  o'clock,  just  as  Howard's 
broken  lines  were  there  gathered  in  confusion.  We 
are  informed  by  General  Doubleday  in  his  account 
of  Gettysburg,  that  he  was  present  on  Cemetery 
Hill  when  Hancock  rode  up  to  Howard  and 
informed  him  that,  by  the  direction  of  General 
Meade,  he  would  assume  command  of  the  field.  To 
this  General  Howard  objected,  replying:  "No, 
General,  you  cannot  take  command  here,  as  I  am 
your  senior  in  rank."  Then  Hancock  said  he 
would  return  and  report  to  General  Meade  in  per 
son.  To  this  General  Howard  also  objected,  say 
ing:  "That  will  not  do  either,  as  I  need  you  here 
to  assist  in  forming  these  lines."  Hancock  was  a 
superb  man,  ready  to  obey  as  well  as  command. 
General  Grant  afterwards  said  of  him:  "  Hancock 
stands  the  most  conspicuous  figure  of  all  our  general 
officers  who  did  not  exercise  a  separate  command." 
So  Hancock  remained  with  Howard  and  gave  him 
all  the  assistance  in  his  power.  Strange  to  say, 
however,  after  viewing  the  lay  of  the  country  —  the 
strong  position  —  the  wide  valley  in  front  and  Semi- 

[132] 


GETTYSBURG 

nary  Ridge  beyond,  occupied  by  the  Confederates 
in  force,  with  an  unobstructed  gateway  for  a  move 
ment  by  their  right  flank  to  the  southward  that 
would  entirely  uncover  our  position,  Hancock 
approved  of  the  Gettysburg  hills  as  the  field 
whereon  to  continue  the  battle,  and  sent  a  despatch 
to  General  Meade  to  that  effect. 

When  General  Meade  received  Hancock's 
despatch,  about  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  Han 
cock  was  at  Gettysburg  actively  making  prepara 
tions  for  the  battle  of  the  coming  day,  provided 
Lee  would  attack  and  not  slip  away  from  our  front. 
So  Meade  gave  up  his  carefully  selected  position, 
and  issued  the  order  for  every  absent  division  to 
advance  on  Gettysburg,  with  all  possible  haste. 

General  Meade  and  staff  reached  Cemetery  Hill 
about  midnight,  where  he  established  his  head 
quarters  in  a  little  old  one-story  frame  house  or 
shack  on  the  west  side  of  the  Taneytown  Road, 
three  hundred  yards  east  of  the  crest  of  the  south 
ern  prolongation  of  Cemetery  Hill,  and  about  four 
hundred  yards  south  of  the  west  gate  of  the  Ceme 
tery.  The  same  old  shack  stood  there  in  1900. 


GETTYSBURG 

After  the  arrival  of  General  Meade  on  Cemetery 
Hill  a  council  of  war  was  held  by  the  Union  gen 
erals  then  present,  and  Meade,  not  being  satisfied 
with  the  conditions  presented  to  him,  gave  it  as  his 
opinion  that  Gettysburg  was  not  the  place  to  fight 
a  battle.  His  generals,  however,  without  a  dissenting 
voice  (General  Sickles  had  not  yet  arrived)  favoured 
no  retreat  from  the  position  they  then  held,  to  Pipe 
Creek  or  any  other  place,  without  a  fight.  There 
certainly  was  no  objection  to  a  battle  in  that  strong 
position,  provided  that  Lee  was  willing  to  attack; 
but  if  he  slipped  past  us,  what  then  ?  That  was 
exactly  what  Meade  feared.  General  Halleck,  in 
a  despatch  from  Washington,  expressed  the  fear 
that  his  position  was  too  far  to  the  eastward;  to 
which  Meade  replied,  during  the  forenoon,  that  in 
the  event  he  should  find  the  Confederates  moving 
to  interpose  between  his  army  and  Washington,  he 
would  fall  back  on  his  supplies  at  Westminster. 

During  the  night  of  July  first,  the  soldiers  in 
battle-line  of  both  armies  rested  on  their  arms, 
while  their  absent  comrades,  under  urgent  orders 
to  reach  the  field,  rested  on  their  feet.  There  is  no 

[134] 


GETTYSBURG 

other  ordeal  so  severe  and  trying  to  a  soldier  as  a 
night -march,  but  this  was  an  occasion  for  the  great 
est  of  human  efforts,  and  throughout  the  silent 
hours  of  that  July  night  they  plodded  on. 

Before  the  morning  of  July  second  dawned, 
Lee's  whole  army,  with  the  exception  of  Pickett's 
division  and  Stuart's  cavalry,  had  arrived  on  the 
field,  and  it  might  be  presumed  that  he  was  ready 
for  battle.  His  left  rested  on  Rock  Creek,  east  of 
Gettysburg,  and  comprised  E well's  corps;  John 
son's  division  near  Gulp's  Hill;  Early's  and 
Rodes'  divisions,  extending  the  Confederate  line 
to  the  right  through  the  city;  Fender's  division  of 
the  Third  Corps  on  the  right  of  Rodes,  with  the 
other  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  resting  on  Semi 
nary  Ridge  around  and  near  general  headquarters. 

Lee's  centre  was  commanded  by  A.  P.  Hill.  His 
right  was  commanded  by  Longstreet,  whose  troops 
were  the  last  to  arrive  on  the  field,  and  for  some 
unaccountable  reason  seemed  a  long  time  in  getting 
into  position. 

When  the  morning  of  July  second  dawned,  the 
condition  of  Meade's  army  had  greatly  improved. 

[135] 


GETTYSBURG 

Not  only  had  the  troops  in  line  at  sunset  rested  and 
recuperated  their  strength  and  courage,  but  Han 
cock's  Second  Corps,  13,000  strong,  had  arrived  on 
the  field,  and  extended  Howard's  former  line  to 
the  left,  southward  along  Cemetery  Ridge  toward 
Round  Top. 

The  Second  Corps  came  upon  the  field  over  the 
Taneytown  Road,  from  three  to  four  hundred 
yards  in  rear  of  the  ridge  upon  which  Hancock, 
with  Meade's  approval,  had  selected  his  position, 
so  that  as  each  division  arrived  opposite  its  place  in 
line,  it  moved  forward  to  the  point  selected  on  the 
ridge,  and  the  weary  soldiers  dropped  to  repose, 
but  ready  for  battle  at  any  moment  when  the  signal 
sounded.  The  Second  Corps  made  our  line  of  bat 
tle  about  34,000  strong,  extending  from  Rock  Creek 
on  the  right,  in  a  northwesterly  direction  along  the 
slope  of  Culp's  Hill  to  its  crest;  thence  westward  to 
the  west  gate  of  the  Cemetery  on  the  Taneytown 
Road,  and  thence  southward  along  the  crest  of 
Cemetery  Ridge  half  way  to  Round  Top.  The 
Twelfth  Corps  neld  the  right  of  our  line  extending 
to  the  crest  of  Culp's  Hill,  the  north  front  of  which 

1 136  ] 


MAJ.-GEN.  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM 
Com.  Right  Wing,  Union  Forces,  July    2  and  S 


MAJ.-GEN.  DANIEL  E.  SICKLES 

Com.  3d  Corps 


GETTYSBURG 

was  held  by  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  First 
Corps,  on  Slocum's  left.  To  the  left  of  Wads- 
worth,  across  the  valley  between  Culp's  Hill  and 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  along  the  north  and  northwest 
fronts  of  Cemetery  Hill  were  stationed  the  three 
divisions  of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  To  the  left  of 
the  Eleventh  Corps,  facing  the  west  front  of  Ceme 
tery  Hill,  were  the  second  and  third  divisions  of 
the  First  Corps.  To  the  left  and  south  of  Double- 
day's  two  divisions  the  Second  Corps  extended  our 
line  southward  along  Cemetery  Ridge  for  the  full 
length  of  Hancock's  three  divisions,  and  Buford's 
cavalry  division  —  which  is  here  counted  in  the 
aggregate  of  Meade's  34,000  —  acted  as  a  reserve 
force  for  the  protection  of  our  flanks  and  the  rein 
forcement  of  any  point  suddenly  put  in  jeopardy. 
The  Third  Corps,  commanded  by  General 
Sickles,  12,000  strong,  also  arrived  on  the  field  at 
an  early  hour  in  the  morning.  This  gave  Meade  a 
force  of  46,000  men  all  told,  to  meet  Lee's  army, 
very  early  on  the  morning  of  July  second.  Thus 
it  appears  that  General  Meade  had  employed  the 
night  to  great  advantage,  and  had  made  every 

[137] 


GETTYSBURG 

effort  in  his  power  to  unite  his  army  so  that  he 
might  in  his  first  battle  meet  his  great  antagonist 
on  somewhere  near  equal  terms.  Still  the  Fifth 
Corps,  commanded  by  General  Sykes,  12,500 
strong,  and  the  Sixth  Corps,  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Sedgwick,  15,500  strong  (28,000  in  all,  or 
more  than  one-third  of  Meade's  whole  army) ,  were 
many  weary  miles  away.  Would  Lee  take  advan 
tage  of  the  fact  that  a  third  of  Meade's  army  was 
still  absent  ?  If  he  intended,  or  desired,  to  pursue 
his  tactics  of  previous  battles,  and  defeat  his  oppon 
ents  in  detail,  here  indeed  was  his  opportunity. 
But  Lee  had  lost  his  balance,  and  there  followed 
the  continuation  of  his  hesitating  policy  of  the 
afternoon  before.  Hour  after  hour  passed,  with 
only  an  occasional  picket  shot,  or  the  solitary  boom 
of  a  heavy  gun,  and  every  hour's  delay  added  to 
Meade's  advantage.  Probably  there  never  was  a 
time  in  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
when  it  stood  in  greater  need  of  a  direct  interposi 
tion  of  the  hand  of  God  in  its  behalf,  especially  at 
five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  July  first,  and  Lee's 
inaction  at  that  time  and  during  the  greater  part  of 

[138] 


GETTYSBURG 

the  next  day  (a  weakness  so  foreign  to  his  character 
on  all  previous  occasions)  seems  to  have  been  in 
response  to  that  trying  need.  He  wavered;  he 
hesitated ;  he  waited,  —  while  our  army  concentrated. 
From  five  o'clock  P.M.  of  July  first  to  four  o'clock 
P.M.  of  July  second,  Lee  was  apparently  asleep; 
and  by  that  twenty-three  hours  of  inaction  his  flood 
tide  of  fortune  had  ebbed,  and  the  wild  dream  of 
his  ambition  had  passed  beyond  all  chance  of 
fulfilment. 


[139] 


CHAPTER  XIV 

LINES  WHICH  WERE  AND  LINES  WHICH  WERE  NOT 
J  FORMED 

ETWEEN  the  southern  prolongation  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  which  terminates  in  Round 
Top  two  and  a  half  miles  to  the  southward,  and  the 
Seminary  Ridge  opposite,  there  lies  a  beautiful, 
irregular  valley,  about  two  and  one-half  miles  in 
length,  by  from  a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  quarter  in 
width.  This  valley  is  divided  into  two  irregular 
triangles  by  the  Emmetsburg  Road,  which  follows 
a  well-defined  ridge  across  and  from  the  western 
slope  of  Cemetery  Hill,  in  a  southwesterly  direc 
tion,  until  the  ridge  merges  into  and  the  road  crosses 
Seminary  Ridge,  about  a  mile  almost  due  west  from 
Round  Top.  The  eastern  triangle  has  its  apex 
toward  the  north,  its  base  extending  from  Seminary 
Ridge  to  Round  Top  and  its  perpendicular  extend 
ing  northward  along  the  easternmost  of  these  three 
ridges,  from  Round  Top  to  Cemetery  Hill.  The 

[140] 


GETTYSBURG 

western  triangle  is  the  reverse  of  the  eastern,  its 
base  extending  from  Cemetery  Hill  about  a  mile 
and  an  eighth  west  to  Seminary  Ridge,  its  perpen 
dicular  running  southward  along  the  ridge  for  the 
distance  of  two  and  one-half  miles,  the  juncture  of 
the  Seminary  with  the  Emmetsburg  Road  Ridge 
forming  its  apex.  The  Emmetsburg  Road,  there 
fore,  forms  the  hypothenuse  of  both  the  aforesaid 
triangles. 

This  valley,  which  may  truly  be  called  the  Valley 
of  Gettysburg,  continues  past  the  base  of  Cemetery 
Hill  and  the  city  far  away  to  the  northward;  while 
to  the  southward  beyond  Round  Top  it  spreads 
out  in  limitless  extent. 

The  eastern  of  the  afore-mentioned  ridges,  occu 
pied  by  Hancock's  corps  from  Cemetery  Hill  half 
way  to  Little  Round  Top,  is  the  least  prominent 
of  the  three.  In  fact,  for  more  than  half  the  dis 
tance,  and  throughout  the  whole  right  wing  of 
Hancock's  line,  the  ridge  is  nothing  more  than  a 
gentle  elevation*  The  Emmetsburg  Road  Ridge  is 
more  prominent,  and  west  of  Hancock's  left,  and 
the  unoccupied  space  between  his  left  and  Little 

run 


GETTYSBURG 

Round  Top,  shuts  off  the  view  of  the  Seminary 
Ridge  beyond.  The  Seminary  Ridge  is  the  most 
commanding  ridge  of  the  three,  and  from  the  point 
opposite  Hancock's  centre  southward  to  its  junc 
ture  with  the  Emmetsburg  Road,  it  becomes  abrupt, 
rocky,  and  heavily  wooded. 

General  Sickles,  in  command  of  the  Third  Corps, 
marched  to  Gettysburg  in  the  early  morning  of 
July  second,  along  the  Emmetsburg  Road.  At 
the  time  he  crossed  the  Seminary  Ridge,  two  and 
one-half  miles  southwest  of  Cemetery  Hill,  Long- 
street,  with  his  Confederates,  was  resting  among 
the  groves  and  on  the  grassy  slopes  of  the  same 
ridge  farther  to  the  northward  and  from  a  mile 
and  a  half  to  two  miles  west  of  Hancock's  right. 

Sickles  noticed  the  splendid  formation  of  the 
Emmetsburg  Road  Ridge,  both  for  defensive  and 
offensive  operations,  with  a  broad  highway  running 
along  its  whole  length  to  facilitate  the  movement 
of  troops,  and  especially  artillery,  from  one  point 
to  another  in  the  line,  and  very  naturally  desired  to 
avail  himself  of  such  a  strategic  position.  General 
Sickles  noticed  something  more.  In  this  wide-open 

[  142] 


GETTYSBURG 

valley  he  saw  a  most  inviting  gateway  for  Lee  to  do 
exactly  what  Longstreet  had  been  urging  him  to 
do — slip  quietly  past  Meade's  defensive  position 
on  Cemetery  Hill  and  Ridge,  under  the  cover  of 
night,  or  under  the  cover  of  Seminary  Ridge  if  he 
cared  to  make  such  a  movement  in  broad  day,  and 
align  his  army  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  Washington,  thereby  compelling  Meade  to  give 
battle  upon  ground  of  Lee's  own  choosing.  This 
same  view  of  the  situation  had  caused  Meade  to 
express  the  opinion  that  Gettysburg  was  not  the 
place  to  fight  the  battle.  However,  General  Meade 
seemed  to  think  that  Cemetery  Ridge  was  a  stronger 
and  more  secure  position,  and  he  instructed  Sickles 
to  form  his  corps  on  Hancock's  left,  extending  his 
line  southward  to  Little  Round  Top.  At  least, 
General  Meade  so  claimed  afterwards,  but  prob 
ably,  not  caring  to  assume  the  whole  responsibility, 
he  gave  such  orders  as  Sickles  construed  into  dis 
cretionary  authority  in  selecting  his  position,  and 
Sickles  selected  the  line  of  the  Emmetsburg  Road. 
This  blunder,  or  want  of  understanding  between  the 
generals,  threw  our  battle  formation  out  of  all 

[143] 


GETTYSBURG 

harmony,  and  may,  or  may  not,  have  worked  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  Union  cause  the  second  day. 

General  Meade  was  extremely  cautious,  too 
cautious  to  be  apt  to  win  a  great  victory  like  the 
capture  or  annihilation  of  the  army  opposed  to  him, 
and  in  this  instance  he  had  every  reason  to  be  cau 
tious  from  the  fact  that  a  third  of  his  army  was  still 
far  away  from  the  field.  Meade  reasoned  that  as 
Lee  had  marched  his  army  far  from  his  base,  and 
had  actually  carried  the  war  into  a  locality  unknown 
to  him,  it  would  be  the  proper  thing  to  encourage 
him  to  fight  a  truly  offensive  battle  on  grounds  of 
Meade's  own  choosing;  and  certainly  he  did  not 
wish  to  assume  a  position,  if  he  could  possibly  avoid 
it,  that  would  occasion  the  renewal  of  the  contest 
before  the  arrival  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps. 
The  longer  Lee  delayed  his  attack,  assuming  that 
he  would  certainly  attack  Meade's  chosen  position, 
the  more  advantageous  the  situation  became. 

By  extending  Hancock's  line  southward  along 
Cemetery  Ridge  to  Round  Top,  Meade  would  have 
a  strong,  compact  position,  with  his  left  absolutely 
secure.  The  Fifth  Corps  was  approaching  the  field 

[144] 


GETTYSBURG 

by  the  Taneytown  Road,  and  would  arrive  in  the 
exact  locality  to  reinforce  readily  any  part  of  his 
west  front,  as  the  Taneytown  Road  runs  the  whole 
length  of  Cemetery  Ridge  and  only  three  or  four 
hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  crest.  Sickles'  corps, 
nearly  12,000  strong,  was  ample  to  form  an  invinc 
ible  battle-line  from  Hancock's  left  to  that  impreg 
nable  bastion  to  the  southward. 

Because  of  the  absence  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Corps,  but  for  no  other  reason,  was  Meade  justified 
in  placing  his  army  in  such  a  purely  defensive  posi 
tion;  for,  to  abandon  the  Emmetsburg  Road  to 
Longstreet  was  in  itself  a  victory  for  Lee.  The 
Emmetsburg  and  Hagerstown  Roads  both  lead  to 
the  Potomac,  and  with  these  roads  in  his  possession, 
Lee  could  readily  retreat  in  absolute  safety,  in  case 
of  defeat. 

There  was  another  reason  why  the  Emmetsburg 
Road  should  not  have  been  given  over  to  the  posses 
sion  of  Longstreet  at  that  time.  It  would  have 
afforded  a  wide  and  unobstructed  gateway  for  Lee's 
whole  army  to  move  by  his  right  flank  completely 
beyond  and  away  from  Meade's  strong  position, 

[1451 


GETTYSBURG 

compelling  Meade  to  evacuate,  and  retreat  in  haste, 
in  order  to  interpose  between  Lee's  army  and  Wash 
ington.  Meade  himself  was  fearful  of  that  very 
movement;  otherwise,  being  the  commanding  gen 
eral,  he  would  have  said  to  Sickles  in  plain  English, 
so  there  could  have  been  no  misunderstanding, 
"  Form  your  corps  on  Hancock's  left,  and  continue 
his  line  southward  along  the  ridge  to  Little  Round 
Top,"  and  surely  Sickles  would  have  followed  such 
instructions;  but  Meade  simply  did  not  care  to 
assume  the  whole  responsibility,  so  he  gave  a  kind 
of  ambiguous  order  that  Sickles  construed  accord 
ing  to  his  ideas  of  the  necessity  of  the  case. 

Sickles  was  a  man  of  action,  a  born  fighter;  and 
his  idea  of  holding  a  position  that  might  readily  be 
turned  into  the  offensive,  and  especially  of  block 
ing  Lee's  open  gateway  to  the  flank  and  rear  of 
Meade's  position,  was  the  correct  one;  provided, 
of  course,  that  the  army  was  strong  enough  and  in 
a  condition  to  assume  it.  Every  soldier  must  admire 
Sickles'  courage,  and  admit  that  he  had  weighty 
reasons  for  making  the  attempt  to  bring  Lee  to 

[146] 


GETTYSBURG 

battle  then  and  there,  rather  than  take  any  chances 
on  a  flank  movement  and  a  battle  later,  in  a  less 
favourable  position. 

The  distance  from  Cemetery  Hill  along  the 
Emmetsburg  Road  Ridge  to  Seminary  Ridge  is 
only  a  trifle,  if  any,  farther  than  from  the  same, 
point  southward  along  Cemetery  Ridge  to  Round 
Top.  Clearly  the  Emmetsburg  Road  Ridge  was 
the  line  that  should  have  been  selected  for  our 
battle-line  had  Meade's  whole  army  been  on  the  field 
and  ready  to  assume  the  position  on  the  morning 
of  July  second.  To  assume  such  position  would 
have  necessitated  the  moving  of  Hancock's  corps 
forward  or  westward  to  the  Emmetsburg  Road; 
which  movement  would  have  swung  his  left  toward 
the  front  a  half  or  three-fourths  of  a  mile,  while 
his  right  would  still  have  been  pivoted  on  the  west 
gate  of  the  Cemetery,  thus  giving  Hancock  a  battle- 
line  about  a  mile  or  a  mile  and  a  half  in  length,  or 
the  same  length  of  the  inner  line  as  held  by  him, 
with  his  left  far  down  the  Emmetsburg  Road  about 
four  or  five  hundred  yards  northeast  of  the  point 


GETTYSBURG 

where  it  is  crossed  by  the  Wheatfield  Road.  Such 
formation  would  have  carried  Sickles'  right  half  a 
mile  farther  southwest  on  the  Emmetsburg  Road 
than  the  point  where  he  placed  it;  from  which  his 
battle-line  would  have  followed  the  Emmetsburg 
Road  to  the  Seminary  Ridge,  a  mile  or  more  farther 
toward  the  southwest. 

Then  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  had  it  been  on  the 
ground,  to  hold  the  left  on  Seminary  Ridge,  and 
the  Sixth  Corps  in  reserve,  Meade  could  have 
fought  Lee  to  a  finish  at  any  point  and  every  point 
along  his  line,  and  followed  up  his  success  by 
sweeping  northward  with  his  reserve  along  the  crest 
of  Seminary  Ridge,  until,  gaining  possession  of 
the  Hagerstown  Road,  he  would  have  cut  off  Lee's 
retreat  and  turned  his  defeat  into  rout  and 
destruction. 

But  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  were  not  there, 
and  the  preparation  for  battle  was  obliged  to  go  on 
without  them.  Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  28,000 
infantry  and  artillery,  and  until  they  should  arrive,' 
it  may  have  been  good  generalship  on  Meade's  part 

[148] 


GETTYSBURG 

to  assume  the  strongest  defensive  position  possible 
and  manoeuvre  to  delay  rather  than  to  facilitate  and 
invite  attack.  Meade's  idea  was  to  watch  the 
enemy,  and  retreat  hastily  if  he  started  to  move 
away  from  his  front.  Sickles'  idea  was  to  shove  his 
lines  into  the  enemy's  teeth. 

The  misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  the  gen 
erals  was  unaccountable.  At  the  very  time  when 
harmony  in  council  and  unity  in  action  were  neces 
sary  to  insure  success,  harmony  and  unity  were  lack 
ing.  Neither  position  was  selected.  Hancock's  line 
was  not  extended  to  Little  Round  Top;  Sickles' 
line  was  not  continued  to  Seminary  Ridge.  These 
were  the  lines  that  were  not  formed.  The  lines 
that  were  formed  were,  Hancock's  in  his  old  posi 
tion  along  the  crest  of  Cemetery  Ridge;  Sickles' 
line  away  to  the  front,  shooting  out  well  toward 
Seminary  Ridge  but  not  reaching  it.  Sickles 
formed  his  corps  in  accordance  with  his  own  mili 
tary  discretion,  which  he  said  was  the  import  of  the 
orders  given  him  by  Meade.  A  soldier's  eye  can 
hardly  be  impressed  with  the  stupendous  weight  of 

[149] 


GETTYSBURG 

General  Sickles'  discretion,  in  studying  his  old  bat 
tle  lines.  Placing  his  right  on  the  Emmetsburg 
Road  at  a  point  about  three  hundred  yards  south 
west  of  the  Codori  House,  which  point  was  five  or 
six  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  Hancock's  left, 
he  extended  his  line  along  the  Emmetsburg  Road 
for  the  distance  of  about  a  thousand  yards,  cross 
ing  the  Wheatfield  Road  and  going  about  one  hun 
dred  yards  beyond  to  the  southwest  corner  of  the 
Peach  Orchard.  At  this  point  Sickles  seemed  to 
weaken  in  his  determination  to  make  the  Emmets 
burg  Road  his  battle-line  and  rest  his  left  on 
Seminary  Ridge;  for  here  he  turned  abruptly  to  the 
rearward,  running  thence  at  nearly  a  right  angle 
with  his  former  line  in  the  direction  of  Little  Round 
Top,  which  is  distant  from  this  point  fully  one  mile 
in  a  direct  line. 

This,  then,  was  the  position  of  Sickles  and  the 
line  he  had  selected.  He  had  cut  himself  loose  from 
the  rest  of  the  army;  had  isolated  his  corps;  had 
taken  up  a  position  absolutely  untenable,  with  his 
right  five  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  his  nearest 

[150] 


GETTYSBURG 

supports,  and  his  centre  advanced  three-fourths  of 
a  mile  beyond  his  supporting  line;  with  his  left,  a 
long  helter-skelter  line  of  nearly  a  mile  in  extent, 
supported  by  nothing  and  resting  nowhere.  And 
this  was  the  position  in  which  Longstreet  found 
him,  when  he  opened  the  battle  of  July  second. 


CHAPTER  XV 

SICKLES'  SALIENT 

r  llHE  stars  were  shining  brightly  on  the  morn- 
•*•  ing  of  the  second  of  July,  when  I  reported  at 
General  Lee's  headquarters  and  asked  for  orders." 
Thus  writes  Longstreet,  and  thereby  it  seems  that 
he  was  ready  for  active  work  in  good  season;  but 
further  on  in  his  account  he  says:  "General  Lee 
was  not  ready  with  his  plans,"  and,  "  as  soon  as  it 
was  light  enough  to  see,  the  enemy  was  found  in 
position  on  his  formidable  heights  awaiting  us." 
Then,  Longstreet  informs  us,  Lee  sent  an  engineer 
to  reconnoitre  on  his  right,  and  also  sent  one  of  his 
staff  to  confer  with  Ewell  as  to  the  opportunity  for 
making  the  battle  by  his  left,  and  at  ten  o'clock 
"was  still  in  doubt  whether  it  would  be  better  to 
move  to  his  far-off  right."  It  was  Lee  who  was 
hesitating;  but  if  he  had  not  fully  made  up  his 
mind  to  renew  the  battle  against  Meade's  strong 
position  when  he  surveyed  the  field  from  the  cupola 

[1521 


GETTYSBURG 

of  the  Seminary  (which  was  Lee's  watch-tower  for 
the  second  and  third  of  July,  as  it  was  Reynolds' 
and  Howard's  on  the  first)  and  saw  far  down  the 
valley  to  his  right,  Sickles'  salient  lines  running  in 
close  against  Seminary  Ridge,  then  was  his  fight 
ing  blood  stirred  to  the  depth,  and  at  eleven  o'clock 
he  issued  his  order  of  battle. 

By  that  order  the  battle  was  to  be  opened  on  his 
extreme  right  by  the  First  Corps,  supported  on  its 
left  by  Anderson's  division  of  the  Third  Corps, 
and  the  general  supervision  of  the  battle  was  put 
into  the  hands  of  Longstreet ;  and,  as  a  distinguish 
ing  feature  among  the  battles  of  Gettysburg,  it 
was  called  "  Longstreet's  battle  of  the  right,"  or  by 
the  Union  soldiers,  "Sickles'  Salient";  but  as  it 
was  the  great  and  decisive  battle  of  the  series,  it 
had  many  subdivisions,  each  taking  a  different 
name. 

Longstreet's  corps,  which  he  boasted  was  "  a 
great  rock,"  comprised  three  divisions;  but  Pick- 
ett's  division  was  at  Chambersburg,  so  that  it  went 
into  the  battle  of  July  second  with  two  divisions, 
McLaws'  and  Hood's,  with  four  brigades  each. 

[153] 


GETTYSBURG 

Longstreet  asserts  that  he  had  "  17,000  against  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac";  but  according  to  his  own 
figures  the  aggregate  of  Lee's  army  was  76,000,  or 
66,000  of  infantry  and  artillery,  and  his  corps  must 
have  comprised  a  third  of  that  number,  or  22,000. 
If  Pickett's  three  brigades,  which  were  absent, 
numbered  6,000,  then  Longstreet  must  have  had 
16,000  in  the  eight  brigades  of  the  two  divisions 
that  he  directed  against  Sickles'  Salient.  He  also, 
by  his  own  statement,  had  Anderson's  division  of 
Hill's  corps,  under  his  command,  and  as  Anderson 
had  five  brigades  in  his  division,  this  would  add 
10,000  to  Longstreet's  force,  swelling  it  to  26,000 
in  all;  if  it  is  a  fact,  as  he  declares,  that  Lee  sent 
him  no  other  reinforcements.  If  Longstreet 
fought  the  battle  of  July  second  with  26,000  men, 
he  did  well,  and  made  a  great  showing  as  well  as  a 
great  effort;  but  he  did  not  fight  the  whole  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  as  he  intimates.  Let  the  reader 
remember  that  fact,  as  he  follows  this  account. 

So  the  order  of  battle  was  given  at  eleven  o'clock, 
and  the  troops  designated  to  make  it  were  con 
ducted  to  their  positions  for  the  attack.  Anderson 

[154] 


GETTYSBURG 

moved  his  brigades  down  the  Seminary  Ridge  and 
eastward  in  the  shelter  of  the  woods  that  covered 
all  the  lower  reaches  and  slopes  of  this  Confederate 
stronghold,  so  as  to  bring  them  in  front  of  Humph 
rey's  three  brigades,  which  held  the  right  of  Sickles' 
line  along  the  Emmetsburg  Road.  Sickles  had 
begun  to  feel  a  trifle  uneasy,  all  alone  with  his  corps 
away  out  there  close  up  to  the  woods  on  Seminary 
Ridge,  and  had  thrown  forward  three  battalions  of 
sharpshooters  —  the  First  Vermont,  First  New 
York,  and  Third  Maine  —  to  develop  the  approach 
ing  enemy.  Anderson's  troops  attacked  and  drove 
back  these  skirmishers;  and  General  Birney,  who 
commanded  Sickles'  left  wing  on  his  rearward  line, 
reported  this  skirmish  as  beginning  at  eleven  forty- 
five  o'clock  and  ending  at  twelve  fifty-five.  From 
this  field  report  we  learn  that  at  about  one  o'clock 
Anderson's  brigades  had  full  and  complete  pos 
session  of  the  woods  that  covered  the  eastern  slope 
of  Seminary  Ridge  in  front  of  Sickles'  right. 
Here  they  deployed,  and  Longstreet  himself  gives 
us  the  order  of  Anderson's  formation,  —  "Wil- 

[155] 


GETTYSBURG 

cox's,  Perry's,  Wright's,  Posey's,  and  Mahone's  bri 
gades  from  right  to  left."  * 

Away  over  the  ridge  there  resided  in  1900  a  lady 
who,  as  a  little  girl,  lived  in  that  vicinity  at  the  time 
of  the  battle.  She  stated  to  the  writer  in  1900,  that 
Longstreet's  men  were  enthusiastic  and  boasted 
that  they  had  "  whipped  the  stuffing "  out  of  the 
Yanks  the  day  before,  and  would  do  the  same  thing 
again  before  the  sun  went  down.  After  passing  be 
yond  the  point  of  Sickles'  Salient,  they  crossed  Sem 
inary  Ridge  to  the  eastward  in  double  lines.  At  the 
crest  of  Seminary  Ridge  at  the  crossing  or  intersec 
tion  of  the  Emmetsburg  Road  the  Confederate 
columns  deployed  for  battle,  McLaws'  four  bri 
gades  on  the  right  of  Anderson,  in  compact  lines 
fronting  the  point  of  the  Salient;  Hood's  four  bri 
gades  spreading  out  to  the  eastward,  so  as  to  envelop 
Sickles'  left,  which  was  under  the  immediate  com 
mand  of  Birney.  Thus  we  find  in  the  afternoon  of 
July  second,  the  First  Corps  of  the  Confederate 


*  Longstreet's  two  divisions  —  McLaws'  and  Hood's  — 
marched  to  their  positions  by  a  route  well  concealed  from 
Sickles'  view. 

[156] 


GETTYSBURG 

army  away  down  the  Valley  of  Gettysburg  to  the 
southward  of  Hancock's  left  flank,  with  the  whole 
Confederate  army  in  uninterrupted  connection 
therewith,  and  in  a  position  to  move  toward  Wash 
ington  and  compel  Meade  to  abandon  his  strong 
hold  without  a  battle.  All  Lee  had  to  do  was  to 
hold  Longstreet  in  that  threatening  position  while 
he  concentrated  his  left  and  centre  in  that  direction, 
and  when  night  fell,  to  take  up  his  line  of  march 
for  the  southward  with  Meade's  army  in  the  lurch. 
But  surely  Lee  was  looking  for  disaster,  and  not 
for  victory,  to  such  extent  that  he  durst  not  draw 
away  from  the  Hagerstown  Road,  which  would 
afford  him  a  safe  retreat  through  the  South  Moun 
tain  passes  to  the  Potomac.  General  Meade  said 
that  Sickles'  position  jeopardized  his  situation,  in 
the  fact  that  it  brought  on  the  battle  before  he  was 
in  readiness,  and  while  twenty-eight  thousand  of  his 
infantry  and  artillery  were  still  absent;  but  really 
it  seems  to  have  had  the  opposite  effect.  The  very 
boldness  of  Sickles'  movement — his  audacity  in 
pushing  his  corps  across  the  valley  to  within  rifle- 
of  Seminary  Ridge  —  was  sufficient  to  give 
[157] 


GETTYSBURG 

Longstreet  pause,  and  it  is  not  strange  that  he 
believed  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in 
position  behind  him.  With  his  line  on  Cemetery 
Ridge  in  connection  with  Hancock's  left,  Meade's 
position  would  have  been  in  open  view  throughout, 
from  the  cupola  of  the  Seminary;  and  having 
determined  to  give  battle  at  eleven  o'clock  A.M. 
when  he  issued  his  battle-order,  surely  Lee  would 
have  seen  to  it  that  Longstreet  moved  at  once  to  the 
attack;  but  away  to  the  southward  Sickles'  Salient 
was  screened  by  the  almost  overhanging  wroods  of 
Seminary  Ridge,  while  his  left  wing — Birney's 
whole  division  —  was  lost  among  the  hills,  groves, 
and  ravines  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Devil's  Den 
and  the  Round  Tops.  Longstreet  must  have  lost  two 
precious  hours  in  marching,  counter-marching,  and 
manoeuvring  for  position.  There  was  no  vain  show 
in  the  preparations  for  battle  on  either  side.  Sick 
les'  regiments  awaited  the  onset  behind  such  hastily 
constructed  cover  as  they  could  improvise,  and  his 
batteries  occupied  all  the  prominent  knolls  of  com 
manding  position,  within  and  to  the  rearward  of  the 
Salient;  while  the  Confederate  artillery,  far  down 

[  158  I 


GETTYSBURG 

the  Emmetsburg  Road,  bristled  from  every  hill-top 
and  showed  their  gaping  mouths  from  the  wood- 
screened  heights  of  Seminary  Ridge,  as  the  long 
lines  of  ragged  butternut  crept  nearer  and  ever 
nearer. 

At  last,  late  in  the  afternoon,  Longstreet's  bri 
gades  were  in  readiness.  They  were  drawn  close 
around  and  confronting  the  Salient  from  the  north 
west,  from  the  west,  from  the  southwest,  and  from 
the  south.  And  here  we  will  pause  for  a  moment 
while  we  take  a  last  look  at  Sickles'  Salient  before 
the  battle  opened.  Could  you,  O  reader,  open  an 
immense  pair  of  dividers  at  right  angles,  and  lay 
them  upon  that  fair,  diversified  field,  the  point  rest 
ing  on  the  Emmetsburg  Road  one  hundred  yards 
southwest  of  the  crossing  of  the  Wheatfield  Road, 
the  left  limb  would  lie  along  the  Emmetsburg  Road, 
pointing  toward  Cemetery  Hill,  while  the  right  limb 
would  point  directly  toward  Little  Round  Top ;  but 
while  Humphreys'  wing  on  the  Emmetsburg  Road 
followed  a  ridge  and  was  nearly  straight  through 
out  its  length,  Birney's  wing,  running  in  a  generally 
southeast  direction,  followed  no  ridge  or  defensive 

[159] 


GETTYSBURG 

line  in  particular,  but  was  very  crooked,  doubling 
back  and  forth  among  the  hills,  swamps,  and  rocks, 
taking  advantage  of  every  position  that  afforded 
shelter  and  defence.  Longstreet  speaks  of  this 
locality  as  follows:  "Hood's  front  was  very 
rugged,  with  no  field  for  artillery,  and  very  rough 
for  the  advance  of  infantry." 

Within  this  Salient  the  troops  of  the  Third  Corps 
had  awaited  battle  for  long  hours  on  that  July  day, 
defiant  of  the  gathering  forces  of  the  enemy,  care 
less  of  increasing  danger,  ready  to  accept  the 
chances  of  wounds  and  death;  for  was  it  not  battle 
that  Sickles,  their  General,  courted  and  desired  on 
that  very  ground,  with  all  the  chances  of  war  against 
him  ? 

And  where  was  Meade  ?  Where  was  the  com 
manding  General  ?  General  Meade's  headquarters 
were  over  the  crest  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  two  miles 
away  to  the  northeast  from  the  point  of  Sickles' 
Salient,  just  three  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  Han 
cock's  right.  In  1900,  when  the  old  veteran 
revisited  the  field,  he  followed  Meade  Avenue 
directly  west  from  the  old  headquarters  on  the 

[  160  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

Taneytown  Road  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge  in  the  rear 
of  Hancock's  position.  One  hundred  yards  to  the 
right  stands  a  steel  tower  of  observation,  erected  at 
this  point  on  account  of  the  prominence  of  its  situ 
ation.  Fifty  yards  to  the  left  or  south  of  the  tower, 
stands  a  bronze  equestrian  statue  of  General  Meade, 
erected  where  the  general  commanding  might  be  pre 
sumed  to  have  stood,  occasionally,  when  the  lines 
were  forming  for  battle,  and  Longstreet  was  pre 
paring  his  brigades  and  batteries  to  crush  Sickles. 
What  a  pity  that  General  Meade  did  not  ride  for 
ward  from  his  headquarters,  three  hundred  yards  to 
this  sightly  position,  some  time  during  the  early  part 
of  the  second  day  of  July,  and  with  his  field-glass 
survey  the  valley  away  to  the  south  westward !  In 
1900  the  old  veteran  stood  upon  this  ground,  just 
three  hundred  steps  by  actual  count  from  General 
Meade's  headquarters,  and  saw,  without  a  field- 
glass,  although  his  eyes  were  old,  and  dim  with  tears, 
if  not  with  age,  the  long  line  of  white  monuments 
extending  down  the  Emmetsburg  Road  to  the  old 
Peach  Orchard  at  Sickles'  Salient,  and  thence  south 
eastward  along  the  hills,  groves,  glens,  around  the 

[161] 


GETTYSBURG 

loop,  along  the  Wheatfield  Road,  and  away  to 
Devil's  Den  and  Death  Valley,  which  tell  faintly 
the  story  of  that  terrible  afternoon,  and  he  said,  over 
and  over  again,  "  Where  was  Meade  ? " 

And  where  were  the  members  of  Meade's  staff  ? 
Where  were  Hancock  and  his  staff  ?  Is  it  the  truth 
that  from  sunrise  until  three  o'clock  of  July  second, 
no  man  informed  the  commanding  General,  and 
General  Meade  did  not  know,  that  General  Sickles, 
with  his  unsupported  corps,  was  far  away  to  the 
southwestward  in  an  untenable  position  ? 

It  must  have  been  an  afterthought  on  Meade's 
part.  While  there  was  danger  of  Lee  slipping 
away  from  his  front,  Meade  was  willing  that 
Sickles  should  defy  him  and  entice  him  to  battle; 
but  as  the  war-clouds  thickened  and  battle  became 
imminent,  he  was  more  than  willing  to  saddle  all  the 
blame  onto  Sickles'  shoulders.  Along  about  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  however,  Meade  declared 
that  in  some  unaccountable  manner  he  made  the 
discovery  that  Sickles  had  disregarded  his  instruc 
tions  and  formed  his  corps  far  out  and  away  from 
the  line  that  he  had  ordered  him  to  occupy;  and 

[162] 


GETTYSBURG 

immediately  he  sent  a  despatch  to  Sickles,  ordering 
him  to  withdraw  his  corps  to  Cemetery  Ridge  on 
Hancock's  left;  but  it  was  too  late  —  Longstreet 
was  ready  for  battle,  and  had  to  be  reckoned  with 
in  any  further  movement  of  troops  on  those  lines 
that  day.  After  the  battle,  General  Meade  talked 
in  harsh  terms  of  Sickles,  and  even  essayed  to  pre 
pare  charges  against  him  for  disobedience  of 
orders;  but  Sickles  had  lost  a  leg  in  the  battle,  and 
had  fought  like  a  hero,  and  Meade  had  really  won 
a  great  victory,  considering  the  chances  against  him 
in  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  although  at  a  tre 
mendous  cost ;  therefore  Abraham  Lincoln  squelched 
the  court-martial.  Perhaps  he  thought  that  even  if 
Sickles  deserved  punishment  for  forming  his  corps 
in  such  an  indefensible  position,  the  commanding 
General  also  deserved  a  greater  degree  of  punish 
ment  for  not  knowing,  in  season  to  avert  disaster, 
what  his  subordinate  was  doing  while  under  his  very 
eye ;  and  if  courts-martial  were  commenced,  it  would 
be  hard  to  tell  where  they  might  end.  Lincoln  was 
generally  not  far  from  right. 

[163] 


CHAPTER  XVI 

PEACH  ORCHARD 

r  I  iHE  old  Peach  Orchard  of  our  war  days  was 
*>  situated  at  the  extreme  apex  of  Sickles' 
Salient,  on  the  east  side  of  the  Emmetsburg  Road, 
and  in  the  angle  formed  by  its  junction  with  the 
Wheatfield  Road.  Sickles'  line  on  the  Emmetsburg 
Road  ended  at  the  southwest  corner  of  the  Peach 
Orchard,  there  turning  at  a  right  angle  to  the 
eastward. 

At  about  twrenty  minutes  to  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  Longstreet  opened  his  batteries  on  that 
point,  raking  Sickles'  lines  with  a  withering  cross 
fire.  His  batteries,  from  commanding  positions  all 
along  the  Emmetsburg  Road,  away  down  to  its 
intersection  with  Seminary  Ridge,  pounded  the 
Peach  Orchard  and  all  within  it  most  unmerci 
fully,  and  swept,  as  with  the  besom  of  destruc 
tion,  the  whole  length  of  Humphreys'  wing. 
On  the  other  hand,  and  at  the  same  time,  from 

[164] 


GETTYSBURG 

over-topping  heights  on  Seminary  Ridge  to  the 
westward,  not  more  than  one-fourth  of  a  mile 
away,  other  batteries  poured  down  their  cross-fire 
on  the  same  devoted  point  and  away  and  beyond, 
raking  the  length  of  Birney's  wing,  seeking  out  his 
infantry  in  their  most  secure  hiding-places.  How 
ever,  Longstreet  asserts  that  this  cross-fire  from  the 
west  hurt  the  right  of  his  line,  as  well  as  Birney's; 
which  was  owing  to  the  fact  that  beyond  the  Loop, 
Hood  had  drawn  his  lines  so  close,  in  an  endeavour  to 
strike  Birney's  flank,  that  the  Confederate  artillery 
fire  from  Seminary  Ridge,  intended  for  Birney's, 
passed  beyond  in  part  and  disturbed  Hood's 
infantry. 

This  strong  artillery  fire  was  continued  for 
twenty  minutes,  and  must  have  greatly  shaken 
Sickles'  infantry  along  both  wings  of  his  Salient. 
In  the  meantime  Sickles'  batteries  were  by  no 
means  idle,  but  their  positions  were  less  command 
ing.  He  had  three  batteries  —  C  of  the  First  New 
York,  and  C  and  F  of  the  First  Pennsylvania  —  in 
the  Peach  Orchard  near  the  apex  of  his  Salient  and 
south  of  the  Wheatfield  Road,  while  on  the  north 

[165] 


GETTYSBURG 

side  of  the  road  he  had  three  others  in  proximity. 
He  also  had  three  batteries,  the  Fifth  and  the  Ninth 
Massachusetts  and  the  Tenth  New  York,  planted 
on  a  prominent  hill  on  the  north  side  of  the  Wheat- 
field  Road  about  three  hundred  yards  east  of  its 
juncture  with  the  Emmetsburg  Road.  Back  of  the 
Peach  Orchard,  which  is  situated  on  a  plateau  form 
ing  the  top  of  the  ridge,  the  country  slopes  rapidly 
but  not  precipitately  to  the  eastward,  forming  a 
wide  grassy  valley  that  extends  far  away  to  the 
south.  This  valley  divided  Birney's  line,  his  first 
brigade,  commanded  by  Graham,  being  stationed 
west  of  it,  in  the  Peach  Orchard  at  the  apex  of  the 
Salient,  and  a  part  of  it  facing  to  the  westward  in 
Humphreys'  wing.  This  contour  of  the  ground 
occasioned  a  wide  gap  in  Birney's  line,  which  beyond 
the  valley  was  continued  to  the  south  and  east  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Loop,  where  De  Trobriand's  and 
Ward's  brigades  took  it  up  and  by  devious  ways, 
continued  it  in  the  direction  of  Devil's  Den.  The 
intervening  valley  is  from  two  hundred  and  fifty 
to  three  hundred  yards  in  width,  and  was  not  an 
inviting  walk  for  Hood's  troopers  that  July  after- 

[  166  ] 


o 

a 


0 

M 


GETTYSBURG 

noon,  as  it  was  guarded  at  the  upper  end  by  the 
three  last-named  batteries  —  eighteen  guns,  with 
gaping  mouths  looking  down  its  length  from  that 
commanding  eminence,  north  of  the  Wheatfield 
Road. 

During  Longstreet's  cannonade  these  last-named 
batteries  were  in  a  splendid  position  to  return  their 
compliments,  and  they  were  not  allowing  the  time 
to  pass  in  idleness;  but  the  Confederate  fire  was 
intended  to  shake  Sickles'  infantry  before  the  charg 
ing  infantry  lines  swept  forward  to  battle.    At  four 
o'clock  the  artillery  fire  slackened,  and  Longstreet's 
infantry,  like  a  cyclone  from  out  the  South,  struck 
Sickles'  lines  at  the  apex  of  his  Salient,  and  the  battle 
of  Peach  Orchard  was  on  in  all  its  fury.     Long- 
street's  orders  from  Lee  were:  "Strike  the  enemy 
on  his  left  flank  and  roll  him  up  like  a  rubber 
blanket " ;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  did  his  best 
to  carry  out  his  instructions.     The  valley  behind 
the  Peach  Orchard  divided  the  combatants  into  two 
unequal  parts.     East  of  the  valley  Birney's  two 
brigades  maintained  their  position  for  a  long  time 
against  Hood's  four  brigades;  but  the  great  strug- 

[167] 


GETTYSBURG 

gle  and  the  great  battle  for  the  first  hour  was  in 
and  around  the  Peach  Orchard  and  along  Humph 
reys'  front,  for  the  possession  of  the  Emmetsburg 
Road.  Longstreet's  instructions  from  Lee  were  to 
keep  close  to  the  Emmetsburg  Road  and  roll  Sick 
les'  line  before  him  toward  Cemetery  Hill.  To  do 
that  he  had  McLaws'  division  of  his  own  and 
Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps  —  nine  brigades 
in  all —  against  Humphreys'  four;  and  in  less  time 
than  it  takes  to  write  it,  the  Confederate  ranks 
surged  around  the  Peach  Orchard  and  far  up  the 
Emmetsburg  Road,  half  concealed  in  sulphurous 
clouds  fringed  with  flame.  For  the  first  hour  it 
was  almost  exclusively  Sickles'  fight.  It  seemed 
for  a  long  time  that  neither  General  Meade  nor 
any  one  else  was  inclined  to  help  Sickles  out  of  his 
scrape;  but  Sickles  was  a  fighter  to  be  proud  of,  and 
no  better  soldiers  ever  lived  than  the  men  of  the 
Third  Corps.  They  were  placed  at  a  terrible  dis 
advantage;  they  had  been  led  like  lambs  to  a 
slaughter-pen,  but  when  the  signal  rang  out  for  the 
slaughtering  to  begin  they  were  lambs  no  longer, 

[168] 


GETTYSBURG 

but  first-class  soldiers,  and  there  was  more  or  less 
slaughtering  done  on  both  sides. 

The  Third  Corps  did  not  "roll  up,"  in  com 
pliance  with  Lee's  programme,  and  it  required  all 
of  Longstreet's  ability  as  a  general,  and  all  the 
power  and  force  of  his  "  Great  Rock,"  as  he  proudly 
called  the  First  Corps,  which  he  handled  and  bowled 
with  consummate  skill,  to  accomplish  the  job  that 
he  had  undertaken.  The  apex  of  Sickles'  Salient 
was  so  far  away  from  Meade's  main  army  and  so 
out  of  joint  with  its  harmonious  formation,  that  it 
was  impossible  to  render  assistance  in  that  quarter. 
If  Sickles  and  his  brave  boys  could  not  hold  it  alone 
and  unaided,  then  surely  it  must  be  surrendered. 
The  same  condition  presented  itself  with  regard  to 
Sickles'  left  flank,  every  part  of  that  wing  being 
fully  a  mile  away  from  Hancock's  farthest  outpost, 
and  in  a  locality  broken  and  hilly.  It  was  differ 
ent  with  his  right.  Humphreys'  wing  occupied  a 
strong  position  so  far  as  his  front  was  concerned, 
and  with  his  flanks  protected  and  made  secure,  he 
could  have  maintained  his  position  against  great 
odds;  but  his  right  was  in  the  air,  the  ridge  followed 

F 169  1 


GETTYSBURG 

by  the  Emmetsburg  Road  falling  away  to  a  gentle 
swell  at  this  point.  The  nearest  troops  in  support 
of  Humphreys'  right  was  Hancock's  line,  six 
hundred  yards  to  rearward;  but  straight  up  the 
Emmetsburg  Road  a  mile  away  was  the  crest  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  along  its  western  brow  and  all 
down  the  ridge  to  Hancock's  right,  every  promi 
nent  knoll  bristled  with  Meade's  artillery.  Within 
three  hundred  yards  of  the  Emmetsburg  Road,  the 
farthest  batteries  not  more  than  fifteen  hundred 
yards  from  Humphreys'  flank,  thirty  heavy  guns 
commanded  the  valley.  Then  to  the  right  of  Han 
cock's  line  three  infantry  divisions — Doubleday's 
and  Robinson's  of  the  First,  and  Steinwehr's  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps  —  guarded  the  west  front  of 
Cemetery  Hill.  Therefore  there  could  have  been 
no  reasonable  excuse  for  not  protecting  Humph 
reys'  right.  All  the  valley  between  the  Emmets 
burg  Road  and  the  ridge  to  the  eastward  was  open 
and  readily  accessible  to  both  infantry  and  artillery. 
Why  should  not  a  brigade  and  battery  or  two  have 
been  sent  forward  in  season  to  make,  at  least,  his 
right  secure?  Was  the  Commander-in-Chief  so  dis- 

[170] 


GETTYSBURG 

turbed  in  his  mind  by  what  he  seemed  to  regard  as 
Sickles'  wilfulness  that  he  could  not  see  his  oppor 
tunity?  Or  may  we  not  consistently  inquire  again, 
Where  was  Meade  ? 

At  all  events,  when  the  battle  waxed  heavy, 
Anderson  swung  his  brigades  on  Humphreys'  flank, 
rolling  him  back  in  some  confusion,  while  the  long- 
continued  pounding  broke  in  the  apex  of  the, 
Salient,  and  the  whole  right  wing  was  forced  back 
from  the  Emmetsburg  Road.  Far  and  wide  the 
ridge  was  strewn  with  the  dead,  and  the  Peach 
Orchard  was  a  slaughter-pen  indeed  ! 

The  Third  Corps  was  defeated  and  forced  to  a 
hasty  retreat,  but  it  was  not  yet  out  of  the  fight. 
Sickles  had  not  chosen  his  lines  at  a  venture  and 
without  due  consideration.  Almost  from  the  apex 
of  his  Salient,  the  Wheatfield  Road,  like  a  central 
thoroughfare,  ran  eastward  along  the  brow  of  the 
hill  overlooking  the  valley  that  trended  to  the  south 
ward,  and  along  that  road  his  artillery  found  an 
open  gateway  to  well-chosen  positions  of  defence, 
selected  for  such  an  emergency  with  care  and  fore 
thought  before  the  battle  opened,  and  back  to  the 

[171] 


GETTYSBURG 

cover  of  rocks,  hills,  ravines,  and  woods,  his  well- 
seasoned  regiments  scurried  away  without  loss  of 
time. 

Then,  too,  the  discovery  was  at  last  made  in  the 
Union  lines  on  Cemetery  Hill  that  Sickles  was 
really  in  trouble ;  and  Hancock,  either  with  or  with 
out  orders  from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  sent  for 
ward  Willard's  brigade  of  his  third  division  to 
reinforce  Humphreys.  But  the  battle  of  Peach 
Orchard  was  fought  to  a  finish  by  the  troops  of  the 
Third  Corps  alone,  with  no  support  from  any 
source.  Sickles  made  a  mighty  effort  to  hold  back 
Longstreet's  overpowering  brigades,  and  always 
believed  that  it  was  the  bold  and  defiant  stand  taken 
by  him  and  the  Third  Corps  that  enticed  Lee  to 
turn  from  an  open  gateway  to  the  southward,  to 
beat  out  his  brains  against  the  rock-ribbed  hills  of 
Gettysburg,  well  manned  by  a  determined  but  very 
anxious  foe.  The  Third  Corps  backed  their  com 
mander  heroically.  They  believed,  as  he  did,  that 
the  sacrifice  was  necessary,  and  they  were  willing 
to  make  it.  The  monuments  and  markers  standing 
in  sublime  silence  all  down  the  Emmetsburg  Road, 

[172] 


GETTYSBURG 

beside  the  boundaries  of  the  old  Peach  Orchard,  in 
the  angle  of  that  unsupported  far-away  Salient, 
attest,  and  will  forever  attest  to  the  determined  for 
titude  and  heroic  patriotism  of  Dan  Sickles  and  his 
Third  Corps. 


[173] 


A 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  WHIRLPOOL  OF  BATTLE 

S  Sickles'  line  fell  back,  his  right  and  left 
wings  were  again  united  east  of  the  valley 
trending  southward  from  the  Wheatfield  Road,  and 
guarded  by  his  well-posted  artillery  during  the 
former  battle.  As  his  Salient  was  reduced,  his 
front  was  shortened  and  made  more  compact,  thus 
serving  to  strengthen  his  line  and  improve  his 
position. 

Birney  had  been  sore  pressed  and  compelled  to 
draw  in  his  line  at  the  Loop,  also  consolidating  his 
front,  which  he  still  boldly  presented  to  Hood's  bri 
gades.  These  movements  established  Sickles'  sec 
ond  battle-line  in  a  nearly  north  and  south  direction, 
from  the  western  edge  of  the  grove  northeast  of  the 
Trostle  House  to  Devil's  Den,  his  centre  being  bent 
forward  toward  or  near  the  Loop. 

Longstreet  had  not  succeeded  in  rolling  Sickles 
up,  but  had  forced  him  back  fully  half  a  mile,  rather 

[174] 


GETTYSBURG 

toward  his  left,  into  that  uneven  and  broken  region 
abounding  in  swales,  ponds,  ravines,  gulches,  rocks, 
thickets,  and  wooded  hills. 

It  was  a  strange  and  singular  location  for  the 
renewal  of  the  battle,  probably  more  uncertain  for 
attack  than  for  defence;  but  the  afternoon  was 
slipping  away,  —  it  was  after  five  o'clock,  —  and  if 
Longstreet  intended  to  win  a  victory  of  any  impor 
tance  that  day,  he  must  press  his  brigades  forward 
to  their  savage  work. 

Willard's  brigade,  coming  fresh  into  the  battle, 
struck  the  flank  of  Barksdale's  advancing  line  with 
a  furious  fire,  the  movement  being  well  supported 
by  Humphreys'  brigades,  and  soon  the  fighting 
became  again  most  desperate  and  destructive. 
Captain  Bigelow,  commanding  the  Ninth  Mass 
achusetts  Battery,  had  moved  from  his  position  on 
the  Wheatfield  Road  overlooking  the  valley  east  of 
the  Peach  Orchard,  taking  up  a  new  station  about 
three  hundred  and  fifty  yards  to  the  north  and  east 
of  the  former  and  just  south  of  the  Trostle  House, 
where  Sickles'  headquarters  were  located.  The 
battle  for  the  possession  of  that  point  was  pressed 

[  175  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

with  great  vigour  by  McLaws;  and  Bigelow  re 
maining  in  his  position  until  his  supports  were 
driven  in,  lost  eighty  horses  out  of  eighty-eight. 
He  was  wounded  himself,  and  lost  six  out  of  seven 
sergeants;  but  with  the  eight  horses  he  had  left  he 
saved  two  out  of  six  of  his  guns. 

The  battle  on  the  left  also  became  furious  all 
along  Birney's  front  from  the  Wheatfield  Road  to 
Devil's  Den,  Birney's  splendid  fighters  utilizing 
every  advantage  of  their  grounds,  hurling  back  their 
well-directed  fire  from  depressions,  rocks,  trees,  and 
stone  fences.  The  Confederate  General  Hood  was 
seriously  wounded,  and  General  Laws  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  his  division.  General  Semmes  of 
McLaws'  division,  was  mortally  wounded.  The 
Union  General  Willard,  of  Hancock's  third 
division,  was  dead.  General  Sickles  was  terribly 
wounded.  Still  the  battle  thickened,  and,  if  pos 
sible,  increased  in  fury.  Hancock  sent  forward 
Caldwell's  whole  division  of  four  brigades,  com 
manded  by  Cross,  Kelly,  Zook,  and  Brooke.  Half 
of  Hancock's  corps  was  now  in  the  battle,  which  was 
still  unequal,  and  Longstreet  pressed  his  advantage 

[176] 


GETTYSBURG 

in  numerical  superiority,  with  the  divisions  of  Law, 
McLaws,  and  Anderson,  his  eye  on  Cemetery  Ridge 
as  his  goal  of  victory. 

The  sun  was  sinking  toward  the  western  moun 
tains.  The  smoke  of  battle  seemed  to  invite  the  early 
coming  of  night.  Longstreet  redoubled  his  efforts ; 
he  hurried  every  battery,  every  gun,  into  action ;  he 
pushed  forward  every  regiment  to  the  firing  line. 

Sickles  was  down  and  out,  but  the  Third  Corps, 
under  Birney's  leadership,  was  still  doing  heroic 
work,  and  Hancock  was  the  guiding  spirit  of  the 
Union  battle,  hurrying  every  gun  and  every  man 
that  he  dared  spare  from  his  already  weakened  line 
at  his  right,  out  to  the  front  in  support  of  Birney, 
Humphreys,  and  Caldwell.  About  two-thirds  of 
the  distance  from  the  apex  of  the  Salient  to  Ceme 
tery  Ridge,  and  behind  the  hard-pressed  Union  line, 
there  was  an  irregular  plateau  or  open  section  of 
cultivated  land  called  the  Wheatfield.  All  around 
this  field  the  country  is  rough,  broken,  and  hilly ;  and 
along  its  eastern  border  Plum  Run  winds  its  course 
away  to  the  southward,  falling  off  precipitously 
into  a  rocky  gorge  that  widens  out,  forming  a  deep 

[177] 


GETTYSBURG 

valley  between  Little  Round  Top  and  Devil's  Den 
opposite,  about  five  hundred  yards  in  a  south  of  west 
direction. 

This  valley  then  trends  to  the  south  west  ward, 
separating  Devil's  Den  from  Round  Top,  which 
sightly  eminence  stands  slightly  east  of  south  there 
from,  and  about  seven  hundred  yards  distant. 
This  valley  between  Devil's  Den  and  Little  Round 
Top  and  to  the  northward  was  named  Death 
Valley  from  the  carnage  that  took  place  therein 
that  day. 

From  the  low  level  of  Death  Valley  to  the  east 
ward  rises  Little  Round  Top  to  the  height  of  three 
hundred  feet — a  solid  mass  of  boulders  with 
scarcely  a  stunted  shrub  clinging  to  its  rocky  face. 
To  the  westward  rises  Devil's  Den,  to  the  height  of 
from  fifty  to  seventy  feet,  a  solid  mass  of  curiously 
carved  and  broken  rocks  of  many  acres  in  extent, 
adorned  in  places  with  clumps  of  stunted  rock-oaks 
and  other  hardy  shrubs.  To  the  south  rises  Round 
Top  to  the  height  of  six  hundred  feet  —  steep  and 
very  rocky;  but,  wonderful  to  relate,  the  pines  and 
rock-oaks  grow  in  luxuriance  up  to  his  very  summit, 

[178] 


fej 


tr1 
O 


O 

d 
2 

o 

^ 
o 


O 

o 


O 

§ 

w 


THE  WHEATFIELD 

Hound  Tops  in  Burl' (/round 


GULP'S  HILL 
From   Eaxt  Cemetery  Hill 


GETTYSBURG 

making  him  both  the  king  and  the  glory  of  the 
Gettysburg  hills. 

As  the  awful  struggle  of  battle  continued,  Plum 
Run  soon  became  Hancock's  last  line  of  defence 
west  of  Cemetery  Ridge  itself.  Before  the  strug 
gling  Union  forces  lay  the  plateau  of  the  Wheat- 
field  ;  behind  and  above  them,  Cemetery  Ridge.  To 
occupy  the  ridge  Longstreet  must  cross  Plum  Run; 
to  cross  Plum  Run  he  must  carry  the  plateau  of  the 
Wheatfield.  To  retain  Cemetery  Ridge  until  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements,  Hancock  must  hold  Plum 
Run;  to  hold  Plum  Run  he  must  not  allow  Long- 
street  to  pass  the  Wheatfield.  Thus  the  struggle 
for  the  possession  of  the  Wheatfield  became  the 
whole  of  the  battle.  On  either  side  the  lines  were 
closely  drawn.  The  Wheatfield,  surrounded  by 
hills  and  groves,  broken  with  rocks,  hedged  in  with 
stone  walls,  was  transformed  into  a  whirlpool  more 
dreadful  than  Charybdis  of  olden  times,  more 
appalling  than  the  Maelstrom  of  the  North  Sea. 

At  half -past  five  o'clock  the  battle  lost  all  form  of 
regularity.  The  lines  swayed,  twisted,  surged, 
intermingled, —  retreating,  advancing,  grappling, 

[179] 


GETTYSBURG 

whirling,  friend  and  foe  in  an  irresistible  vortex  of 
war.  Here  we  have  the  quid  obscurum  of  Gettys 
burg,  very  similar  to  that  portrayed  by  Hugo 
relative  to  the  field  of  Waterloo  —  that  portion  of 
the  battle  unseen  by  mortal  eye,  so  mixed,  confused, 
and  intricate  that  it  never  was  and  never  can  be 
understood. 

In  that  savage  and  prolonged  struggle,  the  con 
tending  armies  within  and  around  the  Wheatfield 
seemed  to  assume  formless  and  terrible  proportions, 
more  hideous  and  revolting  than  the  prehistoric 
monsters  that  fought  to  their  death  in  the  deeps  of 
the  palaeozoic  ages  of  our  infant  world. 

All  around  them  the  air  became  hot  as  from  a 
furnace ;  above,  the  sky  was  obscured  with  clouds  of 
sulphurous  smoke;  the  sun  was  veiled  and  fled  in 
haste  toward  the  shelter  of  the  western  mountains. 
The  earth  trembled ;  the  rocks  were  overturned ;  the 
hills  shook  beneath  their  violent  contortions.  The 
valleys  and  fields  ran  red  with  the  blood  of  their 
carnage. 

The  Confederate  general,  Barksdale,  was  dying. 
G.  L.  Anderson,  of  Laws'  division,  was  wounded. 

[180] 


GETTYSBURG 

General  Zook,  of  Hancock's  first  division,  was  dead. 
Brooke  was  wounded.  Cross  was  dying.  Through 
it  all  the  Confederate  war-monster  seemed  more 
powerful  than  his  antagonist,  gaming  the  ascend 
ency  over  the  Union  war-monster  and  crowding 
him  back  slowly,  but  surely  and  continuously. 

At  twenty  minutes  past  six  o'clock  the  situation  of 
the  Union  army  was  desperate.  If  Lee  did  not 
support  Longstreet  with  reinforcements  from  his 
centre  and  left,  as  Longstreet  complained  bitterly 
that  he  did  not,  what  can  be  said  of  Meade  ?  What 
did  the  Commander-in- Chief  of  the  Union  army  do 
to  relieve  the  tension  ?  If  it  is  true  that  Lee  was 
asleep,  or  had  forgotten  his  "  old  war  horse,"  as  he 
sometimes  called  Longstreet,  in  the  stress  of  the 
mightiest  effort  of  his  life,  is  it  not  also  true  that 
Meade  came  very  near  forgetting  Hancock  in  his 
desperate  struggle  to  maintain  his  position  ?  To 
the  right  of  Hancock's  line  many  batteries,  and  three 
divisions,  or  seven  brigades  of  Union  infantry 
defended  the  west  front  of  Cemetery  Hill ;  and  two 
of  those  brigades  had  hardly  pulled  a  trigger  in  the 
battle  of  the  previous  day.  They  were  not  under 

[181] 


GETTYSBURG 

Hancock's  command,  and  Meade  did  not  feel  war 
ranted  in  weakening  the  line  by  a  single  regiment, 
although  the  position  was  naturally  so  rugged  and 
strong  that  a  skirmish  line  could  have  held  it  against 
a  line  of  battle.  At  least  he  did  not.  It  was  not 
Longstreet  against  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  but 
up  to  that  moment  and  until  half  an  hour  later,  it 
was  Longstreet's  three  divisions,  comprising  thirteen 
brigades,  against  Hancock's  and  Birney's  three 
divisions,  comprising  eleven  brigades,  so  that  the 
weight  of  battalia  was  with  Longstreet. 

But  now  the  time  had  arrived  when  it  became 
necessary  for  Meade,  the  commanding  General  of 
the  Union  army,  to  make  some  movement  on  the 
chess-board  of  war;  for  surely  and  certainly  it  was 
the  danger  hour,  not  alone  for  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  but  for  the  American  Republic  as  well. 
Since  the  birth  of  the  nation  there  was  never  an  hour 
fraught  with  danger  more  imminent.  The  life  of 
the  nation  was  in  the  balance.  Two  hours  before, 
Meade  had  received  a  despatch  from  Sedgwick, 
informing  him  that  the  Sixth  Corps  was  on  the 
march  and  doing  its  utmost  to  reach  the  field. 

[182] 


GETTYSBURG 

About  the  same  time  a  despatch  from  Sykes 
informed  him  that  the  Fifth  Corps  was  nearer  by 
several  miles  than  the  Sixth.  The  afternoon  was 
desperately  hot;  the  men  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were 
not  made  of  asbestos,  but  what  humanity  could  they 
would  do.  It  is  not  recorded  of  Meade  that,  as  he 
watched  and  waited  during  those  anxious  hours,  he 
was  heard  to  murmur,  "  Sykes  or  night ! "  but  more 
than  likely  that  prayer  was  in  his  heart. 

At  twenty  minutes  past  six  o'clock  the  vanguard 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  not  yet  in  sight,  and  Meade 
could  wait  no  longer  for  their  coming.  Then  he 
sent  a  despatch  to  S locum  that  imperilled  the  right 
but  did  not  relieve  the  left.  It  showed  Meade's 
good  intentions,  however,  which  were  worth  some 
thing,  and  if  he  did  more  than  mean  well,  history  has 
failed  to  make  a  record  of  it.  The  despatch  to 
Slocum  called  for  reinforcements.  Slocum  sent 
him  Lockwood's  brigade  of  his  first  division,  but 
as  the  call  was  most  urgent,  Slocum  concluded  to 
take  some  chances;  so,  hastily  turning  his  whole  line 
over  to  the  care  of  General  Greene  and  his  third  bri 
gade  of  the  second  division,  with  instructions  to 

[183] 


GETTYSBURG 

extend  a  skirmish  line  to  replace  his  line  of  battle 
from  the  crest  of  Gulp's  Hill  to  Rock  Creek,  and  if 
attacked,  to  hold  the  whole  line  as  long  as  possible ; 
and  when  the  battle  became  too  heavy,  to  retire  to 
the  crest  and  hold  that  citadel  forever.  Slocum 
marched  away  to  the  left  with  the  balance  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  leaving  one  brigade  —  a  mere  skir 
mish  line  —  to  hold  Gulp's  Hill  and  its  important 
slopes  against  Johnson's  division  of  four  brigades. 
It  was  a  daring  and  perilous  movement,  one  of  the 
mighty  risks  of  war  that  sometimes  must  be  taken. 


[184] 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  AND  THE  BLOODY  SUNSET  HOUR 


ENERAL  G.  K.  WARREN,  chief  of  engi- 
neers  on  General  Meade's  staff,  may  truth 
fully  be  called  the  saviour  of  Little  Round  Top; 
and  for  his  work  that  day  he  earned  the  everlast 
ing  gratitude  of  his  country;  but  without  a  heroic 
effort  on  the  part  of  others,  no  man  could  have  saved 
it;  and  the  key  to  our  left,  as  Little  Round  Top 
certainly  was,  would  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
the  Confederates. 

Along  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  battle  was  rag 
ing  fiercely  to  the  westward,  General  Warren  rode 
far  down  Cemetery  Ridge,  ascended  that  knob  of 
boulders,  and  established  on  the  summit  thereof  a 
signal  station.  The  eastern  and  northern  faces  of 
Little  Round  Top,  though  steep  and  rocky,  are  not 
nearly  so  high  and  difficult  of  ascent  as  the  western 
face  from  Death  Valley.  Warren  soon  made  the 

[185] 


GETTYSBURG 

discovery  that  the  bold  knob  on  which  he  stood  was 
a  most  important  position — not  for  the  Union  army 
while  it  remained  unoccupied  by  the  Confederates, 
as  it  then  was ;  but  if  it  were  once  in  their  possession 
and  crowned  with  their  artillery,  they  could  enfilade 
the  entire  length  of  Cemetery  Ridge  and  take 
Meade's  position  in  reverse  from  Cemetery  Hill  to 
Rock  Creek.  Yet  there  was  not  a  Union  soldier 
there  to  defend  it,  except  Warren  and  two  or  three 
men  of  the  Signal  Corps.  Then,  as  the  afternoon 
wore  away  and  the  battle  drew  nearer,  increasing  in 
fury  around  the  Wheatfield,  Warren  made  the 
further  discovery  that  Laws  had  his  eye  on  Little 
Round  Top;  and  as  he  looked  he  saw  a  flanking 
column  moving  out  from  Devil's  Den  across  Plum 
Run  valley,  headed  directly  for  the  knob  of  boulders 
on  which  he  stood.  A  message  to  signal  head 
quarters  at  Cemetery  Hill  could  bring  no  timely 
relief  even  if  a  regiment  could  be  spared  for  that 
purpose,  as  the  distance  was  more  than  two  miles, 
and  within  half  an  hour  the  advancing  Confederates 
would  be  in  possession  without  firing  a  gun.  But 
there  were  defenders  nearer;  at  that  moment  War- 

[186] 


MAJ.-GEN.  G.  K.  WARREN 
,  Army  of  the  Potomac 


-L. 

r- 


GETTYSBURG 

ren's  ears  caught  the  sound  of  marching  troops,  and 
the  vanguard  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  so  anxiously  looked 
for  by  Meade  and  Hancock,  appeared  on  the 
Taneytown  Road  not  four  hundred  yards  in  rear  of 
the  threatened  position. 

Never  in  the  history  of  war  was  arrival  more 
timely.  The  advent  of  Blucher's  army  on  the  field 
of  Waterloo  was  not  more  opportune  to  the 
exhausted  English  than  was  Sykes'  corps  to  Warren 
and  the  exhausted  troops  of  Hancock  and  Birney. 
A  further  delay  of  half  an  hour  for  any  cause,  and 
Sykes  would  have  found  Little  Round  Top  in 
Laws'  possession,  and  Cemetery  Ridge  occupied  by 
Longstreet  and  his  Confederates.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac  would  have  been  split  into  two  frag 
ments,  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  out  of  the  battle, 
and  Lee  master  of  the  situation. 

Had  Longstreet  begun  his  battle  two  hours 
earlier,  —  at  two  rather  than  at  four  o'clock,  —  it 
would  have  been  over  before  Sykes'  arrival,  and  the 
Battle  of  Gettysburg  would  have  been  counted  as 
the  most  terrible  defeat  of  the  Union  cause.  Lee's 
unaccountable  hesitation  and  unreadiness  in  the 

[187] 


GETTYSBURG 

morning;  Sickles'  daring  and  defiant  Salient  that 
puzzled  Longstreet  and  delayed  his  attack ;  the  stub 
born  resistance  and  heroic  endurance  of  the  Third 
Corps  —  all  combined  to  bring  a  far-reaching  victory 
to  the  Union  cause  at  the  bloody  sunset  hour. 
Warren  hurried  down  over  the  rocks  to  the  point 
where  he  had  left  his  horse,  and  rode  in  haste  to  the 
marching  column,  detaching  Vincent's  brigade  of 
the  first  division,  which  he  hurried  to  the  summit 
of  Little  Round  Top  just  in  time  to  meet  Laws'  bri 
gade  of  Alabamans  climbing  its  western  face,  and 
they  drove  back  the  Southern  men  into  the  valley. 
In  this  struggle  the  gallant  Vincent  was  mortally 
wounded.  Tilton's  and  Sweitzer's  brigades  of 
Sykes'  corps  were  hurried  to  the  front  to  reinforce 
the  Second  and  Third  Corps.  Then  out  of  the 
former  chaos  the  battle  along  the  eastern  verge  of 
the  Wheatfield  began  to  assume  form  and  regular 
ity.  The  first  and  second  brigades  of  the  second 
division,  and  also  the  third  division  of  two  brigades 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  followed  in  support  of  the  main 
battle,  meeting  with  a  withering  fire  Longstreet 's 
temporarily  victorious  brigades  that  had  won  the 

[188] 


55 

S 


to  tr1 
I  H 

^  O 


P 

DC 

*» 

- 


§ 


O 


GETTYSBURG 

Wheatfield  and  were  advancing  toward  the  crest  of 
Cemetery  Ridge. 

But  Laws  had  not  yet  abandoned  his  design  on 
Little  Round  Top;  and  Benning's  brigade  of 
Georgians  having  reinforced  the  Alabamans,  they 
tried  again  to  carry  the  hill  of  boulders.  General 
Weed  with  the  third  brigade  of  the  second  division 
of  the  Fifth  was  then  ordered  to  reinforce  and  hold 
Little  Round  Top.  Colonel  O'Rorke,  with  the 
One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Infantry, 
was  the  first  to  reach  the  firing  line  in  support  of 
Vincent's  brigade,  and  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  raged 
again  on  the  slippery  rocks  and  declivities.  By 
order  of  Weed,  Hazlett's  battery  (D  of  the  Fifth 
U.  S.  Artillery)  was  by  hand  and  with  ropes 
dragged  to  the  summit;  but  the  Confederate  sharp 
shooters,  located  behind  the  boulders  of  Devil's  Den, 
picked  off  the  Union  artillerymen  so  rapidly  as  to 
render  their  guns  of  little  or  no  service  for  a  time. 
General  Weed  was  mortally  wounded;  and  while 
Hazlett  was  leaning  over  him,  receiving  his  dying 
message,  he  also  was  hit,  and  fell  dead  across 
Weed's  body. 

[189] 


GETTYSBURG 

We  have  had  occasion  heretofore  to  speak  of  the 
expert  marksmanship  of  the  Confederate  soldiers, 
but  on  no  field  of  the  war  did  they  exhibit  greater 
skill  in  that  capacity  than  at  this  time  and  place. 
The  rocks  of  Devil's  Den  are  certainly  five  hundred 
yards,  and  probably  more,  from  the  summit  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top;  but  across  the  yawning  chasm  of 
Plum  Run  they  made  life  uncertain  for  the  Union 
soldiers  who  guarded  it.  The  Confederates,  how 
ever,  had  one  great  advantage  over  their  opponents. 
They  were  shooting  upward,  and  the  boulders  of 
Little  Round  Top  were  aglow  with  the  rays  of  the 
setting  sun.  The  Union  soldiers  stood  out  against 
the  sky  clear  and  distinct  to  their  eyes,  a  shining 
mark  for  their  dexterity ;  while  the  superior  quality 
of  their  powder  must  also  be  taken  into  consideration. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Union  soldiers  were  look 
ing  downward,  into  an  abyss,  as  it  were,  with  the 
dazzling  sunshine  in  their  eyes,  and  the  marks  at 
which  they  directed  their  shots  indistinct,  within  the 
shadow  of  overhanging  rocks.  Nevertheless  a  com 
pany  or  two  of  Berdan's  sharpshooters  were  hastily 
distributed  among  the  rocks  and  crevices,  and  they 

[190] 


GETTYSBURG 

soon  returned  the  Confederate  fire  with  satisfactory 
effect;  and  as  the  sun  went  down  behind  the  South 
.Mountain,  giving  to  each  party  of  distant  com 
batants  a  fair  and  equal  chance,  the  Union  artillery 
was  brought  into  play  upon  their  rocky  stronghold, 
with  the  result  that,  when  the  battle  was  over,  many 
a  Georgian,  and  many  an  Alabaman,  was  found 
among  the  rocks  of  Devil's  Den  who  never  re 
treated,  not  a  few  bearing  no  mark  of  ball  or  shell, 
but  killed  by  the  concussion  of  shell  or  solid- 
shot  against  the  rocks  upon  which  they  depended 
for  protection. 

So  Little  Round  Top  was  held  and  made  secure, 
but  the  battle  did  not  cease  with  the  going  down  of 
the  sun;  for  half  an  hour  later  it  was  raging  terri 
fically  in  Death  Valley  and  along  the  Wheatfield 
plateau.  The  stone  walls  and  rocky  defences  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Wheatfield  were  recaptured,  as  was 
also  Devil's  Den,  and  held  by  the  Union  forces. 
At  eight  o'clock  the  battle  ceased.  Longstreet  says : 
"  While  Meade's  lines  were  growing,  my  men  were 
dropping;  we  had  no  others  to  call  to  their  aid,  and 
the  weight  against  us  was  too  heavy  to  carry.  The 

[191] 


GETTYSBURG 

sun  was  down,  and  with  it  went  down  the  severe 
battle."  That  statement  is  true.  During  the  sun 
set  hour  the  weight  of  battalia  was  against  Long- 
street. 

The  Fifth  Corps  entered  the  arena  at  about  seven 
o'clock.  It  comprised  eight  brigades,  and  num 
bered  12,500  men ;  but  as  the  afternoon  was  terribly 
hot  and  the  corps  had  marched  steadily  and  rapidly, 
if  it  went  into  the  battle  with  twelve  thousand  men 
it  made  a  splendid  record.  A  reinforcement  of 
twelve  thousand  fresh  soldiers  (for  although  weary 
enough  with  marching  and  nearly  exhausted  with 
excessive  heat,  they  were  fresh  in  comparison  with 
the  men  who  had  been  hours  in  battle)  to  a  battle- 
line  originally  but  eighteen  thousand  strong,  and 
that  had  lost  thousands,  is  a  great  addition  to  its 
battle  strength.  Thus  the  Union  army,  starting  in 
with  Sickles'  corps  of  twelve  thousand,  was  rein 
forced  after  the  first  hour  with  six  thousand,  and 
again  at  seven  o'clock  with  twelve  thousand,  mak 
ing  its  battle  strength  at  the  finish  nineteen  brigades 
and  30,000  men,  less  the  loss  of  the  day;  while 

[192] 


MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  SYKES 
Com.  5th  Corps 


MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN  SEDGWICK 

Com.  6th  Corp* 


GETTYSBURG 

Longstreet  made  the  battle  without  reinforcements, 
but  from  start  to  finish  with  thirteen  brigades  and 
26,000. 

On  the  whole  it  was  not  so  very  unequal.  Long- 
street  says:  "My  loss  was  about  six  thousand, 
Meade's  between  twelve  and  fourteen  thousand." 
It  is  useless  at  this  point  to  discuss  the  Confederate 
losses ;  but  Longstreet's  estimate  of  the  Union  losses 
is  greatly  exaggerated.  Assuming  that  the  Third 
Corps'  entire  loss  of  4,198  was  sustained  on  the 
second  of  July,  and  also  the  Fifth  Corps'  entire  loss 
of  2,186,  to  the  sum  of  which  we  add  half  the  entire 
loss  of  the  Second  Corps,  which  cannot  be  far  from 
a  correct  estimate,  and  it  brings  the  aggregate  loss 
of  the  Union  army  on  July  second  up  to  about  9,000, 
which  is  more  than  forty  per  cent  in  excess  of  Long- 
street's  loss  as  he  estimates  it. 

But  whatever  the  battle  losses  of  the  second  of 
July  may  have  been,  it  was  the  decisive  battle  of 
the  series,  and  bloody  enough  to  satisfy  any  votary 
of  war  and  carnage. 

It  must  have  been  about  seven  o'clock  when  the 

[193] 


GETTYSBURG 

first  shots  were  fired  by  Vincent's  brigade  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  on  Little  Round  Top.  Within  a  few 
minutes  thereafter,  every  brigade  and  every  regi 
ment  of  that  twelve  thousand  men  were  in  the  fire 
and  fury  of  battle,  where  they  remained  to  the  end 
of  the  struggle.  One  hour  only,  one  hour  at  the 
going  down  of  the  sun,  and  until  darkness  over 
shadowed  the  earth,  and  yet  in  that  short  space  of 
time,  the  Fifth  Corps  sustained  a  loss  of  more  than 
two  thousand  men.  Was  there  ever  a  bloodier  sun 
set  hour  ? 

After  dark  Meade  ordered  the  withdrawal  of  his 
lines  from  all  points  westward  to  the  ridge,  extend 
ing  an  unbroken  line  from  Cemetery  Hill  to  Round 
Top;  and  Sickles  made  no  objection,  being  content 
to  let  his  "  Salient "  go  with  his  leg. 

Before  seeking  his  couch  that  night  it  is  said  that 
Lee  on  bended  knees  offered  up  thanks  to  God  on 
high  for  what  Longstreet  had  so  dearly  won;  and 
Meade  returned  thanks  to  the  same  wise  Providence 
for  what  Longstreet  had  failed  to  win;  while  the 
whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  thanked  God  indeed 

[194] 


GETTYSBURG 

for  the  timely  arrival  of  the  Fifth  Corps ;  and  all 
the  people  of  the  United  States  thanked  Him,  and 
the  boys  of  the  Third,  Second,  and  Fifth  Corps 
for  their  heroic  fighting,  done  all  along  the  line. 


r  195] 


T 


CHAPTER  :XIX 

CEMETERY  HILL  AND  GULP'S  HILL 

HE  battles  of  July  second  began,  but  did  not 


end  with  Peach  Orchard,  nor  yet  with  the 
Wheatfield  and  Little  Round  Top.  Lee  had  deter 
mined  to  try  the  strength  of  the  centre  and  the  right, 
as  well  as  of  the  left  of  the  Union  army  that  day; 
but  Longstreet  affirms  that  all  other  movements 
were  dilatory  and  untimely. 

The  fact  that  the  left  did  not  "  roll  up,"  as  readily 
as  Lee  anticipated,  caused  him,  no  doubt,  somewhat 
to  change  his  programme.  Still,  he  had  his  eye  on 
both  the  other  points,  and  before  the  battle  entirely 
ceased  on  the  left,  both  the  centre  and  the  right 
came  in  also  for  a  touch  of  war. 

Between  Cemetery  Hill  and  the  western  pro 
longation  of  Gulp's  Hill  there  is  a  narrow  valley 
extending  southward  in  a  deep  indentation,  and 
thence  rising  gently  by  a  grassy  slope,  thus  separa 
ting  the  two  elevations  as  it  passes  upward.  Run- 

[196] 


GETTYSBURG 

ning  along  the  northeastern  base  of  Cemetery  Hill 
from  Baltimore  Street,  a  narrow  lane  leads  up  this 
valley  to  the  point  where  Slocum  Avenue  now 
crosses  it  from  hill  to  hill.  That  lane  was  there  on 
July  second,  and  along  its  southern  side  extended 
an  old  but  well  preserved  and  strong  stone  wall, 
forming  a  splendid  breastwork  for  infantry. 
Behind  this  stone  wall  were  posted  a  part  of  How 
ard's  Eleventh  Corps,  comprising  Ames*  and  Von 
Gilsa's  brigades.  North  of  this  valley  Early's 
division  of  Ewell's  corps  held  the  Confederate  line. 
Above  and  behind  Howard's  brigades  Cemetery 
Hill  fairly  gleamed  with  guns,  whose  gaping  mouths 
commanded  the  valley  and  line,  and  from  West 
Gulp's  Hill  Stevens'  Fifth  Maine  Battery,  which 
did  such  splendid  service  on  Seminary  Ridge  in  the 
battle  of  July  first,  looked  savagely  down  from  its 
commanding  position. 

At  the  foot  of  Gulp's  Hill  and  about  a  dozen 
yards  northeast  from  the  lane,  is  a  large  spring  from 
which  a  ravine  trends  easterly  toward  Rock  Creek. 
Both  the  lane  and  ravine  afforded  protection  to 
advancing  troops  until  well  within  this  valley;  and 

[197] 


GETTYSBURG 

just  outside  of  it  Early  had  massed  his  division  for 
a  desperate  effort  to  capture  Cemetery  Hill.  Just 
after  sunset  of  July  second  the  crash  of  musketry 
in  the  valley  below  announced  to  the  men  at  their 
guns  on  Cemetery  Hill  and  Culp's  Hill  that  the 
battle  was  on. 

Longstreet  gives  the  time  of  Early's  attack  at 
nine  o'clock  P.M.  but  it  certainly  occurred  much 
earlier.  Even  then  it  is  hard  to  account  for  the  fact 
that  it  was  not  made  earlier  than  it  was,  with  a 
heavier  column  and  in  concert  with  the  height  of  the 
battle  on  our  left.  An  attack  on  a  strong  position 
after  sunset  by  two  brigades  seems  but  foolishness. 
Early's  two  brigades  had  crept  up  the  lane  and 
ravine  under  cover  of  the  gathering  darkness,  as  far 
as  they  could  possibly  go  without  attracting  the 
attention  of  Howard's  troops,  and  then,  with 
Hayes'  brigade  of  Louisiana  Tigers  in  the  lead, 
supported  by  Hoke's  North  Carolina  brigade, 
charged  straight  for  Howard's  line  of  infantry, 
yelling  and  firing  as  they  advanced  with  a  rush. 

Howard's  infantry  seemed  to  have  been  caught 
napping.  Their  line  was  too  near  the  foot  of  the 

[198] 


GETTYSBURG 

hill,  and  Early's  men  were  almost  on  them  before 
they  were  discovered.  This  made  it  impossible  for 
the  artillery  to  get  into  action,  as  they  would  rake 
friend  and  foe  alike.  Howard's  regiments  returned 
the  fire,  but  the  attack  was  so  sudden,  and  the  Con 
federates  charged  with  such  impetuous  determina 
tion  that  they  soon  gave  way  before  the  rush  of  the 
fiery  Tigers  from  the  canebrakes  of  Louisiana. 
Those  Louisiana  men  paid  no  heed  to  musketry  or 
bayonets,  but  dashed  through  all  opposition,  and 
swarming  over  the  stone  wall  and  up  the  slope,  cap 
tured  two  guns  of  Rickett's  battery  and  fought 
hand-to-hand  with  the  gunners  for  the  others.  But 
the  artillery  boys  fought  desperately  with  stones, 
sponge-staffs,  and  rammers,  when  they  could  not 
use  their  guns,  holding  their  ground  like  heroes. 
Finally,  Early's  line  had  advanced  so  far  up  the 
hill  that  their  left  flank  was  turned  for  a  moment 
in  the  direction  of  the  guns  of  the  Fifth  Maine  Bat 
tery  on  the  western  spur  of  Gulp's  Hill,  which  raked 
them  fore  and  aft  with  canister.  At  the  same 
moment  Battery  B  of  the  Fourth  U.  S.  Artillery 
gave  them  canister  in  front  at  short  range.  Nothing 

[199] 


GETTYSBURG 

human  could  withstand  such  a  reception  for  any 
length  of  time,  and  they  soon  fell  back  to  shelter. 
A  moment  later  the  infantry  line  was  reinforced  by 
Carroll's  brigade  of  Hancock's  third  division  (for 
Hancock  was  our  watchman  on  the  wall  that 
day),  which  dashed  down  the  slope  of  Cemetery 
Hill,  clearing  both  lane  and  ravine. 

This  was  Early's  last  and  only  attempt  to  climb 
Cemetery  Hill;  and  there  many  of  his  brave  follow 
ers  found  a  last  home.  Of  the  Tigers  who  led  the 
charge,  less  than  seven  hundred  returned  to  their 
lines,  and  the  organization  was  about  wiped  from 
existence.  It  was  a  bold  and  desperate  effort, 
but,  for  the  Confederates,  a  most  discouraging 
failure. 

This  battle  was  of  short  duration,  but  exceedingly 
sharp  while  it  lasted.  Carroll's  brigade  lost  about 
one  hundred  men,  while  Ames  and  Von  Gilsa 
together  lost  about  four  hundred,  or  five  hundred  in 
all.  The  Confederate  loss  was  severe,  the  Tigers 
alone  losing  more  than  our  entire  loss. 

Simultaneously  with  Early's  attempt  to  carry 
Cemetery  Hill,  Johnson's  second  division  of 

[200] 


GETTYSBURG 

Ewell's  corps,  which  held  the  extreme  left  of  Lee's 
line,  made  a  vigourous,  determined,  and  for  a  time 
successful  attack  on  the  extreme  Union  right  on 
Gulp's  Hill,  held  by  Slocum's  Twelfth  Corps. 

Gulp's  Hill  was  the  strongest  natural  position 
along  our  whole  line,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
Little  Round  Top.  It  is  a  high,  rocky  hill,  with  a 
sharp  ridge  extending  southeastward  from  its  point 
of  highest  elevation  nearly  to  Rock  Creek,  a  dis 
tance  of  about  a  mile.  The  western  prolongation 
adjoining  the  Eleventh  Corps  was  held  by  the  old 
veteran's  division,  commanded  by  General  Wads- 
worth  of  the  First  Corps.  This  was  joined  on  the 
right  by  Slocum's  corps,  which  extended  the  Union 
line  to  Rock  Creek  and  beyond.  The  hill  itself  is 
a  tower  of  strength,  and  the  face  of  the  ridge  to  the 
north  and  eastward  is  abrupt  and  easily  defended; 
but  as  it  nears  Rock  Creek  it  slopes  away  more 
gradually,  ending  in  a  level  meadow  about  three 
hundred  yards  wide,  along  which  winds  the  stream. 
Back  and  southward  of  this  ridge  a  small  branch 
heads  in  the  valley  west  of  the  Baltimore  Pike, 
which  runs  eastwardly,  crossing  the  pike,  flowing 

[201] 


GETTYSBURG 

into  Rock  Creek  east  of  the  termination  of  the 
ridge. 

Spangler's  Spring,  a  natural  fount  of  water, 
is  situated  just  back  of  the  easternmost  prolonga 
tion  of  the  ridge,  and  about  fifty  yards  north  of  the 
branch,  with  which  it  is  connected  by  a  streamlet. 
These  valleys  uniting  at  this  point  make  a  wide  open 
space;  it  lay  at  Slocum's  right,  penetrating  far  to 
rearward,  which  required  to  be  guarded  carefully. 
While  the  battle  was  in  progress  on  the  left  of 
Meade's  line  and  around  the  Wheatfield  at  the  dan 
ger  hour,  as  we  have  seen,  Slocum  was  called  to 
reinforce  the  left  with  every  man  he  could  spare 
from  his  line.  Slocum  had  in  his  corps  8,589  men 
to  hold  a  line  a  mile  long  and  guard  the  valley  and 
creek  on  his  right,  and  it  was  this  line  that  he  left 
to  the  care  of  Greene  with  only  one  brigade. 

Johnson's  division  of  Ewell's  corps,  with  four 
brigades,  held  the  Confederate  line  opposite;  and 
when  Johnson  discovered  the  weakness  of  Slocum's 
or  Greene's  line  he  prepared  at  once  to  capture  it, 
but  was  late  in  making  the  attack.  When  he  did, 
Greene's  skirmish  line  made  it  lively  for  him  for 

[  202  ] 


Ul 


Q 

tr1 


ui 

l 

s 


SECOND  MARYLAND,  CONFEDERATE, 
MONUMENT 


GETTYSBURG 

some  time.  Johnson  finally  swept  in  along  the  creek 
and  carried  the  ridge  northward  for  the  distance  of 
about  nine  hundred  yards,  Greene's  men  retiring 
before  him  to  the  crest,  which  they  held.  The  Sec 
ond  Maryland  Confederate  Infantry  penetrated  up 
the  ridge  to  the  farthest  point  occupied  by  any  of 
Johnson's  forces;  their  monument  stood  close  up  to 
the  crest  with  monuments  of  the  Union  regiments 
when  the  old  veteran  visited  the  field,  showing  the 
exact  division  point  of  the  contending  forces  during 
the  night  of  July  second.  This  monument  of  the 
Second  Maryland  was  the  only  Confederate  monu 
ment  allowed  to  be  placed  on  the  Union  line  at  that 
time ;  and  shows  that  all  the  ridge  below  it,  down  to 
Rock  Creek,  was  held  that  July  night  by  Johnson's 
Confederates. 

Johnson  then  left  part  of  his  division  to  hold  the 
ridge  against  Greene,  and,  with  the  balance,  moved 
cautiously  up  the  valley  of  the  branch  in  rear  of 
Culp's  Hill,  as  far  as  the  Baltimore  Pike,  without 
meeting  any  opposition.  Four  hundred  yards 
farther  and  just  north  of  Power's  Hill  was  parked 
Meade's  whole  reserve  ammunition  and  supply 

[203] 


GETTYSBURG 

train,  but  Johnson  did  not  know  it.  It  was  after 
dark.  The  battle  was  over;  not  a  shot  was  being 
fired,  and  Johnson  really  became  alarmed.  To  his 
staff  he  said:  "  This  is  too  easy;  I  believe  the  Yanks 
have  set  a  trap  for  us."  So  he  marched  his  troops 
back  to  Slocum's  vacant  line  on  the  ridge,  and 
reunited  his  division,  where  he  camped  and  waited 
for  morning. 

Slocum's  corps  did  not  get  into  the  battle  on  the 
left,  only  a  regiment  or  two  of  Lockwood's  brigade 
having  taken  places  to  strengthen  Hancock's  line. 
The  Fifth  Corps  arrived  before  the  Twelfth,  and 
S locum  hastened  back  to  secure  his  imperilled  posi 
tion.  As  he  marched  slowly  along,  picking  his  way 
in  the  darkness,  he  was  not  many  minutes  in  rear  of 
Johnson's  retiring  troops,  and  when  he  arrived  at 
the  branch  in  rear  of  the  ridge  he  found  his  lines 
occupied  by  the  Confederates  in  force.  Slocum 
camped  his  corps  along  the  south  side  of  the  branch, 
with  Spangler's  Spring  between  his  lines  and  John 
son's.  The  night  was  sultry.  The  soldiers  on  both 
sides  were  famished  for  water.  The  water  in  the 
streams  was  warm  as  the  heat  of  a  July  sun  could 

[204] 


GETTYSBURG 

make  it.  So  the  soldiers,  who  were  to  engage  in 
mortal  strife  at  the  first  peep  of  dawn,  drew  their 
supply  of  water,  far  into  the  night,  in  peace  from 
Spangler's  Spring. 


205] 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  NIGHT  AND  THE  COUNCIL 

A  GAIN  merciful  night  spread  his  mantle  over 
*•*>  the  battlefield.  The  dead  slept  in  peace,  the 
wounded  suffered  and  endured,  and  the  living  and 
well  prepared  for  the  morrow  and  the  renewal  of 
the  sanguinary  struggle. 

The  Sixth  Corps  under  the  command  of  Sedg- 
wick,  15,555  strong,  arrived  on  the  field  almost  be 
fore  the  battle  of  the  second  day  had  ceased,  thus 
at  last  concentrating  and  reuniting  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  its  full  strength  and  completeness ; 
and  from  that  moment  Lee's  last  chance  for  the 
realization  of  his  ambitious  dream  was  at  an  end. 

While  the  Union  army  had  lost  18,000  men  dur 
ing  the  previous  two  days  of  battle,  it  would  con 
front  Lee  on  the  morrow  with  an  unbroken  front 
four  miles  long;  with  65,000  men  in  line  and  on 
reserve;  with  its  left  buttressed  on  Round  Top  and 
its  right  upon  Culp's  Hill;  but  a  leader  for  the  hour 

[206] 


GETTYSBURG 

and  the  occasion  was  not  there.  Defensively, 
Meade's  position  was  impregnable.  The  temporary 
lodgment  of  Johnson  on  the  southeastern  spur  of 
Gulp's  Hill  could  be  readily  overcome,  while  on  his 
flanks  were  his  cavalry,  active  and  watchful,  ready 
to  grapple  with  and  turn  back  Stuart  on  his 
approach  from  either  direction. 

Offensively,  Meade  had  already  abandoned  the 
idea,  if  he  ever  entertained  it.  Lee  held  the  Hagers- 
town  and  the  Emmetsburg  Roads,  with  a  wide  open 
door  for  retreat  the  moment  the  necessity  should 
arrive;  and  Meade  would  never  attempt  to  cut  his 
army  in  two  or  crush  his  right  in  order  to  get  posses 
sion  of  that  back-door.  The  man  who  was  to  fight 
Lee  to  a  finish  and  bar  the  door  behind  him  was  yet 
to  be  found. 

So  General  Meade  prepared  to  stay,  and  in  that 
he  did  well;  but  the  idea  of  capturing  or  destroying 
Lee's  army  never  entered  his  head.  He  strength 
ened  his  lines  from  Gulp's  Hill  to  Round  Top, 
throwing  up  entrenchments  in  the  weak  places,  that 
are  still  there,  and  planting  batteries  in  every  avail 
able  position. 

[207] 


GETTYSBURG 

It  was  now  Lee's  turn  to  call  a  council  of  war. 
It  had  been  wiser  to  call  a  council  of  retreat,  but 
the  retreat  came  in  due  season,  with  or  without  a 
council.  At  the  council  Lee  was  still  the  master 
spirit,  the  same  indomitable  and  courageous  leader; 
in  fact,  at  this  council  more  than  at  any  other  time 
in  his  life,  Lee  laid  himself  open  to  the  charge  of 
mulishness.  He  would  listen  to  no  change  of  his 
plan  of  procedure.  He  said  to  his  corps  com 
manders  and  generals  there  assembled,  "  To-mor 
row  I  will  assault  Meade's  centre." 

To  this  Longstreet  objected;  he  said,  "  General 
Lee,  we  have  failed  to-day  in  a  mighty  effort  to 
break  Meade's  front  or  turn  his  left.  I  give  it  as 
my  opinion  that  another  effort  cannot  succeed.  I 
would  advise  moving  southward  by  the  Emmetsburg 
Road,  which  is  now  clear,  toward  Washington,  thus 
compelling  Meade  to  abandon  his  stronghold  and 
give  us  battle  on  more  favourable  ground." 

Lee  replied:  "No,  gentlemen!  No!  I  will 
strike  him  between  the  eyes.  I  have  to-night  been 
reinforced  by  Pickett's  division  of  infantry,  the 
flower  of  my  army,  and  by  Stuart's  cavalry." 

[208] 


GETTYSBURG 

Here  it  becomes  necessary  to  diverge  from  the 
proceedings  of  Lee's  war-council  and  explain  the 
cause  and  manner  of  these  reinforcements  just 
received  by  Lee's  army.  Pickett's  division  of  infan 
try  was  the  second  division  of  Longstreet's  corps, 
and  comprised  three  brigades,  all  Virginians;  the 
first,  commanded  by  Garnett,  consisting  of  five 
Virginia  regiments;  the  second,  commanded  by 
Kemper,  consisting  also  of  five  Virginia  regiments ; 
the  third,  commanded  by  Armistead,  of  five  Virginia 
regiments;  making  a  complete  division  of  Virginia 
troops  —  fifteen  regiments  in  all.  Lee,  himself  a 
Virginian,  was  extremely  partial  to  Virginian 
troops.  Lee's  partiality  to  Virginians  created  some 
jealousy  in  his  army,  expressed  by  the  saying,  com 
mon  among  his  officers,  "Too  much  Virginia." 
But  the  rank  and  file  really  had  no  reason  to  com 
plain  of  the  high  esteem  in  which  he  held  Pickett's 
division,  in  contemplation  of  the  honour  he  designed 
bestowing  upon  them  the  following  day.  Pickett's 
division  had  been  left  at  Chambersburg  under  orders 
from  headquarters,  to  guard  trains ;  and  during  the 
battles  of  the  first  and  second  of  July  they  got  more 

[209] 


GETTYSBURG 

enjoyment  out  of  Lee's  invasion  of  Pennsylvania 
than  they  did  afterwards. 

Stuart's  cavalry  comprised  five  brigades,  com 
manded  by  Wade  Hampton,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  W. 
H.  F.  Lee,  Robertson,  and  Jones,  with  six  batteries 
of  horse  artillery  under  the  command  of  Beckham. 
On  crossing  the  Potomac,  Lee  had  left  Stuart 
behind  to  befog  Hooker  as  long  as  possible;  then 
to  cross  the  Potomac  and  ride  east  toward  Balti 
more,  in  order  to  draw  the  Union  cavalry  from  the 
route  of  travel  designed  for  the  Confederate  supply 
trains.  Following  these  instructions  Stuart  made 
a  complete  circuit  of  the  Union  army,  riding  hard 
to  no  purpose  except  to  jade  and  weary  his  horses 
and  men.  This  was  another  and  very  serious  mis 
take  of  Lee  in  his  campaign  of  invasion,  for  it 
deprived  him  of  the  use  of  the  main  body  of  his 
cavalry  up  to  the  last  day  of  the  battle.  As  a  gen 
eral's  cavalry  are  his  eyes,  Lee  was  like  unto  the 
blind  Samson  feeling  for  the  pillars  of  the  temple 
of  Dagon.  This  absence  of  Stuart  disturbed  Lee's 
mind  greatly,  and  was  one  of  the  causes  for  his  loss 
of  balance. 

[210] 


GETTYSBURG 

As  Longstreet  says,  "  It  may,  with  the  success 
of  the  first  day,  have  moved  him  to  make  precipitate 
battle  as  his  safest  means  of  escape."  Knowing 
that  Lee's  original  destination  was  Harrisburg, 
Stuart  headed  that  way,  and  on  June  thirtieth  he 
encountered  Kilpatrick's  division  of  Union  cavalry 
in  the  town  of  Hanover,  fourteen  miles  east  of 
Gettysburg.  Stuart  was  not  then  looking  for  a 
fight,  but  anxious  to  reach  Lee's  army ;  so  he  hastily 
retreated  from  Hanover  toward  Carlisle,  where  he 
arrived  on  the  evening  of  July  first.  There  he 
learned  that  Lee  had  abandoned  his  contemplated 
attack  on  Harrisburg,  left  the  Cumberland  Valley, 
crossed  to  the  east  side  of  the  South  Mountain,  and 
that  there  had  already  been  one  day's  fighting 
between  his  army  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
at  Gettysburg.  From  Carlisle,  Stuart  rode  south 
ward  and  reached  Lee's  army  at  Gettysburg  on  the 
evening  of  July  second. 

Therefore,  in  that  war-council  Lee  said:  "I 
have  been  reinforced  by  Pickett's  division  of  infan 
try,  and  Stuart's  cavalry.  To-morrow  morning  I 
will  mass  Pickett's  division  in  the  woods  on  the  west 

[211] 


GETTYSBURG 

slope  of  Seminary  Ridge,  in  front  of  Meade's  left 
centre,  well  supported  to  the  right  and  left.  I  will 
despatch  Stuart  around  Meade's  right  flank  to  make 
a  rear  attack  in  conjunction  with  Pickett's  attack 
from  the  front;  then  shall  every  battery  and  every 
gun  along  our  entire  line  open  and  concentrate  their 
fire  upon  that  point  in  Meade's  line,  the  centre  of 
which  is  designated  by  that  umbrella-shaped  clump 
of  trees,  that  shall  mark  Pickett's  objective;  and 
when  the  bombardment  shall  cease,  then  shall 
Pickett  and  Stuart  charge,  and  I  will  cut  Meade's 
army  in  two,  and  afterwards  destroy  it  in  detail." 
Too  late  !  too  late  !  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
united,  and  there  was  no  power  on  earth  except 
that  of  Almighty  God  that  could  cut  it  in  two,  or 
defeat  it  where  it  stood. 

It  would  seem,  however,  that  God  Almighty,  if 
He  stoops  to  interfere  in  battles  of  men  more  than 
in  common  dog-fights,  was  directing  Lee's  plan  for 
a  purpose.  All  Confederate  accounts  agree  that 
up  to  that  time  the  Union  battle-loss  had  been  much 
greater  than  theirs.  If  Lee  was  strong  enough  to 
invade  the  North,  he  was,  comparatively,  stronger 

[212] 


GETTYSBURG 

and  better  able  to  continue  the  invasion.  His 
army  was  also  united,  and  he  had  with  him  his  cav 
alry,  which  he  had  so  greatly  needed.  If  he  was 
strong  enough  to  risk  another  effort  against  such 
a  position  as  the  Union  army  occupied,  he  was  cer 
tainly  strong  enough  to  slip  away  from  Meade's 
front,  down  the  valley  toward  Washington.  What 
a  surprise  it  would  have  been  to  Meade,  who  dreaded 
the  offensive  as  Satan  dreads  the  sunlight !  But  it 
surely  would  have  been  up  to  him  to  move  quickly 
and  skilfully  to  avoid  the  onus  of  battle  for  the 
security  of  the  national  capital. 

By  that  movement,  what  an  opportunity  would 
have  been  presented  to  Lee  to  put  in  practice  his 
skilful  generalship,  that  had  served  him  so  well  on 
many  occasions  !  But  he  elected  to  forego  all  his 
strategic  ability  and  wise  daring,  and  to  stand  inert 
on  Seminary  Ridge  while  his  devoted  followers  took 
another  buck  at  the  rock-ribbed  hills,  more  than  a 
mile  out  of  their  way. 

We  have  no  fault  to  find  with  the  unseen  and 
unknown  powers  that  directed  the  conclusion  of 
that  council.  Whether  it  was  the  spirit  of  God,  or 

[213] 


GETTYSBURG 

of  old  John  Brown,  that  weighed  down  Lee's  soul, 
or  whether  he  used  his  best  judgment  untrammelled 
by  all  prejudicial  influences,  the  world  in  general 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  particular 
are  justified  in  thanking  God;  for  it  resulted  in  the 
preservation  of  the  Union. 


[214] 


CHAPTER  XXI 

SLOCUM'S  BATTLE  AND  STUART'S  DEFEAT 

"TXURING  the  night  of  July  second,  Slocum 
*^  prepared  his  thunderbolt  of  war,  to  be 
launched  early  in  the  morning  of  the  third,  for  the 
right  had  now  become  the  danger-point  in  Meade's 
line.  Gulp's  Hill  or  Ridge,  was  the  only  point 
where  the  great  high  tide  of  the  Rebellion,  which 
surged  and  beat  so  savagely  against  the  Union  lines 
on  the  afternoon  of  July  second,  found  a  lodgment. 
The  wave  still  remained  on  Gulp's  Ridge,  firmly 
fixed  in  the  form  of  Johnson's  Confederate  division 
of  four  brigades  —  eight  thousand  men.  That  night 
another  Confederate  wave  rolled  in  and  mingled 
with  the  first,  adding  to  its  strength. 

The  second  wave  of  the  Confederate  tide  rolled 
in  very  gently  during  the  night  in  the  form  of  three 
additional  brigades — Smith's  from  Early's,  and 
Daniel's  and  O'Neal's  from  Rodes'  division. 

[215] 


GETTYSBURG 

This  wave  gave  Johnson  twelve  thousand  men ;  and 
there  certainly  seemed  to  be  a  chance  for  a  strong 
aggressive  battle  on  Slocum's  part  for  the  reposses 
sion  of  his  old  line  along  the  ridge.  Why  Ewell 
did  not  send  the  other  three  brigades  of  Rodes' 
division,  and  especially  Gordon's  brigade  of  Early's, 
is,  to  say  the  least,  passing  strange.  Gordon  was 
the  man  who  was  anxious  (so  he  said)  to  climb  those 
heights  with  his  brigade  alone  on  the  evening  of 
July  first.  Surely  he  would  have  enjoyed  slipping 
up  there  in  the  night  time  with  friends  already  there 
to  greet  him,  and  no  enemy  there  to  meet  him  before 
morning;  but  both  Ewell  and  Lee  failed  to  see 
their  opportunity. 

As  Lee  was  determined  to  fight  the  battle  out  on 
that  line,  he  might  have  greatly  improved  his 
chances  of  success  by  concentrating  his  forces  on 
his  left  where  he  had  a  footing,  and  charging 
Meade's  position  from  the  rear,  instead  of  from 
the  front.  Gulp's  Ridge  is  almost  directly  in  the 
rear  of  Hancock's  and  Doubleday's  positions,  which 
Lee  made  his  mad  effort  to  carry  from  their  front; 
and  the  distance  is  not  so  great,  while  the  ground 

[216] 


GETTYSBURG 

is  uneven  and  affords  much  protection  for  advanc 
ing  infantry.  The  only  reason  that  can  be  imagined 
why  Lee  preferred  to  let  his  opportunity  in  rear 
of  Gulp's  Hill  and  the  Union  lines  go  by  default, 
after  it  was  fairly  and  almost  bloodlessly  in  his 
possession,  was  his  certainty  of  disaster  and  his  fear 
to  uncover  the  Hagerstown  Road  through  the  moun 
tain  passes,  his  road  home  to  Virginia. 

However,  Meade  seemed  to  have  had  small  fear 
for  his  right.  He  massed  in  reserve  two  divisions 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  in  proximity  to  Slocum's  lines, 
apparently  regarding  Slocum  as  perfectly  compe 
tent  to  accomplish  the  work  entrusted  to  him.  He 
sent  him  Shaler's  brigade  from  the  Sixth  Corps, 
which  increased  Slocum's  force  to  a  trifle  over  ten 
thousand  men,  or  seven  brigades  against  Johnson's 
seven;  but  Greene's  brigade,  it  must  be  remembered, 
held  the  summit  or  Gulp's  Hill  proper,  and,  as 
situated,  was  worth  any  other  two  brigades  for 
attack  or  defence.  Slocum  formed  Geary's  division 
and  Shaler's  brigade  in  the  valley  facing  the  ridge 
to  the  northeast,  while  he  massed  Ruger's  division 
on  Geary's  right,  extending  to  Rock  Creek. 

[217] 


GETTYSBURG 

The  brigades  of  both  Slocum  and  Johnson  were 
ready  for  action  very  early  in  the  morning  of  July 
third.  Each  army  tried  to  assume  the  initiative. 
Johnson  had  his  lines  formed  and  was  about  to  open 
the  attack  on  Slocum's  position  in  the  valley  when 
Slocum's  batteries  on  Power's  Hill,  a  prominent 
eminence  to  the  southward  near  the  Baltimore  Pike, 
opened  fire  on  Johnson's  lines  above  the  heads  of 
Slocum's  troops,  while  at  the  same  time  Greene's 
batteries  opened  from  the  summit  of  Culp's  Hill 
enfilading  the  whole  length  of  Johnson's  position 
down  the  ridge.  This  severe  cannonading  threw 
the  Confederates  into  great  confusion,  compelling 
them  to  seek  shelter  and  re-formation.  Again  they 
advanced,  when  in  addition  to  the  artillery  cross 
fire,  Geary's  division  met  them  with  a  withering  fire 
of  musketry;  and  Greene's  brigade,  from  their  com 
manding  perch,  raked  the  ridge  as  far  down  as  their 
pieces  would  carry.  It  was  a  hot  place  for  the  Con 
federates,  but  they  stood  bravely  to  their  work, 
returning  the  Union  musketry-fire  in  true  Southern 
style;  but  they  were  at  a  great  disadvantage  in  the 
use  of  artillery.  They  had  some  batteries  on  Wolf's 

[218] 


GETTYSBURG 

Hill,  east  of  Rock  Creek,  but  the  trend  of  the  ridge 
whereon  their  infantry  was  stationed  protected 
Geary's  line.  Ruger's  division,  farther  to  the  right, 
along  and  near  the  creek,  was  more  exposed. 

Thus  the  battle  raged  fiercely  for  hours,  each  side 
losing  heavily,  and  clinging  to  its  purpose  tena 
ciously.  About  nine  o'clock  the  Second  Maryland 
Confederate  Infantry,  that  held  the  highest  point 
attained  on  the  hill  by  Johnson's  men,  made  a  bold 
and  desperate  attempt  to  storm  the  summit  of  the 
hill  above  them  and  thus  get  possession  of  the  com 
manding  citadel;  but  they  were  repulsed  with  heavy 
loss.  Their  colonel  was  wounded  and  captured, 
and  the  regiment  lost  fifty  per  cent  of  its  number. 

About  half-past  nine  o'clock  Ruger's  division 
swung  around  to  the  right,  taking  Johnson's  line  in 
the  flank,  rolling  them  up  the  ridge  toward  the 
northwest  in  grand  shape.  Johnson  made  a  heroic 
effort  to  retain  possession  of  the  ridge  he  had  won 
so  easily  the  night  before,  but  Ruger's  charge  was 
too  impetuous,  and  he  abandoned  the  ridge  with  the 
loss  of  five  hundred  prisoners,  and  many  killed  and 
wounded,  retreating  helter-skelter  through  the 

[219] 


GETTYSBURG 

woods  to  the  shelter  of  the  thickets  in  the  valley. 
By  ten  o'clock  Slocum  had  won  a  complete  victory, 
reestablishing  his  lines  where  he  had  planted  them 
on  the  night  of  July  first,  the  Confederates  there 
after  making  no  further  demonstration  against  the 
Union  right. 

In  this  battle,  which  was  distinctly  separate  from 
any  other  and  a  continuation  of  the  battle  of  Gulp's 
Hill  of  July  second,  Slocum's  corps  lost  1,082  men, 
to  which  may  be  added  the  loss  of  seventy-five  from 
Shaler's  brigade  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  increasing 
Slocum's  total  loss  in  the  battle  to  1,157.  Johnson's 
division  lost  1,821,  to  which  must  be  added  the  loss 
sustained  by  Smith's,  Daniel's,  and  O'Neal's 
brigades,  in  order  to  ascertain  Johnson's  full  loss. 
This  is  one  battle  wherein  the  Confederates  certainly 
outnumbered  the  Union  troops,  and  also  wherein 
the  Confederate  records  show  a  greater  loss  than 
that  sustained  by  the  Union  forces. 

Lee  seemed  to  have  perfect  confidence  in  his  plan 
of  battle  for  July  third,  as  previously  portrayed  to 
his  generals  in  their  war-council,  by  which  he 

[220] 


GETTYSBURG 

expected  to  cut  Meade's  army  in  two  and  defeat 
it  utterly. 

The  supposition  expressed  by  some  historians, 
that  Lee  ordered  Pickett's  Charge,  as  the  main  bat 
tle  of  July  third  is  called,  not  with  the  expectation 
of  breaking  the  Union  centre,  but  simply  to  gain 
time  —  as  a  kind  of  bluff,  to  deter  Meade  from  mak 
ing  an  offensive  or  counter  movement  on  his  lines 
while  his  army  was  preparing  to  retreat — is  at 
variance  with  every  known  fact  and  movement  in 
connection  with  his  army  during  July  third. 

There  was  no  bluff  about  it,  and  no  necessity  for 
a  bluff.  Lee  well  knew  that  there  would  be  nothing 
"offensive"  about  Meade,  whatever  the  result  of 
his  final  effort  to  break  his  lines ;  otherwise  he  never 
would  have  taken  the  desperate  risk  of  sending 
Stuart's  jaded  cavalry  on  another  wide  circuit  and 
wild  dash,  wherein  he  was  expected  to  try  titles  with 
a  line  of  securely  posted  infantry;  nor  would  he 
have  put  his  only  division  of  infantry  that  had  not 
been  war-hammered  and  terribly  battered  within 
the  previous  two  days  and  on  which  he  might  rely 

[221] 


GETTYSBURG 

as  a  reserve  in  some  emergency  that  might  occur, 
into  the  fiercest  hell  of  battle ;  where,  if  it  failed  of 
success,  the  result  must  be  the  certain  and  complete 
destruction  of  the  whole  division. 

Lee  still  hoped  that  the  star  of  his  fortune  had 
not  deserted  him;  that  God,  or  good  luck,  was  with 
him  and  at  last  would  give  him  the  victory.  In  this 
he  was  sadly  mistaken,  but  he  knew  of  a  certainty 
that  the  gateway  behind  him  was  always  open  for 
his  retreat  to  the  Potomac  and  into  Virginia,  and 
that  Meade  would  make  no  effort  worthy  of  the 
name  to  close  that  gate  against  him  or  wrench  it 
from  his  possession,  even  if  Stuart  and  all  his 
cavalry  rode  beyond  the  shadow  of  everlasting  night, 
and  the  last  man  of  Pickett's  division  lay  stark  and 
cold  on  the  death-haunted  field. 

So  Lee  issued  his  orders  for  the  day's  operations, 
and  very  early  in  the  morning,  before  Johnson  and 
Slocum  had  joined  battle,  Stuart  was  in  the  saddle 
leading  his  daring  riders  in  a  wide  detour  around 
the  right  flank  of  the  Union  army. 

Three  and  a  half  miles  east  of  Gettysburg,  where 
certain  cross-roads,  leading  southward  beyond 

[222] 


.—  ..__.. 


BRIG.-GEN.  DAVID  McM.  GKEGG 
Com.  2d  Division,  Cavalry  Corps 


BRIG.-GEN.  GEORGE  A.  OUSTER 

Com.  2d  Brigade,  3d  Division,  Car  airy  Corp* 


GETTYSBURG 

Wolf's  Hill  toward  the  Baltimore  Pike,  intersect 
the  Hanover  Road,  Stuart  encountered  Gregg's 
second  division  and  Custer's  brigade  of  the  third 
division  of  Union  cavalry,  and  then  and  there  was 
fought  the  cavalry  battle  of  the  campaign,  and  one 
of  the  sharpest  cavalry  battles  of  the  war;  it  is 
known  in  history  as  "The  Sabre  Fight."  Stuart 
was  at  a  disadvantage;  his  men  were  worn  and 
weary  from  long  and  continuous  riding;  his  horses 
were  jaded  and  spiritless,  while  Gregg's  and  Cus 
ter's  men  and  horses  were  comparatively  fresh  and 
vigouious,  and  ready  for  action.  Stuart  was  over 
come  in  every  charge.  His  lines  were  broken,  his 
troopers  scattered.  He  was  defeated,  and  returned 
in  haste  to  the  rear  of  Lee's  infantry — not  Meade's, 
as  ordered.  And  so  it  came  to  pass  that  Stuart  did 
not  charge  in  conjunction  with  Pickett  and  Petti- 
grew,  when  the  thunder  of  Lee's  artillery  ceased. 


[223] 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  GREAT  CANNONADE 

PIE  second  act  in  Lee's  programme  for  July 
third  began  at  about  a  quarter  past  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon.  Lee's  orders  had  been  obeyed  to 
the  letter,  and  every  battery  and  every  gun  on 
Seminary  Ridge  of  sufficient  range  to  reach  Meade's 
position  had  been  carefully  posted  and  trained  upon 
his  left  centre. 

The  whole  supervision  of  the  battle  had  been  put 
into  the  hands  of  Longstreet ;  to  which  he  seems  to 
have  objected,  for  he  says:  "General  Lee  knew 
that  I  did  not  believe  that  success  was  possible,  and 
he  should  have  put  an  officer  in  charge  who  had 
more  confidence  in  his  plan.  Two-thirds  of  the 
troops  were  of  other  commands,  and  there  was  no 
reason  for  putting  the  assaulting  forces  under  my 
charge.  He  had  confidence  in  General  Early,  who 
had  advised  in  favour  of  that  point  of  the  line  of 
battle.  Knowing  my  want  of  confidence,  he  should 

[224] 


GETTYSBURG 

have  given  the  benefit  of  his  presence  and  his  assist 
ance  in  getting  the  troops  up,  posting  them,  and 
arranging  the  batteries;  but  he  gave  no  orders  or 
suggestions  after  his  early  designation  of  the  point 
for  which  the  column  should  march." 

This  was  surely  placing  Longstreet  in  a  trying 
position;  and  feeling  in  his  soul  that  it  would  be  a 
useless  sacrifice,  he  arranged  the  details  with  a  heavy 
heart.  As  the  assault  and  the  cannonade  were  both 
under  the  general  direction  of  Longstreet,  there 
can  be  given  no  more  correct  information  of  the 
preparations  made,  than  by  quoting  his  own  words ; 
and  here  is  what  he  says: 

"  The  director  of  the  artillery  was  asked  to  select 
a  position  in  his  line  from  which  he  could  note  the 
effect  of  his  practice,  and  to  advise  General  Pickett 
when  the  enemy's  fire  was  so  disturbed  as  to  call 
for  the  assault.  General  Pickett's  was  the  division 
of  direction,  and  he  was  ordered  to  have  a  staff 
officer  or  courier  with  the  artillery  director  to  bear 
notice  of  the  movement  to  advance." 

To  show  what  an  eminent  Confederate  officer  of 
artillery  thought  of  the  chances  for  success,  and 

[225] 


GETTYSBURG 

what  was  the  true  condition  of  their  ammunition 
supply  when  the  artillery  duel  began,  we  make  these 
further  quotations  from  Longstreet's  account: 

"  When  satisfied  that  the  work  of  preparation  was  all  that 
it  could  be  from  the  means  at  hand,  I  wrote  Colonel  Walton, 
of  the  Washington  Artillery : 

'COLONEL-  'HEAD-QUARTERS,  July  third,  1863. 

'  Let  the  batteries  open.  Order  great  care  and  precision 
in  firing.  When  the  batteries  at  the  Peach  Orchard  cannot 
be  used  against  the  point  we  intend  to  attack,  let  them  open  on 
the  enemy  on  the  rocky  hill. 

'  Most  respectfully, 

'  JAMES  LONGSTREET, 
'  Lieutenant-General   Commanding.' 

"  At  the  same  time  a  note  to  Alexander  directed  that  Pickett 
should  not  be  called  until  the  artillery  practice  indicated  fair 
opportunity.  In  a  few  minutes  report  came  from  Alexander 
that  he  would  only  be  able  to  judge  of  the  effect  of  the  fire 
by  the  return  of  that  of  the  enemy,  as  his  infantry  was  not 
exposed  to  view,  and  the  smoke  of  the  batteries  would  soon 
cover  the  field. 

"  Alexander  asked  if  there  was  an  alternative  that  it  be 
carefully  considered  before  the  batteries  opened,  as  there 
was  not  enough  artillery  ammunition  for  this  and  another 
trial,  if  this  should  not  prove  favourable. 

"  He  was  informed  that  there  was  no  alternative ;  that  I 
could  find  no  way  out  of  it;  that  General  Lee  had  considered 
and  would  listen  to  nothing  else;  that  orders  had  gone  for 
the  guns  to  give  signal  for  the  batteries  to  open ;  that  he  should 
call  the  troops  at  the  first  opportunity  or  lull  in  the  enemy's 
fire." 

[226] 


BBIG.-GEN.  E.  P.  ALEXANDER 

Chief  of  Artillery,  1st  Corps,  Army  Northern  Virginia 


BRIG.-GEN.  HENRY  J.  HUNT 

Ctiief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  tlie  Potomac 


GETTYSBURG 

Then  the  signal  gun  sounded,  and  the  silence 
which  for  two  hours  or  more  had  brooded  over  the 
field  was  broken  by  the  Washington  Artillery  of 
New  Orleans,  which  was  posted  in  the  edge  of  the 
woods  on  Seminary  Ridge,  nearly  opposite  the 
Union  left-centre,  and  then  the  whole  ridge  up  and 
dow^n  for  the  distance  of  a  mile  and  a  half  lighted 
up  with  one  continuous  blaze,  as  gun  after  gun  and 
battery  after  battery  opened  their  ponderous 
throats,  belching  forth  fire  and  messengers  of  death 
and  destruction. 

It  was  a  grand  and  awful  demonstration  of  mili 
tary  buncombe;  useless,  foolish,  and  costly  on  the 
part  of  and  for  the  general  that  planned  and  ordered 
it;  but  it  demonstrated  one  fact  beyond  all  ques 
tion,  which  is,  that  Lee  was  not  so  weak  in  men  and 
material,  and  the  Confederacy  was  not  so  destitute 
of  the  sinews  of  war,  as  their  historians  and  friends, 
both  South  and  North,  would  have  the  world 
believe. 

/  Lee  was  a  long  way  from  home,  and  from  his 
base  of  supplies,  yet  he  developed  a  strength  of 
artillery  in  that  cannonade  that  surprised  Meade. 

[227] 


GETTYSBURG 

If  Lee  was  putting  up  a  bluff  for  Meade's  benefit 
and  consideration,  it  should  have  ended  there,  and 
he  should  have  retreated  without  any  further  sacri 
fice  of  life.  But  it  cannot  be  claimed  honestly  for 
an  army  that  it  is  inferior  in  numbers  and  war- 
material  to  its  adversary,  when  it  is  able  to  concen 
trate  on  a  given  point  from  one  hundred  to  one 
hundred  and  twenty  pieces  of  long-range  heavy 
field-artillery,  while  that  adversary  is  able  to  reply 
with  but  eighty  or  ninety  guns;  and  that  was  the 
situation  on  the  third  of  July.  But  it  would  have 
been  wiser  for  Lee  to  save  his  ammunition.  Of 
course  there  was  immense  damage  done  on  both 
sides  during  that  great  military  duel,  the  greatest 
probably  that  ever  took  place  on  the  American  con 
tinent  ;  it  lasted  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  or  more,  or 
until  well  along  toward  three  o'clock.  Caissons 
were  blown  up,  guns  dismounted  and  disabled,  bat 
teries  silenced,  trees  splintered,  rocks  riven,  horses 
and  men  killed  and  wounded,  but  it  had  no  effect 
whatever  on  the  general  result  of  the  charge  in 
contemplation.  If  Lee  expected  to  retreat,  as  he 
afterwards  did,  and  was  burdened  with  an  over- 

[2281 


GETTYSBURG 

weight  of  ammunition  that  he  was  anxious  to  dis 
pose  of  (which  is  not  at  all  likely) ,  then  this  grand 
cannonade  was  a  display  of  wisdom  on  his  part; 
for  the  only  possible  advantage  he  could  have  gained 
by  this  squandering  of  his  ammunition  by  the  ton, 
was,  that  his  limber-chests,  caissons,  and  ammuni 
tion  wagons  were  lightened  for  retreat. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  Lee  expected  to  have  any 
use  for  ammunition  on  the  retreat,  or  ever  after, 
or  if  it  was  a  fact  that  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  was  sore  pressed  to  procure  the  very  stores 
that  he  so  lavishly  threw  away  and  wasted,  then  it 
was  another  of  the  great  blunders  of  a  great  general. 

While  Lee  had  the  advantage  in  the  number  of 
guns  engaged  (which  in  the  matter  of  expending 
ammunition  proved  to  be  only  a  disadvantage) ,  and 
also  in  the  positions  of  his  batteries,  Seminary  Ridge 
being  heavily  wooded  and  thus  furnishing  ample 
cover  for  his  caissons  and  horses  in  rear  of  his  guns, 
Meade  had  the  advantage  in  reserves  with  which  to 
replace  his  crippled  and  exhausted  batteries,  and  a 
decided  advantage  in  the  fact  that  his  Chief -of -Ar 
tillery,  General  Hunt,  foresaw  that  the  cannonade 

[  229  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

was  but  the  prelude  to  some  act  that  was  being 
arranged  behind  the  scenes,  and  in  good  time  to 
make  ample  preparation  to  meet  it.  Usually  a 
cannonade  directed  against  an  infantry  line  can  be 
for  but  one  purpose  only  —  to  disturb  and  rattle 
the  infantry  so  that  their  lines  may  be  the  easier 
penetrated  by  a  charging  column;  but  in  this 
instance  Longstreet's  main  object  was,  undoubtedly, 
to  silence  and  disable  as  far  as  possible  the  Union 
artillery  on  Cemetery  Hill  and  the  ridge  back  of 
Hancock's  centre,  that  commanded  the  ground  over 
which  the  contemplated  Confederate  charge  was  to 
be  made;  for  during  its  continuance  he  says: 

"  General  Pickett  rode  to  confer  with  Alexander,  then  on 
the  ground  upon  which  I  was  resting,  where  he  was  soon 
handed  a  slip  of  paper.  After  reading  it  he  handed  it  to  me. 
It  read: 

' '  If  you  are  coming  at  all,  come  at  once,  or  I  cannot  give 
you  proper  support;  but  the  enemy's  fire  has  not  slackened 
at  all.  At  least  eighteen  guns  are  still  firing  from  the  Ceme 
tery  itself.  ALEXANDER/ 

"  I  mounted  and  spurred  for  Alexander's  post.  He  re 
ported  that  the  ammunition  of  the  batteries  of  position  was  so 
reduced  that  he  could  not  use  them  in  proper  support  of  the 
infantry.  He  was  ordered  to  fill  up  his  ammunition-chests. 
But  alas !  there  was  no  more  ammunition  to  be  had. 

[230] 


GETTYSBURG 

"  Just  then  a  number  of  the  enemy's  batteries  hitched  up 
and  hauled  off,  which  gave  a  glimpse  of  unexpected  hope." 

This  was  at  the  time  that  Hunt  ordered  the  long- 
range  Union  guns  to  cease  firing.  The  concentra 
tion  of  the  Confederate  fire  on  this  point  plainly 
told  where  the  charge  was  intended  to  strike,  and  in 
order  to  be  ready  to  meet  it,  Hunt  ordered  the  Union 
guns  to  cease  firing.  This  was  what  gave  Long- 
street  and  his  Confederates  "a  glimpse  of  unex 
pected  hope,"  hope  that  their  stupendous  artillery 
effort  had  had  some  effect  on  the  Union  batteries. 
But  that  Longstreet  was  deceived  by  this  timely 
precaution  on  the  part  of  Hunt,  there  is  grave 
doubt.  He  might  have  hoped  that  the  grandest 
artillery  demonstration  ever  ordered  by  his  great 
Commander,  Lee,  had  accomplished  more  than  it 
did,  but  he  was  too  good  a  soldier  to  suppose  for  ax 
moment  that  Meade  was  out  of  ammunition,  or  all 
the  batteries  along  his  lines  disabled.  The  move 
ment  afforded  him  only  "  a  glimpse  of  hope." 

How  meagre  that  glimpse  really  was,  the  sequel 
proved.  Hunt  was  only  changing  guns.  While  the 
preparations  for  the  great  Confederate  charge  that 

[281] 


GETTYSBURG 

was  to  break  the  Union  centre  and  defeat  and 
destroy  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  went  on,  and  as 
the  Confederate  batteries,  hot  from  excessive  action 
and  almost  exhausted  of  ammunition,  ceased  firing, 
Hunt  filled  the  places  of  his  retired  batteries  on 
every  hill  and  commanding  eminence  with  short- 
range  guns  —  brass  twelve-pounders,  howitzers,  and 
Napoleons,  to  repel  infantry  —  with  enough  rifle 
batteries  —  Parrotts  and  Rodmans  —  to  reach  out 
to  meet  them  early  in  their  advance,  and  to  hold  their 
batteries  level;  and  the  beauty  of  it  all  was  that 
Hunt's  guns  were  cool  and  in  perfect  order,  and 
his  artillerymen  fresh  and  eager  for  the  fray. 

Steinwehr,  on  the  west  front  of  Cemetery  Hill, 
was  ready;  Doubleday  on  its  southern  trend,  was 
ready;  Hancock,  far  down  the  ridge,  was  ready; 
Hunt,  on  every  knoll  where  a  battery  of  artillery 
could  be  placed,  was  ready. 

The  great  cannonade  was  at  an  end.  The  infan 
try  had  not  been  shaken.  The  artillery  had  not 
been  disabled.  The  whole  Union  line  was  intact, 
awaiting  with  confidence  the  last  act  of  the  drama 
of  battle. 

[232] 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

PICKETT'S  CHARGE 

T  N  order  to  give  the  reader  a  correct  idea  as  well 
•*•  as  a  truthful  account  of  the  Confederate  forma 
tion  for  that  charge,  which  history  has  falsely 
assumed  was  the  main  feature  of  the  Battle  of 
Gettysburg  and  the  danger-hour  in  the  life  of  the 
nation,  we  will  accept  Longstreet's  report,  for  he, 
above  all  others,  is  the  man  who  should  know.  In 
his  report  of  the  charge,  he  says:  "As  the  com 
mands  reported,  Pickett  was  assigned  on  the  right, 
Kemper's  and  Garnett's  brigades  to  be  supported 
by  Armistead's.  Wilcox's  brigade  of  the  Third 
Corps  in  echelon  and  guarding  Pickett's  right; 
Pettigrew's  division  on  Pickett's  left,  supported  by 
the  brigades  of  Scales  and  Lane,  and  under  com 
mand  of  General  Trimble.  The  brigades  of  Petti- 
grew's  division  were  Archer's,  Pettigrew's,  Brock- 
enbrough's,  and  Davis's." 

[233] 


GETTYSBURG 

Thus  the  attacking  force  comprised  two  columns, 
two  lines  in  depth;  Pickett  on  the  right,  his  flank 
guarded  by  one  brigade.  Pickett's  fifteen  regi 
ments  were  all  Virginians,  Wilcox's  five  regiments 
were  all  Alabamans, —  twenty  regiments  in  all  in  the 
column.  Pettigrew's  column  on  the  left  comprised 
four  brigades,  somewhat  mixed  in  statality,  as  it 
comprised  five  North  Carolinian  regiments,  four 
Virginian,  three  Tennesseean,  three  Mississippian, 
and  one  Alabaman,  or  sixteen  in  all.  Pettigrew's 
two  supporting  brigades  comprising  ten  regiments, 
all  of  which  were  North  Carolinians;  so  that,  of 
Pettigrew's  column,  fifteen  of  his  twenty-six  regi 
ments  hailed  from  the  old  North  State.  In  the  right 
column,  then,  the  majority  were  from  Virginia;  in 
the  left  column  a  majority  represented  North  Caro 
lina.  This  fact  occasioned  no  dispute  or  trouble 
between  them  on  the  third  of  July,  1863,  but  in 
after  years  it  was  the  source  of  much  bickering 
among  the  survivors  of  the  lost  cause. 

Longstreet  does  not  give  the  strength  of  either 
of  these  columns,  but  says,  of  his  conversation  with 
Lee  earlier  in  the  day,  when  he  indicated  the  point 

C2341 


MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  E.  PICKETT 
Division  Commander,  1st  Corps,  Army  Northern  Virginia 


BRIG.-GEN.  J.  J.  PETTIGREW 

Hctli's  Division,  3d  Corps,  Army  Northern  Virginia 


GETTYSBURG 

to  which  the  charge  should  be  directed:  "I  asked 
the  strength  of  the  column.  Lee  stated  15,000.  I 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  15,000  men  who  could 
make  successful  assault  over  that  field  had  never 
been  arrayed  in  battle;  but  he  was  impatient  of 
listening  and  tired  of  talking,  and  nothing  was  left 
but  to  proceed." 

It  might  be  presumed  that  the  column  was 
strengthened  on  such  a  pointed  expression  of  lack 
of  confidence  in  its  sufficiency  by  the  man  who  was 
to  direct  it  to  victory  or  defeat,  before  the  final 
arrangements  were  made.  Later  in  his  account 
Longstreet  says:  "Two-thirds  of  the  troops  were 
of  other  commands."  As  Pickett's  division  was  of 
his  command  and  comprised  six  thousand  men,  it  is 
quite  reasonable  to  believe  that  there  were  about 
eighteen  thousand  in  the  two  columns.  And  there 
we  will  leave  it,  anywhere  between  Lee's  and  Long- 
street's  estimates. 

General  Pickett's  division  numbered  6,114  pres 
ent,  equipped  for  duty,  on  June  twentieth,  the  last 
return  of  which  we  have  record  made  by  Pickett 
previous  to  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  it  could 

[235] 


GETTYSBURG 

not  have  fallen  below  six  thousand  when  it  started 
out  in  lead  of  the  column  of  direction  on  that  im 
mortal  charge  in  the  afternoon  of  July  third. 

These  columns  were  in  readiness  to  move  for 
ward,  and  as  the  propitious  moment  arrived  when 
Hunt  drew  off  his  heated  batteries,  giving  the  Con 
federates  a  "  glimpse  of  unexpected  hope,"  Long- 
street  describes  the  last  moment  of  waiting  and  the 
final  order  for  action  as  follows:  "  Pickett  said, 
'  General,  shall  I  advance  ? '  The  effort  to  speak 
the  order  failed,  and  I  could  only  indicate  it  by  an 
affirmative  bow.  He  accepted  the  duty  with  seem 
ing  confidence  of  success,  leaped  on  his  horse  and 
rode  gayly  to  his  command." 

This  force  —  these  two  columns,  whatever  their 
numbers  may  have  been  —  was  the  force  that  Lee 
had  selected  to  strike  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 
the  centre  and  split  it  wide  open.  Was  there  ever 
an  act  more  foolhardy,  more  unworthy  the  genius 
of  a  great  general  ?  Longstreet  gives  it  as  his  opin 
ion  that,  "  Forty  thousand  men,  unsupported  as  we 
were,  could  not  have  carried  that  position  at  Gettys- 

[236] 


GETTYSBURG 

burg.  The  enemy  was  there.  Officers  and  men 
knew  their  advantage,  and  were  resolved  to  stay 
until  the  hills  came  down  over  them.  It  is  simply 
out  of  the  question  for  a  lesser  force  to  march  over 
broad,  open  fields  and  carry  a  fortified  front  occu 
pied  by  a  greater  force  of  seasoned  troops." 

In  another  place,  speaking  of  his  better  chances 
of  success  by  weakening  his  right  to  increase  the 
strength  of  Pickett's  column,  he  says:  "Had  the 
column  been  augmented  by  the  divisions  of  my 
right,  its  brave  men  might  have  penetrated  far 
enough  to  reach  Johnson's  Island  as  prisoners ;  their 
return  to  General  Lee  by  any  other  route  is 
unlikely." 

Lee  ordered  that  Pickett  should  be  strongly  sup 
ported,  but  it  is  possible  that  the  supports  furnished 
were  not  equal  to  the  division  of  direction  in  spirit, 
for  in  his  whole  army  it  was  impossible  to  find  sup 
ports  who  had  not  been  there  before,  many  of  them 
more  than  once  on  that  same  fatal  battlefield,  or 
near  by,  and  it  was  not  strange  that  their  enthusiasm 
was  not  at  the  white  heat  that  seemed  to  glow  and 
burn  in  the  hearts  of  Pickett's  men. 

[237] 


GETTYSBURG 

From  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  Seminary  Ridge, 
where  the  Confederates  came  out  from  their  shelter, 
to  the  umbrella-shaped  copse  on  Cemetery  Ridge 
beyond  the  valley  selected  for  Pickett's  objective,  is 
little  short  of  a  mile  and  a  quarter.  The  course  of 
the  march  crosses  the  valley  and  the  Emmetsburg 
Road  north  of  the  Codori  House,  and  the  two 
columns,  each  occupying  a  frontage  of  two  brigades 
and  supported  on  either  flank  by  a  still  farther 
extension  of  frontage,  covered  a  space  of  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  from  north  to  south.  Along  this 
frontage  Seminary  Ridge  slopes  rapidly  to  the 
eastward  for  the  first  three  hundred  yards,  then  for 
a  thousand  yards  the  valley  is  undulating  with  a 
perceptible  rise  along  the  Emmetsburg  Road  about 
two-thirds  or  three-fourths  of  the  distance  across, 
the  trend  of  the  road  being  toward  Cemetery  Hill 
as  one  goes  northward,  then  a  gentle  slope  upward 
for  the  last  two  or  three  hundred  yards  which 
increases  in  sharpness  to  the  north,  rising  abruptly 
to  Cemetery  Hill. 

The  hill  itself,  which  overlooks  all  this  valley, 
presented  one  continuous  front  of  artillery,  and  the 

[238] 


BRIG.-GEN.  R.  B.  GARNETT 
Pickett's  Division,  Army  Northern  Virginia 


BBIG.-GEN.  J.  L.  KEMPER 
Picket? s  Division,  1st  Corpx,  Army  Northern  Virginia 


GETTYSBURG 

ridge  southward  and  every  knoll  of  commanding 
eminence  behind  it  was  studded  with  cannon;  while 
in  front  and  below  the  frowning  batteries,  gleaming 
lines  of  steel  along  the  tawny  earthworks  told  where 
patiently  the  infantry  bided  their  time. 

.When  Longstreet,  who  foresaw  the  slaughter 
and  opposed  the  charge,  looked  out  over  that  wide 
valley  and  beheld  the  far  side  thereof,  with  its 
frowning  ridges  and  glimmering  labyrinths,  where 
death  and  destruction  watched  and  waited,  what 
wonder  that  his  voice  failed  him,  and,  as  one  struck 
dumb  with  sorrowr  for  the  useless  sacrifice  of  his 
brave  soldiers,  answered  only  with  a  nod  of  assent 
when  Pickett  saluted  him  and  asked,  "  Shall  I  lead 
my  command  forward  ? " 

Within  from  ten  to  fifteen  minutes  after  the 
artillery  ceased  firing,  Pickett's  brave  Virginians 
and  Pettigrew's  heroic  North  Carolinians,  with 
their  brother  clans  equally  brave  and  heroic,  marched 
out  of  the  woods  with  their  guns  at  a  right-shoulder, 
and  with  steady,  measured  tread,  as  if  on  parade, 
headed  down  the  eastern  slope  of  Seminary  Ridge 
and  straight  for  the  "jaws  of  death"  !  When  the 

[239] 


GETTYSBURG 

rear  line  of  the  double  column  was  well  out  of  the 
woods,  presenting  a  splendid  mark  thus  silhouetted 
against  the  face  of  the  ridge,  Cemetery  Hill  and  all 
the  ridge  southward  blazed  and  thundered  anew, 
concentrating  an  appalling  fire  on  the  advancing 
forces.  Such  is  war !  Still  on  the  Confederates 
came.  When  they  reached  the  Emmetsburg  Road 
they  entered  the  "mouth  of  hell,"  for  then  the 
twelve-pounders  and  light  field-guns  loaded  with 
canister  which  the  gunners  double-shotted  as  the 
columns  advanced,  came  into  action,  and  the 
musketry  from  outlying  rifle-pits  were  in  reach. 
Here  the  fury  and  destructiveness  of  the  battle 
reached  its  height.  The  charging  Confederates  here 
began  first  to  use  their  muskets,  and  return  the 
Union  fire. 

As  the  old  veteran  was  not  where  he  could  see  this 
charge,  though  within  hearing  distance  of  the  battle, 
we  will  quote  from  "  The  Cannoneer,"  who  was  a 
gunner  of  Battery  B,  Fourth  United  States  Artil 
lery,  and  saw  the  charge  with  his  own  eyes: 

"  At  this  instant  the  scene  down  to  the  left,  where  the  main 
line  was  charging,  reached  its  climax.  Every  gun  in  our  lines 

[240] 


GETTYSBURG 

that  could  reach  them  was  going,  and  owing  to  the  openness 
of  the  level  ground  they  had  to  cross,  frightful  execution  was 
done  at  every  step.  As  we  could  not  fire  after  they  got  within 
range  of  our  guns,  without  firing  along  the  front  of  our  own 
line,  and  as  the  force  in  our  front  was  not  yet  within  easy 
range,  we  had  nothing  to  do  but  look  on.  Meantime  the 
advance  line  of  the  charging  forces  had  got  across  the  level 
ground  and  had  begun  to  climb  the  slope  of  Cemetery  Ridge. 
This  brought  them  into  contact  with  our  advanced  skirmishers, 
who  lined  every  stone  wall,  clump  of  bushes,  and  boulder  in 
the  fields  along  the  Emmetsburg  Road,  and  who  opened  a 
deadly  fusillade. 

"  Then,  for  the  first  time  the  charging  troops  began  to  use 
their  muskets.  It  was  now  about  four  o'clock,  and  though  the 
sinking  sun  was  shining  bright  and  hot,  the  enormous  amount 
of  smoke  that  had  drifted  over  to  the  westward  made  the  air 
seem  like  one  of  those  soft,  hazy  days  as  seen  in  Indian  Sum 
mer;  but  the  peacefulness  of  nature  found  no  response.  On 
the  contrary,  the  whole  expanse  between  the  two  ridges  was 
a  pandemonium  of  yelling  soldiers,  flashing  muskets,  shells 
bursting  in  air  and  on  the  ground,  riderless  horses  tearing 
about,  barns,  houses,  and  haystacks  on  fire  —  every  where 
flame,  smoke,  and  every  other  evidence  of  destruction ;  while 
above  all  was  the  stupendous  uproar  of  a  hundred  cannon, 
30,000  muskets,  and  myriads  of  bursting  shells  —  the  whole 
making  one  ceaseless  crash,  as  if  the  world  was  breaking  up !  " 

It  is  from  this  point  of  the  battle  onward  that  the 
North  Carolinians  of  Pettigrew's  column  claim  to 
have  been  defrauded  by  the  Virginians  of  their  full 
share  of  the  glory  won  that  day.  We  are  inclined 
to  the  belief  that  the  glory  of  their  defeat  is  hardly 

[241] 


GETTYSBURG 

worth  quarrelling  about ;  and  as  it  is  a  matter  con 
cerning  their  own  funeral  upon  which  they  have  a 
right  to  disagree,  we  are  interested  only  so  far  as 
the  truth  of  history  is  involved. 

However,  it  does  seem  to  us  that  history,  poetry, 
and  romance  have  combined  to  give  Pickett's  column 
credit  for  the  whole  affair.  The  truth  is  that  both 
columns  reached  the  Emmetsburg  Road  and  opened 
fire  on  the  intrenched  Union  troops ;  and  from  that 
moment  the  battle  was  desperate  until  the  Con 
federates  gave  way,  which  did  not  exceed  twenty 
minutes.  Pettigrew's  column,  being  to  the  north 
or  left,  came  squarely  up  against  the  west  front  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  which  is  steep  and  rugged;  while 
Pickett's  column  was  directed  against  a  gently  slop 
ing  ridge  much  easier  of  ascent,  and  no  better 
defended  by  both  artillery  and  infantry. 

The  fact  that  the  west  front  of  Cemetery  Hill 
was  defended  by  Steinwehr's  division  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  comprising  two  brigades,  Coster's 
and  Smith's,  the  latter  not  having  engaged  in  battle 
on  the  first  or  second  of  July,  and  that  Smith's 
brigade  lost  then  and  there  348  men,  is  proof  posi- 

[242] 


GETTYSBURG 

tive  that  Pettigrew's  column  did  some  effective 
shooting.  Coster's  brigade  lost  597,  eight-tenths  of 
which  were  lost  in  this  battle  of  the  third ;  and  when 
a  division  of  three  thousand  men  loses  over  eight 
hundred  in  less  than  half  an  hour's  righting,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  they  were  up  against  soldiers  who 
did  not  care  whom  they  hit.  More  than  that,  on  the 
left  of  Steinwehr,  between  him  and  Hancock,  where 
the  front  was  less  abrupt,  were  stationed  the  second 
and  third  divisions  of  the  First  Corps,  the  two  being 
about  equal  in  strength  to  Stein wehr's;  therefore 
Cemetery  Hill  was  defended  by  about  six  thousand 
Union  infantry,  and  Pettigrew's  North  Carolinians 
and  their  fellows  from  the  South  made  it  mighty 
hot  for  them  for  that  short  half -hour.  Pettigrew 
and  Trimble  were  both  wounded,  the  latter  severely. 
Longstreet  speaks  in  high  praise  of  Pettigrew 
and  Trimble,  and  the  officers  and  men  of  their 
column. 

Longstreet  tells  us  that  here  at  the  Emmetsburg 
Road,  or  while  both  columns  were  advancing  or  try 
ing  to  advance  under  this  frightful  fire,  "  General 
Pickett,  finding  the  battle  broken,  called  the  troops 

[243] 


GETTYSBURG 

off."  It  does  not  appear  that  Pickett  had  much  to 
do  with  calling  off  the  troops  of  either  column,  but 
it  does  appear  that  he  led  his  column  no  farther  than 
the  Emmetsburg  Road,  and  that  the  great  majority 
of  the  soldiers  of  both  columns,  finding  it  impos 
sible  to  stem  the  fierce  tide  of  battle  beyond  that 
line,  with  one  accord  followed  Pickett  back  to  the 
shelter  of  Seminary  Ridge,  and  were  quite  lively 
about  it. 

Armistead  of  the  second  line  pressed  forward, 
gathering  up  his  shattered  remnants  for  a  final  ef 
fort;  and  herein  Pickett's  column  carried  off  the 
palm  of  glory.  In  face  of  that  awful  death-storm, 
they  reached  the  foot  of  the  ridge.  Now  they  are 
climbing  the  slope:  Lee  shall  not  think  —  the  world 
shall  never  say  —  that  the  fault  of  defeat  was  theirs. 
Two  hundred  yards  farther  is  the  copse  on  the  crest 
of  the  ridge,  a  hundred  yards  only  to  Hancock's 
waiting  lines  of  infantry.  Then  the  crash  of 
musketry  increases  to  a  sound  like  falling  forests, 
and  the  charging  lines  melt  away  as  snow  before 
the  breath  of  the  Chinook.  Kemper  is  wounded; 
Garnett  is  killed;  Armistead  puts  his  cap  on  the 

[244] 


BRIG.-GEN.  LEWIS  A.  ARMISTEAD 
Pickett's  Division,  1st  Corps,  Army  Northern  Virginia 


o 

QC 


o 

— 

PH 

o 
w 


GETTYSBURG 

point  of  his  sword  to  guide  his  devoted  band;  he 
leaps  the  outer  wall  and  falls  within  the  Union  line. 
The  force  of  the  charge  is  spent;  they  cannot 
retreat;  they  are  at  the  end  of  their  march;  they 
throw  down  their  arms  and  surrender,  all  that  is 
left  of  them.  Pickett's  mad  charge,  the  last  act  in 
the  great  tragedy  among  the  picturesque  hills  of 
Gettysburg,  is  over. 

During  the  advance  of  the  Confederate  columns 
across  the  valley,  their  artillery  was  not  by  any 
means  idle,  and  wherever  they  had  ammunition 
they  used  it  freely,  giving  the  Union  artillery  and 
infantry,  also,  the  very  best  (or  worst)  that  was  at 
their  command.  Although  the  advantages  were 
all  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  even  then  the 
battle  was  not  all  on  one  side. 

General  Hancock,  General  Gibbon,  and  General 
Stannard  were  wounded  during  the  engagement, 
and  Lieutenant  Gushing — commanding  Battery 
A,  Fourth  U.  S.  Artillery  —  was  killed,  while 
working  the  last  serviceable  gun  of  his  battery, 
about  fifty  yards  to  the  right  and  front  of  the 
umbrella-shaped  copse,  within  a  few  feet  of  the 

[245] 


GETTYSBURG 

spot  where  the  Confederate  Armistead  fell  riddled 
with  bullets. 

This  point,  called  the  "  Bloody  Angle,"  was  so 
named  from  the  fact  that  here  culminated  Pickett's 
Charge,  at  a  point  about  seventy-five  yards  in 
advance  of  the  general  line  on  either  side,  being 
defended  in  front  and  on  the  right  and  left  by  a 
stone  wall,  on  each  of  three  sides,  over  the  front 
wall  of  which  Armistead  and  a  few  of  his  followers 
leaped  to  their  deaths.  This  was  the  only  point 
where  any  of  Pickett's  men  got  within  the  Union 
lines;  and  not  one  of  them  ever  got  out  again  except 
as  a  war-prisoner. 

Pickett's  division  was  said  to  have  been  annihi 
lated,  but  though  his  losses  were  heavy  the  percent 
age  was  not  equal  to  that  of  some  Union  brigades 
in  the  previous  days  of  the  battle.  Of  four 
generals  and  fifteen  field  officers,  only  Pickett  and 
one  lieutenant-colonel  returned  to  Seminary 
Ridge  unharmed. 

When  it  was  known  that  the  Confederate  charge 
had  failed,  General  Kilpatrick  sent  his  first  brigade, 
commanded  by  General  Farnsworth,  on  a  charge 

[246] 


BRIG.-GEN.  JUDSON  KILPATRICK 
Com.  3d  Division,  Cavalry  Corps 


BRIG.-GEN.  ELON  J.  FARNSWORTH 

Com.  1st  Brigade,  3d  Division,  Cavalry  Corps 


GETTYSBURG 

through  the  infantry  detachments  in  rear  of  the 
Confederate  right.  Presumably  the  order  came 
from  General  Meade.  Farnsworth  made  a  heroic 
charge,  riding  over  rocks  and  stone  fences,  cutting 
his  way  through  detachments  of  guards,  and  riding 
down  the  skirmishers  that  opposed  him,  but  was 
obliged  at  several  points  to  come  under  infantry 
and  artillery  fire,  where  he  was  finally  killed,  and  his 
brigade  defeated  and  turned  back  with  heavy  loss. 

The  demonstration  was  uncalled  for  and  foolish 
in  the  extreme,  for  the  reason  that  it  was  a  useless 
waste  of  life,  as  Meade  had  no  infantry  in  read 
iness  to  support  the  cavalry.  Longstreet  says  of 
that  charge:  "Had  the  ride  been  followed 
promptly  by  the  enemy's  infantry,  and  pushed  with 
vigour,  they  could  have  reached  our  line  of  retreat." 

By  four  o'clock  P.M.  the  great  Battle  of  Gettys 
burg  was  over.  Lee  and  Meade  faced  each  other 
in  battle-line  until  the  morning  of  July  fifth,  but 
during  all  that  time  Lee  was  hustling  his  trains, 
his  wounded,  and  his  war-prisoners,  over  the 
Hagerstown  and  Chambersburg  Roads  toward  the 

Potomac. 

[  247 1 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

GETTYSBURG  TO  APPOMATTOX 

T  *  THEN  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  was  over, 
Meade's  lines  were  all  intact,  and  he  had  a 
concentrated  army  of  about  70,000  men,  of  all 
arms,  under  his  command.  The  losses  sustained  by 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  during  the  three  days  at 
Gettysburg,  and  including  the  cavalry  losses  in 
their  battles  immediately  around  Gettysburg,  are 
officially  stated  as  follows : 

General  Headquarters      ...  4 

First  Corps      .         .         .*       .         .  6,024 

Second  Corps           .         .         .         .  4,350 

Third  Corps    ,.         .         .         .         .  4,210 

Fifth  Corps 2,187 

Sixth  Corps     .         ....  242 

Eleventh  Corps        ....  3,801 

Twelfth  Corps         .         .         .        <;  1,081 

Artillery  Reserve     .         .         .         .  242 

Cavalry  Corps 849 


Total  loss  of  all  arms        .        .        .      22,990 
[  248  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

These  figures  leave  the  strength  of  the  various 
corps  and  of  the  army  when  the  battle  was  over,  as 
follows : 

First  Corps      .        .         .        .        .  3,998 

Second  Corps  ...        v      >v        8,558 
Third  Corps    ,        .        >r    ....       .        7,714 

Fifth  Corps     .        .'        .        .        .  10,322 

Sixth  Corps     .        .        .      '•.-  V  15,313 

Eleventh  Corps        .         .         .  t$fe'      6,040 

Twelfth  Corps          .        .t       .  .....       7,508 

Reserve  Artillery    .         .        .         .         2,304 

Cavalry  Corps          .         .       V       .  9,951 


Total  of  all  arms  .  v?  ;  .,  ; ,.  71,708 
As  these  figures  make  no  allowance  for  loss  by 
sickness  during  the  days  of  the  battle,  it  seems  fair 
to  assume  that  Meade's  army,  after  the  Battle  of 
Gettysburg  was  ended,  stood  on  that  ridge  of  hills 
confronting  Lee,  70,000  strong.  It  is  not  by  any 
means  so  easy  to  fix  the  strength  of  Lee's  army,  as 
his  losses  never  were  and  never  can  be  ascertained 
with  any  degree  of  accuracy.  The  Confederate 
losses,  as  given  by  Longstreet,  which  agree  pretty 
closely  with  all  Confederate  guess-work  reports,  are 
as  accurate  as  any  to  be  obtained,  and  are  as  follows : 

[2491 


GETTYSBURG 

Longstreet's  First  Corps .         .         .  7,539 

Ewell's  Second  Corps       .         .         .  5,937 

Hill's  Third  Corps  ....  6,735 

Cavalry  Corps         ....  1,426 


Tot al  loss  of  all  arms  .  .  .  21,637 
This  difference  of  1,353  in  favour  of  the  Con 
federates,  if  true,  shows  that  Lee  really  retreated 
from  Gettysburg  with  undue  haste,  for  his  army 
must  have  been,  as  compared  with  Meade's,  better 
able  to  remain  in  Pennsylvania  and  continue  his 
campaign  against  Washington  than  when  he 
invaded  the  North.  Lee  may  have  been  short  of 
ammunition  on  account  of  his  lavish  waste  of  it  at 
the  great  cannonade,  and  may  have  been  compelled 
to  retreat  on  that  account,  but  from  the  Confeder 
ate  showing  there  can  be  no  other  reason.  How 
ever,  we  are  inclined  to  believe  that  the  Confederate 
losses  in  the  aggregate  exceeded  the  Union  losses  by 
several  thousand.  In  the  matter  of  prisoners  alone 
there  is  a  discrepancy  sufficiently  wide  to  make  a 
very  different  showing.  While  the  Confederates 
report  a  loss  of  5,150  as  missing  and  unaccounted 
for,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  record  of  war-prisoners  on 

[250] 


GETTYSBURG 

file  in  the  office  of  the  Adjutant  General  of  the 
United  States  Army  bears  the  names  of  12,227 
wounded  and  unwounded  Confederates  captured  at 
Gettysburg  between  July  first  and  fifth  inclusive. 
There  we  find  a  difference  of  7,077.  It  is  not  pos 
sible  that  a  third  more  than  half  of  the  prisoners 
taken  by  the  Union  forces  were  wounded  men. 
Neither  is  it  possible  that  the  Confederates  had  any 
means  of  knowing  what  proportion  of  their  miss 
ing  were  wounded.  They  claim  to  have  lost  in 
wounded  12,700,  so  that  if  all  the  prisoners  cap 
tured  by  the  Union  forces  were  in  excess  of  5,150  — 
which  the  Confederates  claim  as  the  extent  of  their 
missing — then  it  must  appear  that  of  their  12,700 
wounded  the  Union  forces  captured  7,077,  while 
they  retained  and  carried  with  them  back  to  Vir 
ginia  but  5,623  of  their  wounded.  Such  an  out 
come  must  have  been  impossible  at  Gettysburg,  for 
in  no  instance  did  the  Union  army  capture  a  Con 
federate  hospital  and  it  was  only  the  desperately 
wounded  that  the  Confederates  could  not  remove 
that  fell  into  our  hands.  In  every  battle  three- 
fourths  of  the  wounded  can  care  for  themselves,  and 

[251] 


GETTYSBURG 

more  than  half  are  only  slightly  wounded.  From 
the  battlefields  of  Gettysburg  the  Confederates 
took  with  them  at  least  three-fourths  of  their 
wounded.  If  we  count  the  prisoners  actually  taken 
by  the  Union  forces,  it  adds  to  their  losses  7,077 
in  missing,  swelling  the  Confederate  aggregate  loss 
to  28,714. 

If  the  Confederate  reports  are  true,  our  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  exceeded  theirs  by  2,482. 

The  percentages  of  Union  losses  in  the  various 
battles  can  be  closely  estimated,  and  were  about  as 
follows :  In  the  battle  of  July  first,  the  longest,  most 
stubbornly  contested  of  the  series  of  battles,  and 
the  only  one  wherein  the  Confederates  were  victo 
rious,  the  Union  loss  was  41  per  cent.  In  the  main 
battle  of  July  second,  which  includes  Peach 
Orchard,  the  Wheatfield,  and  Little  Round  Top, 
the  Union  loss  was  30  per  cent.  In  Early's  charge 
on  Cemetery  Hill  on  the  evening  of  July  second, 
the  Union  loss  was  16  per  cent.  In  Slocum's 
battle  on  the  right,  including  both  Greene's  engage 
ment  on  the  evening  of  July  second  and  the  main 
battle  on  the  morning  of  July  third,  wherein  Slo- 

[252] 


GETTYSBURG 

cum  regained  his  lost  position,  Slocum's  loss  was  12 
per  cent. 

In  Pickett's  Charge,  on  July  third,  a  careful 
estimate  places  the  number  of  Union  troops 
defending  the  left  centre  of  Meade's  lines  approx 
imately  at  eleven  thousand,  with  an  approximate 
loss  of  24  per  cent. 

It  is  impossible  to  ascertain  the  Confederate  per 
centage  of  losses;  but  if  Longstreet's  statement  is 
correct  relative  to  his  battle  on  the  left  on  July 
second,  —  that  he  made  the  battle  with  17,000  men 
and  that  his  loss  was  6,000, — it  would  amount  in 
that  instance  to  about  35  per  cent.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  our  estimate  is  the  correct  one,  and  Long- 
street  had  26,000  and  lost  about  9,000  in  the  battle, 
then  the  percentage  of  his  loss  was  about  the  same, 
or  34  per  cent. 

In  Pickett's  Charge  the  Confederate  account 
places  Pickett's  loss  as  follows: 

Kemper's  brigade     .         .         .         .  731 

Garnett's  brigade     .         .         V         .  941 

Armistead's  brigade.         .-       ±        ,,        1,191 


Pickett's  total  loss    .         .         .         .        2,863 
or  forty  per  cent. 

[  253  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

It  is  useless,  in  fact  wearisome,  to  pursue  this 
estimate  of  losses  farther.  Each  army  lost  more 
than  it  could  afford  to  lose;  and  we  speak  of  the 
losses  in  this  connection  on  account  of  their  bearing 
on  the  campaigns  that  followed. 

The  Confederates,  living  and  dead,  and  their 
descendants,  have  no  reason  to  be  ashamed  of  their 
prowess  as  soldiers  at  Gettysburg,  and  at  other 
great  battles,  so  far  as  their  fighting  qualities  were 
concerned,  for  they  were  magnificent  fighters,  there 
is  no  question  about  that. 

Therefore,  it  seems  foolish  for  them  to  try  to 
deny  their  great  losses  and  Lee's  terrible  blunders 
at  Gettysburg,  in  order  to  save  the  reputation  of 
Lee  as  a  military  genius.  At  Fredericksburg, 
Burnside  assaulted  Lee's  position,  which  was  not 
less  secure  and  impregnable  than  Meade's  was  at 
Gettysburg,  the  principal  difference  being  that 
Lee  had  his  army  all  concentrated  and  in  position 
at  Fredericksburg  before  the  battle 'opened.  There 
Burnside's  loss  was  12,321,  to  Lee's  5,309,  as 
reported  by  him,  or  more  than  two  to  one;  but  the 

[254] 


GETTYSBURG 

United  States  did  not  belie  its  losses,  either  on  that 
account,  or  to  save  Burnside's  reputation.  Lee 
made  military  blunders  at  Gettysburg  that  were 
not  exceeded  by  Burnside  at  Fredericksburg ;  and 
it  seems  perfectly  foolish  for  Lee's  admirers,  South 
or  North,  to  befog  and  belie  the  truths  of  history. 

After  the  battle,  and  during  the  remainder  of  the 
third  and  all  of  the  fourth  of  July,  with  an  army  of 
70,000  men  under  his  command,  15,000  of  whom, 
or  one-fourth  of  his  infantry  (the  Sixth  Corps), 
having  scarcely  pulled  a  trigger  during  the  battle, 
Meade  watched  Lee  pull  his  defeated  army 
together,  which  had  been  pounded,  and  hammered, 
and  slaughtered,  and  repulsed  at  every  point,  and 
march  away  with  flying  colors  to  prolong  the  war 
for  another  year  and  a  half.  It  should  have  ended 
immediately  after  the  Confederate  authorities 
learned  of  the  utter  failure  of  that  campaign. 

Gettysburg  was  Meade's  first  and  last  battle  as 
a  commanding  general.  He  retained  the  supreme 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  until  the 
next  winter,  and  handled  it  skilfully  in  avoiding 

[255] 


GETTYSBURG 

battle,  but  made  no  headway  toward  overthrowing 
the  Confederacy.  He  retained  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Grant  until  after 
Appomattox  and  the  close  of  the  war,  and  proved 
himself  to  be  a  skilful  and  reliable  lieutenant  in 
executing  the  plans  of  a  competent  leader;  but  if 
the  United  States  had  given  him  an  army  of  500,000 
men,  and  allowed  him  to  retain  the  chief  command 
of  that  army,  it  is  very  doubtful  if  he  ever  would 
have  taken  Richmond,  or  captured  Lee's  army. 
Meade  was  far  from  being  a  great  general. 
Appomattox  was  the  complement  of  Gettysburg. 
Without  a  Gettysburg,  Appomattox  never  could 
have  been  reached;  and  without  an  Appomattox, 
Gettysburg  and  all  the  other  battles  of  the  Civil 
War  would  have  been  in  vain. 

Gettysburg  was  the  death-warrant  of  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  and  of  slavery.  Appomattox 
was  the  execution  of  the  former  and  the  death-knell 
of  the  latter. 

When  the  Southern  Confederacy  died,  Abraham 
Lincoln's  Emancipation  Proclamation  had  the 
power  to  free,  and  did  free,  every  slave  beneath  the 

[256] 


GETTYSBURG 

Stars  and  Stripes;  and  the  God-accursed  institution 
that  had  dominated  America  for  more  than  two 
hundred  years,  and  finally  drenched  the  land  with 
blood,  met  the  death  that  it  deserved. 


[  257  1 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE   UMBRELLA  GROVE  AND   THE  FIRST    MINNESOTA 

A  BOUT  three  hundred  and  fifty  yards  south 
^  ^  of  the  steel  tower  on  South  Cemetery  Hill, 
stands  the  little  umbrella  thicket  or  grove  that 
guided  Pickett  in  his  last  mad  charge  on  Hancock's 
lines  on  the  afternoon  of  July  third,  1863. 

The  grove  stands  on  the  west  side  of  Hancock 
Avenue,  and  consists  of  forty  trees  —  thirty  rock- 
oaks,  nine  red-oaks,  and  one  hickory.  They  stand 
on  a  rocky  knob  in  a  thick  cluster,  which  causes 
their  branches  to  spread  out  like  a  great  umbrella. 

The  grove  is  enclosed  by  an  iron  picket  fence,  in 
a  circle  sixty  yards  in  circumference.  Seven 
hundred  and  fifty  yards  south  of  this  grove,  on  the 
west  side  of  Hancock  Avenue,  stands  the  monument 
of  the  First  Minnesota  Infantry,  the  first  among 
the  infantry  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  in 
the  Civil  War.  Of  all  the  regiments  that  partici 
pated  in  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  on  either  side, 

[  258  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

the  First  Minnesota  deserves  the  highest  honour  for 
bravery,  firmness,  endurance,  and  success. 

Not  on  another  field  of  war  since  the  world  began 
was  ever  exhibited  a  more  daring  and  heroic  deed 
than  that  performed  by  the  First  Minnesota  in 
front  of  that  monument,  on  the  afternoon  of  July 
second. 

At  a  critical  moment  when  the  tempest  of  battle 
was  raging  in  its  fury  over  and  around  the  Wheat- 
field;  when  the  Confederates  had  broken  through 
CaldwelFs  lines,  and  Wright's  brigade  was  advanc 
ing  toward  the  crest  of  Cemetery  Ridge;  in  order 
to  gain  the  necessary  time  to  interpose  a  brigade 
from  Sykes'  oncoming  corps,  General  Hancock 
ordered  a  single  regiment  —  the  First  Minnesota, 
which  was  the  only  one  obtainable  —  to  charge  in 
and  delay  the  advancing  foe.  The  regiment 
advanced  with  two  hundred  and  sixty-two  men  in 
line,  meeting  a  brigade  of  the  enemy  and  losing 
within  the  space  of  fifteen  minutes  two  hundred  and 
twenty-five  in  killed  and  wounded,  or  eighty-six  per 
cent  of  their  whole  number;  but  they  checked  the 
Confederate  advance  and  held  their  ground  against 

[259] 


GETTYSBURG 

them  until  Hancock  was  enabled  to  supply  re 
inforcements. 

Here  was  a  display  of  heroism  and  endurance 
that  threw  Pickett's  Charge  of  the  following  day 
far  into  the  shade.  The  charge  of  the  Six 
Hundred  at  Balaklava,  October  twenty-fifth,  1854, 
and  the  charge  of  Pickett's  six  thousand  at  Gettys 
burg  on  the  third  of  July,  1863,  were  both  sur 
passed  by  the  charge  of  this  less  than  three  hundred 
at  Gettysburg  on  the  second  of  July,  1863;  for 
there  the  brave  Minnesotans  accomplished  what 
they  undertook.  Both  Lord  Cardigan's  charge 
with  his  Light  Brigade,  and  Pickett's  Charge  with 
his  three  brigades  were  failures,  the  latter  being  a 
terrible  defeat ;  but  the  charge  of  the  First  Minne 
sota  was  a  success  —  a  victory.  They  held  their 
ground,  and  when  the  battle  was  over  they  were  all 
there,  not  a  man  missing,  every  man  accounted  for: 
fifty  killed,  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  wounded, 
thirty-seven  still  in  battle-line,  and  the  line  in  their 
keeping. 

In  behalf  of  the  Iron  Brigade,  which  lost  sixty- 
four  per  cent  of  its  number  at  Gettysburg — more 

[260] 


FIRST  MINNESOTA  INFANTRY  SHAFT 

Marking  Spot  of  Regiment's  Stand  Against  Charge  of 
Wright's  Brigade 


SECOND  WISCONSIN  INFANTRY 

MONUMENT 
On  Spot  Where  Firxt  /)«//'*  Battle  Opened 


GETTYSBURG 

than  any  other  brigade  in  either  army ;  in  behalf  of 
the  Second  Wisconsin  Infantry,  which  lost  a  larger 
percentage  of  killed  and  wounded  than  any  other 
regiment  in  the  Union  army  during  the  war,  the 
old  veteran  respectfully  takes  off  his  hat  to  the 
First  Minnesota. 


[261] 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE  "BLOODY  ANGLE"  AND  THE  "HIGH  TIDE" 
A  T  the  time  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  the 
•*•  Umbrella  Grove,  of  rock-oaks  mostly,  was 
a  copse,  and  after  many  years  the  old  veteran 
returning  to  the  fields  of  Gettysburg  found  it 
still  a  clump  of  dwarfed  trees,  apparently  stunted 
in  growth  from  the  fact  that  it  stands  on  a  rocky 
knob.  Just  north  of  this  grove  there  is  what 
appears  to  have  been  a  small  field  or  pasture, 
enclosed  on  three  sides  with  a  stone  wall,  and 
extending  to  the  front  or  westward  about  a  hundred 
yards.  On  the  day  of  the  battle,  the  western  wall 
was  used  for  a  breastwork  of  defence;  it  sheltered 
Hancock's  infantry  against  Armistead's  oncoming 
troopers.  Within  the  enclosure  (the  rear  wall 
having  been  removed  to  give  place  to  Hancock 
Avenue)  and  thirty  yards  in  rear  of  the  front  wall, 
stood  Cushing's  battery.  A  marker  designates  the 
spot  where  Lieutenant  Gushing  fell  dead,  as  he 

[262] 


GETTYSBURG 

fired  his  last  shot.     The  front  wall  is  the  same  over 
which  Armistead  led  his  followers  to  their  doom. 

This  wall-enclosed  square  or  field  is  called  the 
"  Bloody  Angle,"  and  is  designated  on  the  "  Map 
and  Monumental  Guide  of  the  Gettysburg  Battle 
fields,"  and  by  all  or  nearly  all  who  have  attempted 
to  describe  it,  as  the  "high  tide  of  Gettysburg." 
The  visitor  who  journeys  far  to  see  this  historic 
battlefield,  usually  procures  a  carriage,  the  driver 
acting  as  guide,  and  is  driven  out  on  Washington 
Street  till  it  merges  into  the  Taneytown  Road, 
thence  along  that  road  and  Hancock  Avenue  until 
this  point  is  reached.  There  the  guide,  as  he  pur 
ports  to  be,  recounts  his  story  of  Pickett's  awful 
charge  and  near  success,  with  victory  almost  within 
his  grasp,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  verge  of 
defeat  and  dissolution,  while  the  life  of  the  nation 
trembled  in  the  balance,  etc. ;  and  the  visitor,  look 
ing  across  the  valley  to  the  wooded  crest  of  Semi 
nary  Ridge,  from  which  Pickett's  division  marched 
forth  to  its  doom,  thinks  he  has  seen  the  battle 
field  of  Gettysburg,  or  at  least  all  of  it  worth  the 
seeing,  and  that  he  is  actually  standing  on  the  line 

[263] 


GETTYSBURG 

—  the  identical  spot  and  point  —  demarcating  the 
culmination  of  the  "high  tide"  of  the  Rebellion. 
But  the  visitor  is  misled;  the  guide  is  in  error. 
Standing  at  the  Bloody  Angle  the  battlefields 
of  Gettysburg  are  all  around  you,  to  the  west,  to 
the  northwest,  to  the  north,  to  the  northeast,  to  the 
east,  to  the  soutK,  and  to  the  southwest;  in  fact 
history  is  at  fault,  and  all  the  poetry  and  eloquence 
expended  for  the  past  forty-seven  years  on  Pickett's 
Charge  as  the  one  supreme  event  in  American 
history,  by  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in 
imminent  danger  of  being  wiped  from  the  face  of 
the  earth,  and  the  life  of  the  Republic  hung  by  a 
thread,  have  been  wasted  —  indeed,  worse  than 
wasted,  for  they  have  served  to  bury  the  truth  of 
history  beneath  a  high  tide  of  delusive  nonsense. 

All  about  the  umbrella  copse  and  within  the  wall- 
enclosed  field  where  Cushing's  battery  stood,  and 
outside  the  wall  far  down  the  valley  to  the  Emmets- 
burg  Road  and  beyond,  was  bloody  enough  on  that 
third  day  of  July,  1863,  but  there  were  dozens  of 
other  angles  on  the  fields  and  hillsides  and  in  the 
valleys  around  Gettysburg,  that  were  equally 

[264] 


o 


3.  H 

I 

w 


I 


o 
o 

^ 

PQ 


fe 
O 

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w 
o 


GETTYSBURG 

bloody;  and  when  Pickett's  mad  charge  was  made, 
the  danger-hour  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and 
for  the  nation  that  that  army  defended  had  passed 
fully  eighteen  hours  before.  A  great  writer  once 
said,  "All  history  is  a  lie,"  and  in  a  measure  that 
statement  is  true.  No  better  proof  of  that  truth 
can  be  cited  than  the  fact  that  poets,  historians, 
orators,  map-makers,  monument-makers,  guides, 
and  visitors  of  this  great  battlefield,  have  all  fallen 
readily  into  the  same  rut  of  untruth,  outlined  by 
the  first  despatch  from  Gettysburg  after  the  hard- 
won  victory  was  fully  assured,  that  the  danger- 
point  was  the  umbrella  copse  and  the  danger-hour 
the  time  of  Pickett's  Charge,  successfully  repelled. 

The  object,  therefore,  of  this  chapter  is  to  correct 
that  error,  if  such  may  now  be  possible,  while  some 
who  participated  in  the  great  battle  are  still  living 
and  can  testify  to  the  truth  of  the  statements  herein 
contained. 

That  the  "high  tide"  of  the  Confederacy  culmi 
nated  at  Gettysburg,  there  can  be  no  dispute. 
Lee's  army  was  then  at  the  zenith  of  its  power,  and 
opened  the  battle  in  full  confidence  of  its  strength 

[265] 


GETTYSBURG 

and  ability  to  win  a  sweeping  and  far-reaching 
victory.  From  every  reasonable  human  stand 
point,  Lee  should  have  won  the  Battle  of  Gettys 
burg.  He  commanded  a  powerful  and  previously 
victorious  army,  and  the  confidence  and  faith  of 
every  officer  and  every  soldier  of  that  army  in  the 
wise  generalship  and  supreme  genius  of  their  leader 
amounted  to  a  superstition. 

In  the  battle  of  July  first  Lee's  "high  tide"  of 
victory  culminated,  sweeping  the  Union  army  from 
the  field,  and  it  looked  very  much  as  though  he  were 
destined  to  accomplish  all  that  the  Richmond 
oligarchy  expected  from  him.  In  the  battle  of  the 
second  of  July  there  was  no  "  high  tide  "  of  victory 
for  either  army ;  but  there  was  an  appalling  danger 
from  the  Confederate  battle-line,  rolling  in  against 
the  Union  front,  like  a  mighty  surge  of  the  sea, 
from  Little  Round  Top  to  Rock  Creek. 

The  danger-hour  and  the  bloody  sunset  hour  of 
that  terrible  day  were  one  and  the  same.  There  we 
find  the  "high  tide"  of  the  Confederacy,  not  only 
for  Gettysburg  but  for  the  war,  when  the  vortex 
of  battle  surged  up  toward  Cemetery  Ridge ;  when 

[  266] 


GETTYSBURG 

Sickles  and  Brooke,  bleeding  and  disabled,  were 
out  of  the  fight,  and  Willard,  Sherill,  Cross,  and 
Zook  lay  dead  on  the  trampled  and  gory  Wheat- 
field;  when  Weed,  Vincent,  O'Rorke,  and  Hazlett 
were  dying  to  save  Little  Round  Top;  when  the 
First  Minnesota  Infantry  stood  in  the  death-laden 
breach  and  blocked  the  Confederate  advance  with 
their  dead  and  dying  comrades;  when  the  belching 
guns  of  the  Fourth  United  States  and  Fifth  Maine 
Batteries  were  sweeping  Early's  Tigers  from  the 
gates  of  the  Cemetery,  and  Sprigg  Carroll's  bri 
gade  was  dashing  over  rocks  at  a  double,  to  rein 
force  Von  Gilsa's  recoiling  troops;  when  Greene 
with  but  one  brigade  was  holding  Culp's  Hill, 
around  which  the  spume  of  that  surging  tide  lay 
until  the  next  day,  against  Johnson's  division; 
while  Slocum,  leaving  the  right  in  peril,  was  hurry 
ing  away  to  relieve  the  left  from  apparently  a 
greater  peril.  That  was  the  "  high  tide  "  of  danger 
for  America  and  Freedom;  the  bloody  sunset  for 
Lee. 

And  what  about  Pickett's  Charge,  on  the  third 
day  of  July,  the  tragic  third  act  of  this  most  spec- 

[267] 


GETTYSBURG 

tacular  drama  of  battle,  so  frequently  called  the 
Confederate  "high  tide"  at  Gettysburg  ?  As  well 
call  the  last  stand  of  the  Old  Guard  at  La  Haye 
Sainte,  Napoleon's  high  tide  at  Waterloo,  for  that 
was  Napoleon's  high  tide  of  defeat.  But  there 
was  need  for  the  Old  Guard  to  die  !  The  Prus 
sians  on  their  flank  and  the  English  from  Mont  St. 
Jean  were  advancing  in  wild  triumph  and  un 
broken  ranks,  sweeping  the  French  battalions  like 
chaff  before  the  wind.  They  went  to  their  doom 
bravely,  even  cheerfully,  shouting  "Vive  I' 
Empereur  1" — recognizing  the  necessity  of  the  sac 
rifice.  They  could  not  stem  the  victorious  tide,  but 
they  died  heroically,  thereby  saving  the  life  of  their 
great  Emperor  for  a  more  humiliating  and  cruel 
fate.  They  could  not  save  his  cause.  There  was 
no  such  need,  no  necessity  whatever  for  the  sacrifice 
of  Pickett's  and  Pettigrew's  divisions  by  Lee,  for 
his  life  was  not  in  danger,  nor  his  liberty  at  stake; 
though  his  cause  on  that  field,  and  all  future  fields, 
was  lost  beyond  redemption,  his  position  on  Semi 
nary  Ridge  was  secure,  and  his  road  open  for  a  safe 

[268] 


GETTYSBURG 

retreat.  Pickett's  double  column  went  to  their 
doom  as  bravely  as  Napoleon's  Old  Guard.  They 
passed  through  the  "jaws  of  death"  and  into  the 
"  mouth  of  hell." 

Not  more  than  fifty  of  Pickett's  six  thousand 
reached  the  Bloody  Angle  in  front  and  just  to  the 
north  of  the  Umbrella  Grove,  and  followed  Armi- 
stead  over  the  stone  wall,  Hancock's  outmost  line, 
into  the  enclosure ;  and  not  one  of  that  fifty  returned 
to  Seminary  Ridge  to  tell  Pickett  or  Longstreet  or 
Lee  the  story  of  his  adventure. 

Longstreet  knew  it  was  butchery,  not  war,  and 
wept  as  he  saw  his  brave  soldiers  sent  to  their  doom. 
In  his  normal  condition  of  mind  Lee  would  have 
recognized  at  once  the  fact  known  to  every  other 
officer  and  every  soldier  in  his  army,  eighteen  hours 
before,  that  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  was  irretriev 
ably  lost  to  him;  but  the  finger  of  God,  seemingly, 
had  paralyzed  his  brain  or  stricken  his  soul  with  the 
madness  of  desire  to  snatch  victory  from  defeat. 

When  Pickett's  division  was  annihilated,  and  the 
victory  assured  to  the  Union  army,  then,  and  not 

[269  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

till  then,  Lee  recognized  the  fact  that  his  defeat  had 
swept  him  forever  from  the  fulfilment  of  his  dream, 
and  he  turned  to  the  Hagerstown  Road  and  the  land 
beyond  the  Potomac. 


[270] 


MONUMENT  TO  OUSTER'S 
CAVALRY  BRIGADE 


0  I3 


APPENDIX 

THE  TOWERS  OF  GETTYSBURG 

TN  the  days  of  the  great  battle  there  was  but  one 
•*  tower  of  observation  within  the  city  that  served 
the  purpose  of  a  viewpoint  of  the  battlefields.  That 
tower  was  the  cupola  of  the  Seminary  on  Seminary 
Ridge,  and  was  used  by  General  Buford,  General 
Reynolds,  and  General  Howard  on  the  first  day  of 
July,  and  by  Lee  on  the  second  and  third,  to  view 
therefrom  not  only  their  own,  but  the  enemy's  lines. 

Now  there  are,  besides  the  cupola,  five  steel 
towers,  ranging  from  sixty-five  to  seventy-five  feet 
in  height,  standing  on  the  most  prominent  points 
of  elevation  overlooking  the  old  battlefields  of 
Gettysburg. 

These  towers  were  erected  by  the  Government, 
at  a  cost  of  fifty  thousand  dollars,  expressly  for 
observation  purposes,  and  the  grand  and  far-reach 
ing  views  to  be  obtained  from  their  summits  should 
not  be  overlooked  or  neglected  by  any  person  who 

[271] 


GETTYSBURG 

may  have  the  good  fortune  to  visit  this  greatest 
of  American  battlefields. 

I 

It  was  a  lovely  morning  in  May,  many  years 
after  the  war,  when  all  nature  was  clothed  afresh  in 
the  garments  of  renewed  life  and  vigour,  that  we 
wended  our  way  from  out  the  peaceful  city,  along 
the  Mummasburg  Road  to  the  point  where  it 
crosses  the  Seminary  Ridge,  and  there  ascended  the 
tower,  that  from  this  central  position  overlooks  the 
battlefield  of  July  first,  1863. 

Standing  on  the  summit  of  that  tower  we  looked 
southward,  far  down  Seminary  Ridge  and  Rey 
nolds  Avenue,  to  its  point  of  termination,  and  then 
westward  over  Buford  Avenue  and  Reynolds' 
Woods  to  Willoughby  Run  and  the  wooded  hills 
beyond.  Eastward  Howard  Avenue  crosses  the 
valley  from  the  Mummasburg  Road  below,  to  Rock 
Creek;  and  southeastward  lies  Gettysburg  in  beauty 
and  in  peace. 

The  battle-lines  held  by  the  old  First  Corps  on 
July  first,  and  especially  where  with  our  brigade 

[272] 


GETTYSBURG 

we  fought  from  the  eastern  edge  of  Reynolds' 
Woods  to  and  beyond  Willoughby  Run;  then  back 
again  through  Reynolds'  Woods  to  Seminary 
Ridge,  where  we  repulsed  Heth's  last  charge,  were 
full  of  glorious  though  sad  recollections.  Along 
those  grand  ridges,  beside  those  sparkling  waters, 
and  on  those  green  and  grassy  slopes,  thousands  of 
our  comrades  endured  wounds  and  suffered  death 
that  other  summer  day,  that  seems  almost  but 
yesterday. 

There  war  in  all  his  fury  reigned  supreme.  The 
smoke  of  battle  hung  above  every  hill.  The  victo 
rious  foe,  with  dancing  flags  on  a  ridge  of  steel, 
swept  down  the  valley  from  the  northward  upon  the 
fair  city  overcome  with  fear.  To-day  the  city 
smiles  in  peace,  the  hills  are  fair  to  look  upon,  the 
orchards  are  fragrant  with  bloom,  and  the  songs 
of  innumerable  birds  fill  all  the  air.  Peace  reigns 
o'er  the  land,  and  war  is  a  memory  of  the  past. 

II 

Descending  from  that  tower  and  following  the 
trend  of  Seminary  Ridge  southward;  crossing  the 

[  273  1 


GETTYSBURG 

railroad,  and  the  Chambersburg  Pike;  passing 
Lee's  old  headquarters  and  the  Seminary  with  its 
old-time  cupola;  crossing  the  Hagerstown  Road, 
far  down  Confederate  Avenue  we  arrived  at  the 
point  where  the  Wheat  field  Road  intersects  Semi 
nary  Ridge.  Here  is  the  central  point  of  obser 
vation  in  the  Confederate  battle-line  of  July  second.. 
Ascending  the  tower,  from  its  summit  we  look 
westward  and  behold  the  wooded  slopes  of  Semi 
nary  Ridge  and  the  rocky  valley  of  Willoughby 
Run  far  below.  To  the  eastward  the  wide,  diver 
sified  valley  stretches  away  to  the  feet  of  the  Round 
Tops,  heavy  with  the  verdure  of  Spring,  and  sweet 
with  the  perfume  of  flowers.  Before  our  eyes  are 
the  Emmetsburg  Road,  and  the  white  monuments 
demarcating  Humphreys'  battle-line;  and  beyond, 
Cemetery  Ridge,  which  Longstreet  struggled  long 
and  desperately  to  reach.  All  is  now  loveliness  and 
peace.  The  marks  of  battle  have  been  effaced. 
The  old  Wheatfield,  reaped  of  its  appalling  death- 
harvest,  now  waves  with  a  renewed  and  luxuriant 
growth  that  shall  not  be  trodden  under  the  feet  of 
men  in  the  mad  strife  of  battle;  nor  shall  the  fruit 

[274] 


GETTYSBURG 

of  the  young  Peach  Orchard,  now  a  huge  bouquet 
of  fragrant  loveliness,  standing  where  the  old 
Peach  Orchard  stood  in  Sickles'  Salient,  be 
gathered  in  blood. 

Ill 

Leaving  Confederate  Avenue  and  Seminary 
Ridge,  we  follow  the  Wheatfield  Road  eastward  to 
the  Peach  Orchard  and  Sickles'  Salient;  thence 
along  the  Emmet sburg  Road  up  the  valley  toward 
the  city  until  we  reach  Cemetery  Hill ;  thence  across 
the  cemetery  and  along  Slocum  Avenue  to  the 
rocky  citadel  of  the  right.  Ascending  the  tower 
that  crowns  Gulp's  Hill,  and  standing  on  the  sum 
mit  thereof,  we  see  the  fair  city  apparently  beneath 
us  to  the  northwest. 

Northward  are  woodland,  field,  orchard,  garden, 
and  meadow.  Eastward  is  the  broken  gorge,  the 
wild  valley  of  Rock  Creek.  Southward  are 
innumerable  picturesque  hills,  glens,  rivulets,  and 
glades.  Westward  we  look  down  upon  Cemetery 
Hill,  with  its  imposing  statues  and  towering  mon 
uments,  and  the  starry  flag  of  America  waving 

1275] 


GETTYSBURG 

above  them.  Grand  and  inspiring  is  the  scene. 
Beneath  our  very  feet  Greene's  brigade  held  this 
sublime  fastness  on  the  night  of  July  second, 
against  Johnson's  whole  division;  but  to-day,  only 
the  memories  of  war  remain. 

IV 

Following  Slocum  Avenue  westward,  crossing 
the  Baltimore  Pike  and  the  Cemetery  to  the  Taney- 
town  Road,  thence  southward  along  that  road  and 
Hancock  Avenue,  we  reach  the  crest  of  South 
Cemetery  Hill,  overlooking  the  centre  of  the  Union 
line  of  battle  on  July  third.  From  the  summit  of 
this  tower  we  can  see  Gulp's  Hill  to  the  northeast 
in  all  his  rugged  glory.  Northward  are  the  ceme 
tery  and  the  city.  Southward  stretches  Hancock 
Avenue  far  past  the  Bloody  Angle  and  the  Um 
brella  Grove,  away  to  the  rock-faced  "  key  of  the 
left "  and  his  towering  mate  in  the  distance.  South-, 
westward  the  Emmetsburg  Road  and  Sickles 
Avenue,  with  the  Salient,  Peach  Orchard,  the 
Wheatfield,  and  Death  Valley,  with  their  countless 
monuments,  lie  spread  out  before  us  like  a  huge 

[276] 


GETTYSBURG 

map.    Due  west  stands  Seminary  Ridge,  extending 
to  the  north  and  south  far  as  the  eye  can  reach. 

From  that  high  ridge  beyond  the  peaceful  valley 
more  than  a  mile  away,  across  those  green  and 
flowery  fields,  came  Pickett  and  Pettigrew,  with 
their  thousands  of  devoted  followers,  enveloped  in 
the  clouds  of  war,  and  marching  to  their  death  !  But 
the  storm  of  battle  has  passed  forever,  and  all  the 
valley  rejoices  in  the  smiles  of  peace. 


Following  Hancock  Avenue  southward  along 
the  crest  of  the  ridge,  whose  westward  slopes  were 
lapped  by  the  ensanguined  waves  of  the  war's  fierce 
"high  tide";  crossing  the  massive  boulders  that, 
piled  upon  each  other,  form  Little  Round  Top, 
where  Vincent,  Weed,  O'Rorke,  and  Hazlett,  with 
hundreds  of  their  soldiers,  gave  their  lives  in  full 
and  free  devotion  to  their  country's  cause,  during 
that  bloody  sunset  hour,  we  climbed  the  green- 
mantled  eminence  beyond  and  ascended  the  tower. 

Standing  seventy-five  feet  above  the  summit  of 
the  king  of  the  rock-ribbed  hills  of  Gettysburg,  we 

[277] 


GETTYSBURG 

are  also  lifted  up  in  a  spirit  of  heavenly  light  and 
joy,  from  which  we  look  down  upon  everything 
that  is  earthly. 

What  a  glory  is  Round  Top  !  The  pines  and 
the  rock-oaks  clothe  him  in  garments  of  green  from 
his  base  to  his  summit,  and  the  pilgrim  above  on  his 
tower  looks  down  o'er  the  sides  of  a  mountain 
clothed  in  feathery  branches.  To  the  eastward  and 
westward  in  the  distance,  the  wooded  ridges  limit 
the  vision.  Southward  the  glorious  valley  stretches 
afar.  Northward  are  the  old  battlefields  —  the 
homes  of  the  living,  the  graves  of  the  dead,  the 
dwarfed  hills,  the  low-lying  valleys,  and  the  far 
away  city. 

Here  all  is  beauty  and  peace  !  The  old  veteran 
dreams,  and  even  the  memories  of  war  are  for 
gotten.  He  forgets  the  past,  with  its  strife  and 
turmoil,  forgets  the  present  with  its  cares  and  its 
burdens,  while  within  this  holy  temple  in  mid-air  he 
communes  in  spirit  with  the  Great  Master ! 

Oh,  who  can  describe  Round  Top,  and  paint  the 

scene  from  his  tower  ?    And  who  can  translate  to 

^  ;C 

mortal  ears  the  voices,  there  heard  by  the  spirit  ? 

[278] 


EAST  CEMETERY  HILL 


SCENE  OF  CAVALRY  FIGHT,  THIRD  DAY 


GETTYSBURG 


THE  NATIONAL  CEMETERY  AND  PARK 

A  T  the  time  of  the  great  battle  the  City  Ceme- 
-^*b  tery  stood  where  it  still  stands,  its  northern 
boundary  extending  across  or  near  the  summit  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  while  the  main  portion  thereof 
occupied  the  southern  slope.  The  eastern  gate  of 
the  City  Cemetery  opened  on  the  Baltimore  Pike 
near  the  northeast  corner  of  the  enclosure,  and  the 
Baltimore  Pike  formed  its  eastern  boundary,  while 
the  western  boundary  was  formed  by  the  Taney- 
town  Road,  on  which  its  west  gate  opened.  During 
the  battle  the  Union  line  ran  across  Cemetery  Hill, 
along  or  near  the  northern  wall  of  this  old  City 
Cemetery. 

North  of  the  City  Cemetery,  and  lying  between 
the  Baltimore  Pike  and  Taneytown  Road  on  a 
broad  plateau  slightly  sloping  toward  the  north,  lies 
the  National  Cemetery.  In  the  days  of  the  battle 
this  plateau  was  rough  and  rocky,  and  in  a  wild  and 
uncultivated  condition.  The  Gettysburg  Cemetery 

[279] 


GETTYSBURG 

Company  was  organized  and  incorporated  by  the 
State  of  Pennsylvania  shortly  after  the  battle,  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  here  a  soldiers'  ceme 
tery.  These  grounds  were  dedicated  for  that  pur 
pose  on  the  nineteenth  of  November,  1863.  In  1872 
the  State  of  Pennsylvania  assigned  it  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States. 

The  cemetery  has  been  beautified  and  adorned 
with  great  care  and  expense,  and  the  soldiers  who 
died  at  Gettysburg  in  defence  of  the  flag  and  the 
Union  are  buried  here  in  sections,  comprising  a 
large  semi-circular  plat,  each  of  the  eighteen  States 
represented  in  the  battle  occupying  a  section ;  beside 
which  there  in  a  section  for  United  States  Regulars, 
and  a  section  for  the  Unknown  Dead — which  is  the 
largest  section  of  them  all.  The  States  repre 
sented  and  the  number  of  their  soldiers,  the  total 
amounting  to  three  thousand,  five  hundred  and 
fifty-three,  are  as  follows : 

Maine        .        .  .  .      '  ;  «  104 

New  Hampshire  ,.*  .,        ,  >  49 

Vermont     .         .  ,  .,  .,        •  •  61 

Massachusetts     .  .  '••"'•  •  159 

Rhode  Island  .  .  ,  V       i  V  ;  12 

[280] 


GETTYSBURG 

Connecticut         .       \       V       •        *  22 

New  York          «       ..         .         .         .  861 

New  Jersey         .....  78 

Delaware  .         .         .         ...  15 

Maryland   .        .        .        »        .         .  22 

West  Virginia    .         .         .         .         •  11 

Ohio  .         .         .         .         .         .        .  131 

Indiana       .         .         .         .         .         .  80 

Illinois        ......  6 

Michigan   * 171 

Wisconsin  ......  73 

Minnesota  ......  52 

Pennsylvania   '  .         .         .         .         .  534 

U.  S.  Regulars 133 

Unknown  Dead          .         .  .979 

Among  those  here  buried  the  old  veteran  found 
the  name  of  George  H.  Stevens,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  of  his  regiment,  the  Second  Wisconsin;  and 
also  the  names  of  three  of  his  comrades  of  Company 
H  —  Lieutenant  William  S.  Winegar  and  Privates 
Henry  C.  McCollum  and  Edward  H.  Heath;  also 
the  name  of  Sergeant  Walter  S.  Rouse  of  Com 
pany  E,  all  of  whom  were  killed  on  July  first,  1863, 
between  Seminary  Ridge  and  Willoughby  Run. 
McCollum  was  his  tentmate,  and  in  the  same  file 
when  they  went  into  battle. 

[281] 


GETTYSBURG 

Not  all  the  men  who  died  in  the  great  battle  were 
buried  in  this  cemetery.  Some,  more  especially 
officers,  who  had  friends  near-by  that  could  reach 
the  battlefield  in  season,  were  taken  to  their  homes 
for  burial.  Some  were  buried  where  they  fell,  and 
thereafter  the  ground  was  so  trodden  that  their 
graves  were  unrecognizable.  While  the  old  veteran 
was  visiting  the  field,  the  skeletons  of  three  Union 
soldiers  were  found  on  the  hillside  not  far  from 
Spangler's  Spring,  where  the  ground  was  being 
excavated  for  the  improvement  of  the  avenue ;  and 
probably  there  are  many  others  that  will  never  be 
found.  Then,  the  old  veteran  was  told  by  old  men 
who  resided  in  Gettysburg  in  the  days  of  the  battle, 
and  after,  that  from  Baltimore,  Philadelphia, 
Harrisburg,  Washington,  and  other  cities,  there 
came  medical  students  and  others  seeking  after 
subjects  for  the  medical  institutions  of  those  cities; 
and  beyond  all  doubt  or  question,  they  carried  many 
corpses  away  for  that  purpose. 

At  the  converging  of  this  semicircular  plat  stands 
the  Soldiers'  National  Monument.  It  is  sixty  feet 
in  height  and  twenty-five  feet  square  at  its  base, 

[282] 


GETTYSBURG 

crowned  with  a  statue  representing  the  Genius  of 
Liberty.  Projecting  from  the  four  corners  are  alle 
gorical  statues  representing  War,  History,  Peace, 
and  Plenty.  Those  figures  were  made  in  Italy  by 
Randolph  Rogers. 

This  monument  was  dedicated  on  July  first,  1869, 
on  which  occasion  Bayard  Taylor  contributed  an 
ode;  Governor  Morton  of  Indiana  delivered  the 
oration;  and  General  Meade  made  an  address. 

The  Confederate  soldiers  from  fourteen  States, 
who  died  at  Gettysburg,  were  buried  in  temporary 
graves,  as  the  Union  soldiers  were;  but  later  their 
bones  were  collected  and  carried  back  to  the  South 
land,  where  they  were  finally  buried;  so  that  none 
but  Union  soldiers  rest  in  the  National  Cemetery  at 
Gettysburg. 

The  battlefield  of  Gettysburg  in  the  hands  of  the 
United  States  became  a  National  Military  Park  in 
the  sense  of  the  battle-lines  being  restored  to  and 
kept  in  the  condition  in  which  they  were  at  the  time 
of  the  battle.  The  work  done  for  decorative  pur 
poses  has  been  with  the  view  of  making  the  old  lines 
more  accessible.  The  lines  of  breastworks  and  the 

[283] 


GETTYSBURG 

old  buildings  and  stone  walls,  which  served  as  land 
marks  at  the  time  of  the  battle  and  were  afterward 
destroyed,  have,  as  far  as  possible,  been  restored  to 
their  former  condition. 

The  Secretary  of  War  appointed  three  Battle 
field  Commissioners,  all  of  whom  were  participants 
in  the  battle.  When  the  old  veteran  was  on  the 
field  this  Commission  was  composed  of  Colonel  John 
P.  Nicholson,  Twenty-eighth  Pennsylvania  In 
fantry;  Major  C.  A.  Richardson,  One  Hundred 
and  Twenty-sixth  New  York  Infantry;  Major  Wm. 
M.  Robbins,  Fourth  Alabama  Infantry. 

By  Act  of  Congress  in  1895,  the  battlefield 
became  a  United  States  Military  Park,  whereupon 
the  Memorial  Association  transferred  its  grounds, 
amounting  to  about  eight  hundred  acres,  with  many 
hundreds  of  beautiful  monuments  erected  by  the 
people  of  the  various  States,  to  the  care  and  protec 
tion  of  the  United  States.  The  battlefields  in 
all  are  three  miles  wide  by  five  miles  long,  and 
contain  about  fifteen  square  miles  of  territory.  The 
various  avenues,  together  with  Reynolds'  Woods, 
Gulp's  Hill,  Spangler's  Spring,  Cemetery  Hill,  the 

[284] 


GETTYSBURG 

Umbrella  Grove,  Seminary  Ridge,  the  Em- 
metsburg  Road,  the  Peach  Orchard,  the  Wheat- 
field,  the  Devil's  Den,  Death  Valley,  and  the  Round 
Tops  are  owned  or  controlled  by  the  United  States, 
and  constitute  the  grandest  National  Park  in 
America. 

The  Commission  has  caused  to  be  built  and  opened 
many  macadamized  driveways,  generally  along  the 
rear  of  the  old  battle-lines,  and  has  marked  the  posi 
tion  of  each  corps,  division,  and  brigade,  so  that  the 
locations  of  troops  on  both  sides  may  be  visited  in 
carriages. 

The  names  of  the  avenues  as  located  at  the  time 
the  old  veteran  visited  the  fields  were:  Reynolds, 
Hancock,  Sickles,  Sykes,  Sedgwick,  Slocum, 
Howard,  Meade,  Buford,  Pleasonton,  Gregg,  Kil- 
patrick,  Devin,  Merritt,  Neill,  Wright,  Excelsior, 
United  States,  Crawford,  and  Brooke.  Confeder 
ate  Avenue,  which  stretches  the  length  of  Seminary 
Ridge,  is  divided  and  apportioned  among  the  Con 
federate  corps  commanders,  Longstreet,  Ewell, 
Hill,  and  Stuart. 

This  park,  although  the  best  preserved  and 
[  285  ] 


GETTYSBURG 

grandest  of  the  battlefields  of  the  earth,  is  still  being 
improved  and  beautified  wherever  possible,  without 
disturbing  any  of  the  battle  landmarks,  and  it  is 
hoped  that  from  every  portion  of  our  broad  country 
thousands  of  people  will  visit  this  sacred  field. 

The  Soldiers'  National  Monument,  standing  in  a 
central  and  commanding  position  in  the  National 
Cemetery  at  Gettysburg,  was  formally  dedicated  on 
the  first  day  of  July,  1869. 

On  the  very  spot  where  stands  the  National  Monu 
ment,  stood  the  immortal  Lincoln  when  he  made 
his  world-renowned  Address  at  the  dedication  of 
the  cemetery  grounds  on  the  nineteenth  of  No 
vember,  1863. 


[286] 


GETTYSBURG 


LINCOLN'S  GETTYSBURG  ADDRESS  AT  THE  DEDICATION 
OF  THE  NATIONAL  CEMETERY 

November  19, 1863. 

FOUR  score  and  seven  years  ago  our  fathers 
brought  forth  upon  this  continent  a  new  nation,  con 
ceived  in  liberty,  and  dedicated  to  the  proposition 
that  all  men  are  created  equal. 

Now  we  are  engaged  in  a  great  civil  war,  testing 
whether  that  nation  or  any  nation  so  conceived  and 
so  dedicated  can  long  endure.  We  are  met  on  a 
great  battlefield  of  that  war.  We  are  met  to  dedi 
cate  a  portion  of  it  as  the  final  resting-place  for  those 
who  here  gave  their  lives  that  that  nation  might  live. 
It  is  altogether  fitting  and  proper  that  we  should  do 
this. 

But,  in  a  larger  sense,  we  cannot  dedicate,  we 
cannot  consecrate,  we  cannot  hallow  this  ground. 
The  brave  men,  living  and  dead,  who  struggled  here 
have  consecrated  it  far  above  our  power  to  add  or 
detract.  The  world  will  little  note  nor  long  re- 

[287] 


GETTYSBURG 

member  what  we  say  here,  but  it  can  never  forget 
what  they  did  here.  It  is  for  us,  the  living,  rather, 
to  be  dedicated  here  to  the  unfinished  work  that  they 
have  thus  far  so  nobly  carried  on.  It  is  rather  for 
us  to  be  here  dedicated  to  the  great  task  remaining 
before  us,  that  from  these  honoured  dead  we  take  in 
creased  devotion  to  that  cause  for  which  they  gave 
the  last  full  measure  of  devotion ;  that  we  here  highly 
resolve  that  the  dead  shall  not  have  died  in  vain; 
that  this  nation  shall,  under  God,  have  a  new  birth 
of  freedom;  and  that  government  of  the  people,  by 
the  people,  and  for  the  people,  shall  not  perish  from 
the  earth. 


THE  END 


[288]] 


INDEX 


INDEX 


ALABAMA,     regiments     from, 

234. 
Alexander,  E.  P.   (General), 

226,  230. 

Ames'  brigade,  197,  200. 
Anderson,    G.    L.,    wounded, 

180. 
Anderson's  division,  103,  110, 

153-156,  168,  171,  177. 
Antietam,  battle  of,  22. 
Appomattox,    significance    of, 

256,  257. 

Archer,  J.  J.  (General),  cap 
ture  of,  66-69. 
Archer's   brigade,   61-66,   69- 

73,  90,  233. 
Armistead,  L.  A.   (General), 

killed,  246. 
Armistead's  brigade,  209,  233, 

244,  253,  262,  263,  269. 

BALAKLAVA,  battle  of,  com 
pared,  260. 

Baltimore  Pike,  45,  58,  201, 
203,  218,  223. 

Barksdale,  Wm.  (General), 
wounded,  180. 

Barksdale's  brigade,  175. 

Barlow's  division,  89. 

Beckham,  ,  210. 

Benning's  brigade,  189. 

Berdan's  sharpshooters,  190. 

Bigelow,  Captain,  175,  176. 

Birney's  division,  155,  156, 
158,  159,  165-167,  174- 
177,  182,  187. 


"  Black  Hats,"  the,  64,  93. 
"Bloody    Angle,"    the,    246, 

262-264,  269. 
Brockenbrough's  brigade,  70, 

233. 
Brooke,   John    R.    (Colonel), 

176,  181,  267. 

Bryan,  Jonathan  (Sergeant), 
killed,  67. 

Buford's  division,  44,  45,  49- 
51,  60-64,  70,  74,  75,  103- 
105,  109,  112,  124,  137. 

Burnside,  Ambrose  E.  (Gen 
eral),  23,  24,  100,  254,  255. 

CALDWELL'S      division,      176, 

177,  259. 

"  Cannoneer,"  the,  quoted,  82- 
85,  240,  241. 

Carlisle,  Pa.,  211. 

Carlisle  Road,  44,  57. 

Carroll's  brigade,  200,  267. 

Cemetery  Hill,  52,  55,  58,  75, 
89,  96,  105,  109,  124,  126, 
130,  132,  134,  140-143,  147, 
149,  168,  170,  172,  181, 
186,  194-200,  230,  232,  238, 
240-243,  252,  258. 

Cemetery,  the  National,  at 
Gettysburg,  founding  of, 
279,  280;  States  repre 
sented  in,  280,  281. 

Cemetery  Ridge,  58,  105,  143- 
145,  158,  160,  163,  177, 
179,  185-189,  238,  266. 


[  291  ] 


INDEX 


Chambersburg,  Pa.,  37,  42, 
43,  153,  209. 

Chambersburg  Pike,  38,  44, 
45,  56,  68,  80,  92,  97,  101, 
247. 

Chancellorsville,  battle  of,  25, 
27,  119,  129. 

Codori  House,  150,  238. 

Commission,  Gettysburg  Na 
tional  Park,  Members  of, 
284. 

Corps.  See  respective  nu 
merical  or  other  designa 
tions  (Eleventh,  Signal, 
etc.). 

Coster's  brigade,  75,  89,  90, 
242,  243. 

Cross,  Edward  E.  (Colonel), 
176,  181,  267. 

Culp's  Hill,  54,  55,  105,  135, 
184,  196-207,  215-220,  267. 

Cumberland  Valley,  37,  38, 
42,  43,  211. 

Cushing,  Lieutenant,  killed, 
245. 

Cushing's  battery,  262,  264. 

Custer's  brigade,  223. 

Cutler's  brigade,  70. 

DANIEL'S    brigade,    76,    215, 

220. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  27. 
Davison,  Sergeant,  83,  84,  88. 
Davis's  brigade,  70,  71,  233. 
Death  Valley,  178,  185,  191. 
De  Trobriand's  brigade,  166. 
Devil's    Den,   158,    162,    166, 

174,    176,    178,    186,    189- 

191. 
Doles'  brigade,  76. 


Doubleday,  Abner  (General), 

93-96,  132,  232. 
Dow,  Charles   (Captain),  66, 

67. 

EARLY'S  division,  38-40,  43, 
51,  89-92,  95,  104,  135, 
197-200,  215,  216,  224,  252, 
267. 

Edwards's  Ferry,  42. 

Eleventh  Corps  (Federal), 
34,  45,  50,  51,  60,  74-76, 
90-92,  95,  104,  105,  112, 
125,  130,  132,  136,  137, 
170,  197-199,  201,  242, 
248,  249. 

Emancipation  Proclamation, 
results  of  issuing  the,  22- 
24. 

Emmetsburg,  Pa.,  45,  50,  58, 
60. 

Emmetsburg  Road,  58,  61,  62, 
140-159,  164,  166-172,  207, 
208,  240-244,  264. 

Emmetsburg  Road  Ridge,  55, 
58,  97,  141,  142,  147. 

Ewell,  R.  S.  (General),  37, 
38,  152,  216. 

FAIRCHILD,  COLONEL,  62,  66. 

Farnsworth,  General,  charge 
of,  246,  247. 

Fifth  Corps  (Federal),  34,  52, 
53,  128,  138,  144,  145,  148, 
183,  187,  188,  192-195,  204, 
248,  249,  259. 

Fifth  U.  S.  artillery,  Battery 
D,  189. 

First  Corps  (Confederate), 
28,  107,  135,  142,  153-159, 
161,  164,  165,  167,  169, 
172,  176,  179,  182,  187, 


F2921 


INDEX 


First  Corps  (Confederate), 
cont'd — 

188,  191-194,  209,  224-226, 
230,  231,  233-237,  239-241, 
250,  269. 

First  Corps  (Federal),  34, 
45,  50,  51,  60,  61,  63,  70, 
74,  76,  80,  83,  93-96,  104, 
105,  112,  119-122,  124,125, 
137,  170,  201,  216,  232, 

243,  248,  249. 

Fourth  U.  S.  artillery,  Bat 
tery  A,  245. 

Fourth  U.  S.  artillery,  Bat 
tery  B,  80-85,  94,  199,  240, 
.241,  267. 

Fredericksburg,  battle  of,  22, 
254. 

Fry,  Colonel,  70. 

GAMBLE'S  brigade,  61. 
Garnett's   brigade,   209,   233, 

244,  253. 

Geary's  division,  217-219. 

Gettysburg  and  vicinity,  de 
scription  of,  54-59. 

Gettysburg  Battlefield  Me 
morial  Association,  284. 

Gibbon,  John  (General),  219, 
245. 

Gordon,  John  B.  (General), 
39-41,  90-93,  102,  216. 

Gordon,  John  B.  (General), 
quoted,  35,  39-41,  90,  91, 
102,  107. 

Gordon's  brigade,  39-42,  90, 
91,  216. 

Graham,  C.  K.  (General), 
166. 

Grant,  U.  S.  (General),  quot 
ed,  132. 


Greene,    Geo.    S.    (General), 

183,  202,  203. 
Greene's    brigade,    217,    218, 

252,  267. 
Gregg's  division,  223. 

HAGERSTOWN,  Md.,  37. 
Hagerstown    Road,    59,    110, 

111,    145,    157,    207,    217, 

247,  270. 
Halleck,   H.   W.,    (General), 

43,   130,    134. 
Hall's  battery,  83. 
Hampton,    Wade    (General), 

210. 
Hancock,    W.    S.    (General), 

52,  128,  131-133,  136,  172, 

176,  177,  232,  245,  259. 
Hanover,  Pa.,  211. 
Hanover  Road,  57,  223. 
Harper's  Ferry,  43. 
Harrisburg,  Pa.,  38,  42,  43, 

211. 
Harrisburg  Road,  44,  57. 

Harrison, ,  42. 

Hayes'  brigade,  198. 
Hazlett,     Lieutenant,     killed, 

189. 

Heath,  Edward  H.,  281. 
Heth,       Harry        (General), 

wounded,  90. 
Heth's    division,    44,    49,    51, 

61,  64,  68-70,  103,  104. 
"  High  Tide,"  the,  263-268. 
Hill,  A.  P.  (General),  28,  70, 

135. 

Hoke's  brigade,  198. 
Hood,  J.  B.,  General,  wound 
ed,   176. 
Hood's    brigades,     153,     156, 

160,  165-167,  174. 


[293] 


INDEX 


Hooker,    Joseph     (General), 

24,  25,  37,  42,  43,  100,  129, 

210. 
Howard,    O.    O.     (General), 

74,    75,    90,    96,    125,    130, 

132. 
Humphreys'      division,      155, 

159,  164-177. 
Hunt,    Henry    J.    (General), 

128,  229,  231,  232,  236. 
Hunterstown  Road,  57. 

ILLINOIS,  Eighth  cavalry,  61. 
"  Iron  Brigade,"  the,  63,  76, 

260. 
Iverson's  brigade,  76. 

JOHNSON'S  division,  43,  135, 
184,  200-204,  207,  216-222, 
267. 

Jones, ,  210. 

KEMPER,  J.  L.  (General), 
wounded,  244. 

Kemper's  brigade,  209,  233, 
253. 

Kilpatrick,     Judson      (Gen 
eral),  246. 

Kilpatrick's  division,  211. 

Krzyzanowski,  Colonel,  95. 

LANE'S  brigade,  71,  233. 

Laws,  E.  M.  (General),  176. 

Laws'  division,  177,  186-189. 

Lee,  Fitzhugh  (General), 
210. 

Lee,  R.  E.  (General),  16,  21, 
22,  25,  27-37,  42-45,  49, 
50,  53,  59,  97-111,  123- 
125,  127-129,  135,  138, 
139,  144-146,  152,  167-169, 
172,  194,  196,  206-213, 


216,  217,  220-229,  234-237, 
247,  250,  254,  255,  265- 
270. 

Lee,  W.  H.  F.,  210. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  issues 
Emancipation  Proclama 
tion,  22;  refuses  to  court- 
martial  Sickles,  163;  his 
speech  at  the  dedication  of 
the  National  Cemetery, 
287,  288. 

Little  Round  Top,  150,  178, 
185-195,  201,  252,  266, 
267. 

Lockwood's  brigade,  183,  204. 

Longstreet,  James  (General), 
28,33,69,97,  98,  103,  107, 
135,  145,  151-158,  164, 
165,  167,  169,  176,  179, 
181,  182,  187,  188,  191- 
194,  224-226,  230,  231, 
233-237,  239,  243,  249, 
269. 

Longstreet,  James  (General), 
quoted,  69,  97,  98,  103,  107, 
152,  154,  156,  160,  191- 
193,  208,  211,  224-226, 
230,  231,  233,  235-237, 
243,  247,  250. 

"  Longstreet's  Battle  of  the 
Right,"  153. 

Louisiana  Tigers,  198-200. 

Lutheran  Seminary,  44,  52, 
54,  62,  74,  158,  271. 

MAHONE'S  brigade,  156. 

Maine,  Fifth  artillery,  80,  93, 
197,  199,  267. 

Maine,  Fifth  artillery,  Stev 
ens'  battery,  80,  93,  197, 
199,  267. 


[294] 


INDEX 


Maine,  Second  artillery,  Bat 
tery  B,  80. 

Maine,  Third  infantry,  155. 

Manchester,  Pa.,  128. 

Mansfield,  Major,  88. 

Marsh  Creek,  45,  50. 

Maryland,  Second  infantry, 
203,  219. 

Massachusetts,  Fifth  artillery, 
166. 

Massachusetts,  Ninth  artil 
lery,  166,  175. 

McClellan,  George  B.  (Gen 
eral),  18,  19,  22. 

McCollum,  Henry  C.,  281. 

McLaws'  division,  153,  156, 
168,  176,  177. 

McPherson's  Woods,  see  Rey 
nolds'  Woods. 

Meade,  G.  C.  (General),  34- 
36,  43-46,  50,  52,  104-106, 
123,  124,  127-138,  143-149, 
157,  160-163,  181-183,  194, 
207,  217,  227,  229,  247, 
248,  255,  256,  283. 

Minnesota,  First  infantry, 
258-261,  267. 

Mississippi,  regiments  from, 
234. 

Mitchel,  Sergeant,  84. 

Mummasburg  Road,  44,  45, 
57,  75,  76. 

NATIONAL       Monument       at 

Gettysburg,  282,  286. 
National  Park  at  Gettysburg, 

283-286. 
New    York,    First    artillery, 

Battery  C,  165. 
New    York,    First    artillery, 

Battery  L,  80. 


New    York,    First    infantry, 

155. 
New  York,  One  Hundred  and 

Fortieth  infantry,  189. 
New    York,    Tenth    artillery, 

166. 

Newville  Road,  57. 
Nicholson,  John  P.  (Colonel), 

284. 
North     Carolina,     regiments 

from,  234,  239,  241. 
Northern  Virginia,  Army  of, 

16-18,  20,  21,  27-38,  53,  99, 

100,    107,    108,    190,    249, 

250,  253,  254,  265,  266. 

OAK  HILL,  76. 

"  Old  Abe's  Folly,"  24. 

"  Old  Common  Sense  "  (Gen 
eral  Reynolds),  122. 

O'Neal's  brigade,  76,  215, 
220. 

O'Rorke,  Patrick  H.  (Col,), 
189,  267,  277. 

PACKARD,  CORPORAL,  85. 

Peach  Orchard,  150,  164-173, 
226,  252. 

Pender's  division,  44,  51,  71, 
104,  135. 

Pennsylvania,  Eleventh  in 
fantry,  84. 

Pennsylvania,  First  artillery, 
Battery  B,  80. 

Pennsylvania,  First  artillery, 
Batteries  C  and  F,  165. 

Perrins'  brigade,  71. 

Perry's  brigade,  156. 

Pettigrew's  division,  70,  223, 
233,  234,  239-243,  268. 


[295] 


INDEX 


Pickett's  Charge,  233-246, 
253,  258,  260,  263-270. 

Pickett's  division,  52,  53,  135, 
154-,  208-211,  221-226,  230, 
233-246,  269. 

Pipe  Creek,  45,  123,  127,  130. 

Pleasonton's  cavalry  corps, 
58. 

Plum  Run,  177,  179,  186, 
190. 

Point  of  Rocks,  42. 

Posey's  brigade,  156. 

Potomac,  Army  of,  17-25,  29, 
30,  33-37,  42-46,  53,  58,  64, 
101,  104,  108,  117,  128, 
129,  154,  182,  206,  212, 
245,  248,  249,  252,  263- 
265. 

Potomac  River,  21,  22,  36,  37, 
42,  43,  59,  110,  121,  145, 
157,  210,  222,  247. 

Power's  Hill,  203,  218. 

RAMSEUR'S  brigade,  76. 

Rappahannock  River,  22,  23, 
25,  99,  119. 

Reynolds,  John  F.  (Gen 
eral),  45,  50,  61,62,71,72, 

74,  90,  112,   113,   118-127. 
Reynolds'  Woods,  63,  72,  74, 

76,  88. 
Richardson,   C.    A.    (Major), 

284. 

Ricketts'  battery,  199. 
Robbins,  William  M.  (Maj.), 

284. 

Robertson,  ,  210. 

Robinson's  division,   170. 
Rock  Creek,   54,   55,   57,  58, 

75,  88,  105,  1S5,  136,  184, 


186,  197,201-203,  217-219, 

266. 
Rodes'    division,    44,    51,    76, 

90,  104,  135,  215. 
Rogers,  Randolph,  283. 
Rollins,  Nat  (Captain),  88. 
Round  Top,  55,  58,  136,  140, 

141,    144,    147,    178,    194, 

206,  207. 
Rouse,  Walter  S.  (Sergeant), 

181. 
Ruger's  division,  217,  219. 

"  SABRE  Fight,"  the,  223. 

Scales,  A.  M.  (General), 
wounded,  90. 

Scales'  brigade,  71,  233. 

Schurz's  divisions,  75,  76,  88- 
90,  95,  96. 

Second  Corps  (Confederate), 
34,  37,  38,  42,  76,  89,  103, 
124,  125,  135,  197,  200, 
202,  250. 

Second  Corps  (Federal),  52, 
128,  131,  136,  137,  141- 
150,  157-163,  169,  170, 
176,  179,  181,  182,  187, 
188,  193,  195,  204,  216, 
230,  243,  244,  248,  249, 
262. 

Sedgwick,  John  (General), 
138,  182,  206. 

Seminary  Ridge,  55-57,  62, 
73,  75-90,  92,  94,  97,  98, 
101,  124,  133,  135,  140- 
159,  164,  165,  212,  213, 
224,  227,  229,  238,  239, 
263,  268,  269. 

Semmes,  P.  G.  (General), 
wounded,  176. 

Shaler's  brigade,  217,  220. 


[296] 


INDEX 

Sherill,  E.   (Colonel),  killed,  TANEYTOWN,  Pa.,  45,  50,  51, 

267.  123,  127. 

Sickles,     D.     E.     (General),  Taneytown  Road,  45,  58,  133, 

137,  142-177,  267.  136,  145,  187. 

"  Sickles'    Salient,"    153-177,  Tennessee,     regiments     from, 

187,   194.  234. 

Signal  Corps  (Federal),  186.  Third    Corps    (Confederate), 

Sixth    Corps    (Federal),    34,  28,   34,   70,   73,    103,    110, 

52,  53,  128,  138,  144,  182,  153,  154,  168,  250. 

206,    217,    220,    248,    249,  Third    Corps    (Federal),    45, 

255.  52,  112,  128,  135,  137,  142- 

Slavery,  16,  24,  257-  177,     188,     192-195,     233, 

Slocum,  Henry  W.  (General),  248,  249. 

105,    130,    183,    184,    202,  Thomas's  brigade,  71. 

204,  215-220,     252,     253,  Tilton's   brigade,    188. 

267.  Towers    of    Gettysburg,    the, 

Smith's     brigade,     215,     220,  271-278. 

242.  Trimble,     I.     R.     (General), 

South  Mountain,  38,   43,   59,  233,  243. 

157,  211.  Trostle  House,  174,  175. 

Spangler's  Spring,  202,  204,  Twelfth  Corps  (Federal),  34, 

205.  43,  52,  105,  130,  136,  183, 
Stannard,  George   (General),  184,    201,    202,    204,    217- 

wounded,  245.  220,    248,    252,    253,    267. 
Steinwehr's    division,   75,   89, 

170,    232,    242,    243.  ««  UMBRELLA  Grove,"  the,  258, 

Stevens'  battery,  80,  93,  197,  262,  265,  269. 

199,  267.  Union  Mills,  Pa.,  128. 
Stevens,  George  H.,  281. 

Stewart,  Captain,  83.  VERMONT,First  Infantry,  155. 

Stuart's   cavalry,  28,  36,  42,  Vincent,     Strong     (General), 

52,  53,  57,  207,  210,  211,  wounded,  188,  267. 

221-223.  Vincent's   brigade,    188,    189, 

Susquehanna    River,    38,    40,  194. 

42.  Virginia,  regiments  from,  209, 

Susquehanna  Valley,  38,  43,  234,  239,  241. 

125.  Von  Gilsa's  brigade,  197,  200, 

Sweitzer's  brigade,   188.  267. 

Sykes,   George    (Gen.),    138,  Von     Schimmelfennig,     Gen- 

183,  187,  188.  eral,  95. 
[297] 


INDEX 


WADSWORTH'S     division,     70, 

103,  137,  201. 
Walton,  Colonel,  226. 
Ward's  brigade,  166. 
Warren,    G.    K.     (General), 

185-188. 
"  Washington   artillery,"   the, 

227. 
Washington,  D.  C.,  130,  134, 

157,   208,   213,    250. 
Waterloo,  battle  of,  compared, 

48,  49,  180,  187,  268. 
Weed,  S.  H.  (General),  189, 

267. 
Wheatfield,  the,  177-180,  188, 

191,  202,  252,  259,  267. 
Wheatfield    Road,    148,    150, 

165,  166,   174-177. 
Wilcox's    brigade,    156,    233, 

234. 
Willard,  George  L.  (Colonel), 

killed,  176,  267. 


Willard's  brigade,  172,  175. 

Williamsport,  Pa.,  36. 

Willoughby  Run,  45,  50,  55, 
56,  60,  66,  68,  72,  78. 

Winegar,  William  S.  (Lieu 
tenant),  281. 

Wisconsin,  Second  infantry, 
65-69,  72,  261. 

Wisconsin,  Second  infantry, 
Company  H,  acts  as  color 
guard,  88. 

Wisconsin,  Sixth  infantry,  68, 
84. 

Wolf's  Hill,  219,  223. 

Wright's  brigade,   156,  259. 

Wrightsville,  Pa.,   40. 

YORK,  Pa.,  39-41. 

York  Pike,  39,  43,  57,  89. 

ZOOK,  S.  K.  (General),  killed, 
181,  267. 


[  298  ] 


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